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Abstract:
Electricity generation, transmission and distribution, and load are all impacted by weather patterns. Electric system
assets have been designed for historic weather conditions, with the goal of ensuring reliability and quick recovery
following extreme events. However, climate change is causing major shifts in historic weather patterns and more
frequent and severe extremes, which are creating new risk profiles for the electric system. Proactive climate resilience planning by electric utilities to identify, respond, and rationally allocate these climate risks is thus increasingly
salient. This paper argues that it is also legally required.
Recently published industry studies demonstrate that accurate, specific, and actionable climate resilience planning
is possible. Nevertheless, and despite the significant benefits of climate resilience planning, relatively few electric
utilities have engaged in the process. This paper explores two legal doctrines, public utility law and tort law, which
we argue obligate electric utilities to plan for the impacts of climate change on their assets and operations. Public
utility law requires electric utilities to meet, among other things, prudent investment and reliability standards. Tort
law establishes a duty of care that obligates electric utilities to, among other things, avoid foreseeable harm when
performing acts that could injure others. We argue that, as climate science becomes more precise and predictive,
these legal standards take on new meaning and require electric utilities to engage in climate resilience planning.
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PART 1:

Introduction

The electric system is significantly affected by weather
conditions. High temperatures increase demand for
electricity, while simultaneously reducing the operating efficiency of thermoelectric generating facilities
and the carrying capacity of transmission and distribution lines.1 Droughts can force the curtailment or shutdown of hydroelectric and other water-dependent
generation, as can storms and flooding, which can also
damage or destroy transmission and distribution infrastructure. 2 Seeking to reduce these and other risks,
electric system operators have designed their infrastructure in the context of historic weather patterns,
with the goal of ensuring reliability and quick recovery
following extreme weather events. However, with climate change now causing major shifts in historic
weather patterns and more frequent and severe
extremes, electric system operators must fundamentally rethink their approach.
The Fourth National Climate Assessment, published in
2018, concluded that “[a]nnual average temperature
over the contiguous United States has increased by
1.2ºF (0.7ºC) over the last few decades and by 1.8ºF
(1ºC) relative to the beginning of the last century.”3 This
temperature increase has led to more frequent and
intense heat waves, droughts, storms, and other
extremes, as well as environmental changes such as
sea level rise, all of which are negatively affecting the
electric system.

1
2

3
4

5
6
7
8
9

The number and severity of weather-related electricity outages have increased in recent years as system
operators grapple with multiple compounding climate
impacts. 4 One example occurred in Washington state
in summer 2015, when higher than average temperatures led to a spike in demand at the same time as a
wildfire forced the shutdown of a transmission line,
which in turn necessitated the curtailment of output
from a hydroelectric generating facility. 5 This led to a
twenty-percent shortfall in electricity supply, which
cost the local utility—Seattle City Light—approximately $100,000 per day to replace. 6 More recently,
what may be the hottest terrestrial temperature ever
reliably recorded in California, along with severe wildfires, contributed to a grid operator forced blackout in
August 2020.7
As these experiences demonstrate, the consequences
of climate change already present a significant physical risk to electricity infrastructure, with that risk
expected to increase in coming years as climate
change worsens. 8 The Chief Executive Officer of
investment giant BlackRock, Larry Fink, recently
observed that climate risk is “driving a profound reassessment of risk and asset values.” 9 The U.S.
Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s report,
Managing Climate Risk in the U.S. Financial System,
similarly found that “awareness is growing across
infrastructure sectors, including energy . . . that physi-

See generally Craig Zamuda et al., Energy Supply, Delivery, and Demand, in IMPACTS, RISKS, AND ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FOURTH NATIONAL
CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, VOLUME II 174, 193 (D.R. Reidmiller et al. eds., 2018), https://perma.cc/P9QM-YJHF.
Id.; see also Michelle T. H. van Vliet et al., Vulnerability of US and European Electricity Supply to Climate Change, 2 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 676 (2012),
https://perma.cc/K2VZ-DJDJ (finding that, due to climate change-induced drought and heat, the capacity of fossil fuel and nuclear power plants in the
U.S. will decline by 4.4 to 15 percent between 2031 and 2060).
Katherine Hayhoe et al., Our Changing Climate, in IMPACTS, RISKS, AND ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT,
VOLUME II 72, 74 (D.R. Reidmiller et al., eds., 2018), https://perma.cc/R8PT-9YB2 https://perma.cc/HB9P-F8EL.
ALYSON KENWARD & UROOJ RAJA, BLACKOUT: EXTREME WEATHER, CLIMATE CHANGE AND POWER OUTAGES 10-11 (2014), https://perma.cc/FPF2-55AK;
Alex Gilbert & Morgan Bazilian, California Power Outages Underscore Challenge of Maintaining Reliability During Climate Change, the Energy Transition, UTIL.
DIVE (Aug. 19, 2020), https://perma.cc/J7LB-8H2W.
CRYSTAL RAYMOND, SEATTLE CITY LIGHT CLIMATE CHANGE VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT AND ADAPTATION PLAN 17 (2015),
https://perma.cc/LYQ6-ZT3L [hereinafter SCL CLIMATE VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT].
Written Testimony of Dr. Lynn Best, Chief Environmental Officer, Seattle City Light, to Field Hearing of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
Subcommittee on Energy on the Department of Energy’s Functions and Capabilities to Respond to Emergencies (Aug. 15, 2016), https://perma.cc/6X57-7R9U.
Kavya Balaraman, California Regulators Plan Post-Mortem to Examine Cause of Rolling Blackouts, UTIL. DIVE (Aug. 21, 2020), https://perma.cc/L5RU-7FJP.
Zamuda et al., supra note 1, at 193; see also U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE U.S. ENERGY SECTOR: REGIONAL VULNERABILITIES AND
RESILIENCE SOLUTIONS 189 (2015), https://perma.cc/K9FZ-V7J5.
Larry Fink, A Fundamental Reshaping of Finance, BLACKROCK (Jan. 14, 2020), https://perma.cc/RCG7-EC73.
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INTRODUCTION

cal risks do not just impact particular sites and locations, but also shorten the lifecycle of infrastructure
and degrade its operational reliability.” 10
A number of electric utilities have acknowledged climate risk in general terms in their corporate filings with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and
other documents.11 Most electric utilities are, however,
yet to integrate climate considerations into system
planning, design, operation, and other decisions.12
Indeed, only a handful of electric utilities have conducted a comprehensive assessment of where and
under what conditions their systems are vulnerable to
the impacts of climate change, and fewer still have
identified and implemented measures to reduce those
vulnerabilities. (Consistent with industry parlance, in
this paper, we refer to the process of assessing vulnerabilities and developing remedial measures as “climate
resilience planning”).
This paper argues that electric utilities are legally obligated to plan for climate risks to protect already made
investments and proactively improve future investment
decisions. We identify two separate legal bases for such
an obligation, though others almost certainly exist. The
first is found in state public utility law, which requires
electric utilities to provide customers with continuous,
reliable service at just and reasonable rates—something
that will not be possible unless electric utilities plan for
future climate impacts. The second arises from tort law

10
11

12

2

principles, under which electric utilities may be held liable for negligence if they breach an owed duty of care,
which we argue here extends to failure to plan for reasonably foreseeable climate impacts.
This paper explores how public utility law and tort law
can be used to drive climate resilience planning by
electric utilities. We consider the feasibility of each
approach and discuss relevant legal considerations,
doctrines, and precedents. This paper should not be
read, however, to endorse a particular litigation strategy or offer recommendations as to when, where, or
how a particular approach should be pursued. The
remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Part 2
defines climate resilience planning and details its use
in the electric utility sector. Part 3 explores opportunities to advance climate resilience planning through
state utility commission proceedings. It identifies key
statutory and common law requirements imposed by
public utility law that authorize, and in some cases
even compel, state utility commissions to mandate climate resilience planning by electric utilities. Part 4
considers whether and when electric utilities that fail
to engage in climate resilience planning can be held
liable under tort law in state court. Part 5 considers the
interplay between the two primary forums identified in
Parts 3 and 4, analyzing legal considerations centered
upon choice of forum, including doctrines of primary
jurisdiction and exhaustion, and related evidentiary
issues. Part 6 concludes.

U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N CLIMATE-RELATED MARKET RISK SUBCOMM., MANAGING CLIMATE RISK IN THE U.S. FINANCIAL SYSTEM 14
(2020), https://perma.cc/UT9M-FG2Y [hereinafter CFTC REPORT].
E.g., NextEra Energy, Inc. & Florida Power & Light Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 25 (Feb. 15, 2019) (indicating that “severe weather and natural disasters . . . can
be disruptive and cause power outages and property damage . . . . [The company’s] physical plants could be placed at greater risk of damage should changes in
the global climate produce unusual variations in temperature and weather patterns, resulting in more intense, frequent and extreme weather events, abnormal
levels of precipitation and . . . a change in sea level”); Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 36 (Feb. 20, 2020) (noting that
“[c]limate change could affect customer demand for the Companies’ energy services. It might also cause physical damage to the Company’s facilities and
destruction of their operations due to more frequent and more extreme weather-related events”).
See infra Part 2.3.
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PART 2:

Climate Resilience Planning in
the Electric Utility Sector
Electric utilities face differing climate risks, partly
because of regional differences in the nature and
extent of climate-induced weather and environmental
changes, and also partly because of differences in
electric utility systems and assets. All electric utilities
will, however, be affected by climate change in some
way.13 Across all regions, electric utilities will be faced
with higher average and extreme temperatures, changing precipitation patterns, and more intense storms
that could force the curtailment or shutdown of generating facilities and lead to widespread transmission
and distribution outages.14
The U.S. Department of Energy (“DOE”) and various
other government bodies and private-sector entities
(e.g., Moody’s) have recommended that electric utilities
engage in climate resilience planning to identify vulnerabilities within their systems and develop management
options.15 This Part describes the basic steps involved in
climate resilience planning and the data required. We
also explain how climate resilience planning differs from
traditional electric utility planning processes and the
benefits it provides. Finally, we survey recent electric
utility climate resilience planning efforts and assess
their adequacy. Based on that analysis, we conclude
that climate risks to electric utility infrastructure can be

13
14

15

16

17
18

19

identified and incorporated into decision-making using
well-established, proven planning processes. We
observe instances where those processes have been
effectively employed by electric utilities, but additionally find that the sector generally has often failed to
engage in climate resilience planning despite its feasibility and usefulness. That failure has major implications
for electric utility customers, who are more likely to
experience climate-induced service disruptions due to
the utility’s failure to prepare and will ultimately bear
the costs of recovery, which may be significantly higher
than the costs of prevention.16 Climate-induced electricity service disruptions can also have broader social consequences. For example, where electricity outages
affect critical facilities, such as hospitals or water treatment plants, public health and safety may be threatened.17 Similar threats may also arise due to
environmental accidents or other problems triggered
by outages. One example occurred during Hurricane
Harvey in Texas in 2017, when an electricity outage at an
industrial facility led to the release of toxic chemicals
into the air.18 More recently, the 2020 blackouts in
California, triggered by extreme heat, caused pumps at
a wastewater treatment plant to fail, resulting in raw
sewage being discharged into nearby waters.19

Zamuda et al., supra note 1, at 178.
Id. at 179-83. Numerous other reports have explored how the impacts of climate change will affect different parts of the electric system in different areas.
See, e.g., JAYANT SATHAYE ET AL., ESTIMATING RISK TO CALIFORNIA ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE FROM PROJECTED CLIMATE CHANGE 9-50 (2011),
https://perma.cc/EX2M-8828; PETER CAMPBELL JOHNSTON ET AL., CLIMATE RISK AND ADAPTATION IN THE ELECTRIC POWER SECTOR (2012),
https://perma.cc/XC2Q-YVHK; U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 8; Ariel Miara et al., Climate and Water Resource Change Impacts and Adaptation Potential for
US Power Supply, 7 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 793 (2017), https://perma.cc/AA5T-TUEL; MOLLY HELLMUTH ET AL., ADDRESSING CLIMATE VULNERABILITY
FOR POWER SYSTEM RESILIENCE AND ENERGY SECURITY: A FOCUS ON HYDROPOWER RESOURCES (2017), https://perma.cc/9AJU-VEDC; JUSTIN
GUNDLACH & ROMANY WEBB, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON THE BULK POWER SYSTEM: ASSESSING VULNERABILITIES AND PLANNING FOR RESILIENCE
4-13 (2018), https://perma.cc/353Y-RSGB; ANNA M. BROCKWAY & LAUREL N. DUNN, WEATHERING ADAPTATION: GRID INFRASTRUCTURE PLANNING IN A
CHANGING CLIMATE 5-13 (2019), https://perma.cc/LH5J-DZME.
See generally U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR: GUIDE FOR CLIMATE CHANGE RESILIENCE PLANNING 1-2 (2016),
https://perma.cc/6B6Q-EH7P [hereinafter 2016 DOE PLANNING GUIDE]; KRISTIN RALFF-DOUGLAS, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, CLIMATE ADAPTATION IN
THE ELECTRIC SECTOR: VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS & RESILIENCE PLANS 5 (2016), https://perma.cc/R6NW-F6GV [hereinafter 2016 CPUC REPORT];
McKinsey & Co., Confronting Climate Risk, MCKINSEY QUARTERLY (May 15, 2020), https://perma.cc/T5AR-M2AW; Research Announcement, Moody’s Investors
Service, Moody’s U.S. Regulated Electric Utilities Face Varied Exposure to Climate Hazards (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.moodys.com/research/
Moodys-US-regulated-electric-utilities-face-varied-exposure-to-climate--PBC_1210434.
SCL CLIMATE VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT, supra note 5, at 1 (noting that “[i]t will be easier and more cost-effective to consider the impacts of climate change
in the planning and design of new infrastructure and power resources now than it will be to retrofit infrastructure or replace resources once the impacts of climate
change intensity”).
See generally Justin Gundlach, Microgrids and Resilience to Climate-Driven Impacts on Public Health, 18 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 77 (2018),
https://perma.cc/4DCT-4W3W.
Steven Mufson, Harvey Causes Chemical Companies to Release 1 Million Pounds of Extra Air Pollutants, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE (Sept. 4, 2017),
https://perma.cc/MR7F-BBX4; Lisa Song et al., Independent Monitors Found Benzene Levels After Harvey Six Times Higher Than Guidelines, PROPUBLICA
(Sept. 14, 2017), https://perma.cc/9YMF-2PVJ.
J.D. Morris, 50,000 Gallons of Sewage Spill into Oakland-Alameda Waters After Power Failure, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON. (Aug. 16, 2020),
https://perma.cc/SBE4-MK2C.
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2.1 The Basics of Climate Resilience Planning
In the electric utility sector, climate resilience planning
is generally conceived of as a two-stage process,
involving the development of (1) climate vulnerability
assessments and (2) climate resilience plans. 20 Broadly,
climate vulnerability assessments identify where and
under what conditions electric utility assets are at risk
from the impacts of climate change, how those risks
will manifest, and what the consequences will be for
system operation. 21 Based on that information, electric
utilities can then develop climate resilience plans, outlining measures to reduce the risk to vulnerable
assets. 22 Such efforts can take a number of forms, but
generally involve both measures to prevent or minimize damage to vulnerable assets (e.g., investments in

asset hardening23 or relocation) and to manage the
consequences of such damage when it occurs (e.g.,
investments in system recoverability). 24 In developing
climate resilience plans, electric utilities compare the
costs and impacts of different measures and, based on
that information and the risk profile of each asset,
determine whether, when, and how to invest. 25
Previous reports published by DOE and others have
outlined recommended best practices for climate resilience planning in the electric utility sector. 26 Those
reports generally recommend that electric utilities take
a long-range, 50-plus year view and plan for the
impacts of climate change over the anticipated useful
life of existing assets and new assets under development. 27 Electric utilities should not necessarily limit

Box 1: Guarding Against Maladaptation in Resilience Planning
Maladaptive measures address the symptom of a particular risk while also exacerbating its underlying cause. As
the World Bank has noted, in the climate context, maladaptation involves “actions . . . that (unintentionally) constrain the options or ability of other decision makers now or in the future to manage the impacts of climate
change, thereby resulting in an increase in exposure and/or vulnerability to climate change.”28 Maladaptation also
“describes the extent to which adaptation fails or has been conducted in an unsustainable manner.”29 Guarding
against maladaptation requires climate resilience planning and investment processes to be designed in a manner
that acknowledges the critical importance of reducing greenhouse gas emissions to reduce climate risk. 30
In the context of electric utility climate resilience planning, measures to gird against coming climate consequences
should be evaluated and implemented in a manner consistent with emission reduction strategies. Thus, for example, electric utilities should consider investments to support distributed renewable energy resource deployment
instead of hardening fossil fuel infrastructure. While this paper focuses on the need to assess climate risk and
implement climate resilience planning, electric utilities must also make the transition to clean energy a fundamental priority of their resilience efforts.

20
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2016 DOE PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 15, at 1.
Id. at iii.
Id.
Hardening measures include adding barriers to protect equipment vulnerable to flooding, adding or improving cooling systems to protect equipment vulnerable
to high heat, and reinforcing assets vulnerable to wind damage. See generally Zamuda et al., supra note 1, at 188-89.
While various steps can be taken to lessen the risks posed by climate change, it would be cost prohibitive, and is likely unnecessary to, design a system that is
completely immune from climate impacts. See 2016 CPUC REPORT, supra note 15, at 22.
See, e.g., 2016 DOE PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 15; U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR: GUIDE FOR ASSESSING
VULNERABILITIES AND DEVELOPING RESILIENCE SOLUTIONS TO SEA LEVEL RISE (2016), https://perma.cc/AAA7-P448; ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK,
GUIDELINES FOR CLIMATE PROOFING INVESTMENT IN THE ENERGY SECTOR (2013), https://perma.cc/ZRD2-M7EG; 2016 CPUC REPORT, supra note 15;
MELISSA ALLEN ET AL., OAK RIDGE NAT’L LAB., ASSESSING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF RESILIENCE INVESTMENTS: TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
CASE STUDY (2017), https://perma.cc/N6S9-LGX7; GUNDLACH & WEBB, supra note 14.
2016 DOE PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 15, at 44, 80, 83.
Id. at 22-26.
JANE EBINGER & WALTER VERGARA, WORLD BANK, CLIMATE IMPACTS ON ENERGY SYSTEMS: KEY ISSUES FOR ENERGY SECTOR ADAPTATION 90 (2011),
https://perma.cc/3WVZ-MPJC. Maladaptation could, for example, occur where electric utilities invest in elevating or hardening infrastructure against sea level
rise in areas where “retreat” is more appropriate. See generally Beatriz Azevedo de Almeida & Ali Mostafavi, Resilience of Infrastructure Systems to Sea-Level Rise
in Coastal Areas: Impacts, Adaptation Measures, and Implementation Challenges, 8 SUSTAINABILITY 1115 (2016), https://perma.cc/FNW3-7WBS (finding that
“[e]levating vulnerable systems is the most effective adaptation measure to reduce the risk of failure of the electric system. Although being the most effective
methods, elevation of energy equipment could not be the most cost-effective approach”).
Orr Karassin, Mind the Gap: Knowledge and Need in Regulating Adaptation to Climate Change, 22 GEO. INT’L ENV’T L. REV. 383, 389 n.31 (2010).
EBINGER & VERGARA, supra note 26, at xxx. Notably reducing greenhouse gas emissions continues to be the best approach to preventing future damage.
Alice Hill & Leonardo Martinez-Diaz, Adapt or Perish: Preparing for the Inescapable Effects of Climate Change, FOREIGN AFFS. (Jan./Feb. 2020),
https://perma.cc/CG49-38DJ. For a discussion of how mitigation efforts should be informed by adaptation benefits, see Lesley K. McAllister, Adaptive
Mitigation in the Electric Power Sector, 2011 B.Y.U. L. REV. 2115 (2011), https://perma.cc/Q6CZ-X6K6.
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their review solely to assets they own or operate, particularly where their ability to deliver reliable electricity
services depends on facilities owned or operated by
third-parties. One critical groups of assets that may fall
outside electric utilities’ direct control but should nevertheless be considered is generation. In this regard,
the California Public Utilities Commission (“CPUC”) has
noted that in states with deregulated electricity markets, “utilities no longer own all the generation assets
and rely on independent power producers and merchant generators for a significant amount of power.
These assets should be considered part of any evaluation of vulnerabilities in the same way the [utilities]
assess their own assets.”31

Electric utilities should consider the full range of climate impacts expected to occur within their respective
service territories during the planning period. This necessarily requires the use of forward-looking projections
because, in the age of climate change, historic data is
no longer a good predictor of future conditions. 32 Since
the impacts of climate change will vary regionally, electric utilities should use localized or downscaled projections, which reflect anticipated conditions in the
planning area (see Box 2). 33 Based on those projections
electric utilities can evaluate how different climate outcomes may affect their systems and identify key vulnerabilities that may need to be addressed. 34 Electric
utilities will often benefit from engaging outside con-

Box 2: Projecting Climate Impacts
The extent of future climate change will depend largely on the amount of future greenhouse gas emissions. 35
Global climate models (GCMs), which mathematically simulate key aspects of the Earth’s climate, are used to project likely outcomes based on different emissions scenarios. 36 While the spatial resolution of GCMs has increased
over time, most still use grid cells that extend sixty miles or more on one side, resulting in coarse-resolution projections that are ill suited for use in climate resilience planning. 37 Downscaling techniques can, however, be used
to process and refine GCM projections to estimate climate impacts at finer geographic scales that are more useful
for climate resilience planning. 38
The availability of downscaled data has increased significantly in recent years. 39 It can now be found in various
publicly available tools and reports developed by government, academic, and other independent bodies.40 One
example is the web-based Cal-Adapt tool which was developed by researchers at the University of California,
Berkeley with funding from the California Energy Commission and California Strategic Growth Council.41 The
tool includes projections for key climate variables, such as temperature and precipitation, at 3.5 square mile
increments.42 Other sources include even more granular data, with spatial scales below 2.5 miles, and even as
fine as 0.6 miles.43

31
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39
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Id.
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, A REVIEW OF CLIMATE CHANGE VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS: CURRENT PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM DOE’S
PARTNERSHIP FOR ENERGY SECTOR CLIMATE RESILIENCE 12 (2016), https://perma.cc/5EKK-T9GA [hereinafter 2016 DOE PARTNERSHIP REPORT].
2016 DOE PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 15, at 17; 2016 CPUC REPORT, supra note 15, at 9.
The assessment of impacts builds on, but is distinct from, the assessment of future climate conditions. The latter focuses on how key climate variables (e.g.,
temperature, precipitation, etc.) are likely to change in the future and the associated shifts in environmental conditions (e.g., sea level rise). That involves a
different analysis from the assessment of how future climate and environmental conditions will impact electric assets and systems.
Hayhoe et al., Climate Models, Scenarios, and Projections, in CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL REPORT: FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, VOLUME I 133,
134 (D.J. Wuebbles et al., eds., 2017), https://perma.cc/HB9P-F8EL.
Id. at 141.
CONSOLIDATED EDISON, CLIMATE CHANGE VULNERABILITY STUDY (2019), https://perma.cc/GR37-6UJT. The spatial resolution of GCMs is improving.
The latest, experimental models can project key climate parameters (e.g., temperature and precipitation) in 15 to 30 mile increments. Even this may, however,
be too coarse for use in climate resilience planning. See Hayhoe et al., supra note 35, at 141.
Hayhoe et al., supra note 35, at 141. For a discussion of downscaling techniques, see id. 144-46; SYLWIA TRZASKA & EMILIE SCHNARR, CENTER FOR
INTERNATIONAL EARTH SCIENCE INFORMATION NETWORK, A REVIEW OF DOWNSCALING METHODS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE PROJECTIONS (2014),
https://perma.cc/YC8V-46B2.
Joseph J. Barsugli et al., The Practitioners Dilemma: How to Assess the Credibility of Downscaled Climate Projections, 94 EOS 424, 424 (2013),
https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/2013EO460005.
See, e.g., U.S. Climate Resilience Toolkit, Energy Data Gallery, https://toolkit.climate.gov/topics/energy/energy-data-gallery (last updated Sept. 24, 2019);
Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., NASA Earth Exchange (NEX) Downscaled Climate Projections (NEX-DCP30),
https://www.nccs.nasa.gov/services/data-collections/land-based-products/nex-dcp30 (last visited July 10, 2020); U.S. Geological Survey, Regional Climate
Change Viewer, http://regclim.coas.oregonstate.edu/visualization/rccv/index.html (last visited July 10, 2020); Bureau of Reclamation et al., Downscaled CMIP3
and CMIP5 Climate and Hydrology Projections, https://gdo-dcp.ucllnl.org/downscaled_cmip_projections/#Welcome (last visited July 10, 2020); Conservation
Biology Inst., Adapt West–A Climate Adaptation Conservation Planning Database for North America, https://adaptwest.databasin.org/ (last visited July 10, 2020).
Cal-Adapt, https://cal-adapt.org/ (last visited July 10, 2020). For more information about Cal-Adapt, see Susan Wilhelm, Cal. Energy Comm’n, Presentation at
IEPR Workshop on Adaptation and Resilience for the Energy System: Unveiling Cal-Adapt 2.0: Facilitating Energy Sector Resilience and Providing Foundational
Scenarios for California’s Fourth Climate Change Assessment (Aug. 29, 2017), https://perma.cc/27TJ-H2J7.
Cal-Adapt, Climate Tools, https://cal-adapt.org/tools/ (last visited July 10, 2020).
Hayhoe et al., supra note 35, at 144.
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sultants or partnering with academic researchers who
can assist in developing and/or interpreting downscaled climate projections and work with the utility’s
in-house engineering team to evaluate system impacts.
Given the uncertainty regarding future emission levels
and associated climate impacts, it is often recommended that electric utilities adopt a “bounded parameters” approach, comparing asset vulnerabilities and
resilience solutions under best- and worst-case scenarios.44 That approach can, however, be difficult to implement because projected outcomes often differ widely
between scenarios.45 For example, a 2014 DOE study of
climate risks to energy infrastructure found that, by the
2070s (i.e., within the useful life of some assets deployed
this decade),46 New York City could experience anywhere from one to four feet of sea level rise.47 Planning
for such a wide range of possible outcomes presents
significant challenges for electric utilities, including
because relatively low probability outcomes could have
catastrophic impacts. Consider, for instance, how existing assets would be affected under the different sea
level rise scenarios in the DOE study. With one foot of
sea level rise, only one large existing electric system
asset48 would be inundated, whereas nine would be
inundated at the high end.49 Should electric utilities
invest in measures to protect all nine potentially affected
assets or only a subset? Should electric utilities design
new assets to withstand a full four feet of sea level rise
or only a smaller amount? Should electric utilities delay
making these decisions until greater certainty exists?
Electric utilities’ answers to these and similar questions
will necessarily depend on their own risk tolerances—i.e.,
the level of risk they are willing to accept—and those of
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their customers, regulators, and other stakeholders.
Where risk tolerances differ, conflicts could arise. It is
important to recognize that, while the appropriate risk
tolerance may be debated, all electric systems present
some risk as service disruptions and outages can never
be completely eliminated. 50
One tool that may aid electric utilities and other stakeholders in evaluating risk is probabilistic modeling.
Broadly, probabilistic climate projections incorporate
probability distributions for each climate parameter,
and thus provide an indication of the likelihood of different climate outcomes. 51 As such, probabilistic projections enable electric utilities to make a more informed
assessment of where and how individual assets will be
impacted, and the most appropriate resilience investments. 52 Recognizing these benefits, DOE has supported research to develop downscaled, probabilistic
climate projections. 53 Such projections are now publicly
available for key climate parameters (e.g., temperature
and precipitation) in many areas, 54 but custom modeling may be required in some cases. 55 Recent advances
in modeling techniques have made it easier for electric
utilities and others to obtain customized projections,
incorporating detail at spatial and temporal scales that
align with those used in the planning process.
After securing the necessary data, electric utilities can
evaluate the risk to their assets by comparing anticipated future climate and environmental conditions to
existing asset characteristics (e.g., location) and design
and operating parameters.56 Electric utilities should
assign a risk profile to each asset, based on the likelihood
and consequences of it being impacted, and use that
to prioritize vulnerabilities and resilience measures.57

See, e.g., 2016 DOE PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 15, at 19.
2016 CPUC REPORT, supra note 15, at 8-9.
Many electric system assets have useful lives of 50 years or more. See Zamuda et al., supra note 1, at 192.
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, EFFECT OF SEA LEVEL RISE ON ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE IN FOUR MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREAS 15 (2014),
https://perma.cc/D66N-633K.
The DOE study defined large assets to mean power plants of 100 megawatt capacity or greater and substations of 230 kilovolts or greater. See id. at 16.
Id. at 17-18.
See generally Romany Webb, Ensuring Electricity System Resilience in the Face of Climate Change: Report of a Workshop Co-Hosted by the Sabin Center for
Climate Change Law, CLIMATE L. BLOG (Apr. 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/J7HF-9FCU.
2016 DOE PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 15, at 19; see also A. Barrie Pittock et al., Probabilities Will Help Us Plan for Climate Change, 413 NATURE 249 (2001),
https://perma.cc/8TBG-PCQ7 (arguing that “probability estimates are needed” for effective planning and that, without them, “planners will be left needing to . . .
hedge their bets, delay their decisions, or else gamble on whether humanity will go down high or low emissions development pathways as they adapt design
standards and zoning to climate change”).
2016 DOE PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 15, at 19.
Id. DOE has partnered with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to make available
climate data specifically tailored for use in electric resilience planning. See generally U.S. Climate Resilience Toolkit, Energy Data Gallery,
https://toolkit.climate.gov/topics/energy/energy-data-gallery (last updated Sept. 24, 2019).
See, e.g., Liang Ning et al., Probabilistic Projections of Climate Change for the Mid-Atlantic Region of the United States: Validation of Precipitation
Downscaling during the Historical Era, 25 J. CLIMATE 509 (2012), https://perma.cc/SGL8-9L9B; David W. Pierce et al., Probabilistic Estimates of Future
Changes in California Temperature and Precipitation Using Statistical and Dynamical Downscaling, 40 CLIMATE DYNAMICS 839 (2013),
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s00382-012-1337-9.pdf.
2016 DOE PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 15, at 19.
See id. at 31-35.
Id. at 54-59.
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A range of measures, with varying risk mitigation potential, may be available for each vulnerability. 58 In developing their resilience plans, electric utilities must
compare the available measures to determine whether
and when to invest. 59 In other contexts, electric utilities
typically base their investment decisions on cost-benefit analysis (“CBA”), but this can be difficult to apply to
resilience projects, including because key benefits are
unknown or difficult to quantify.60 Additional evaluation
tools may, therefore, be needed (see Box 3).

It is often recommended that, after evaluating possible
resilience measures, electric utilities develop “flexible
resilience pathways” to guide their implementation. The
flexible pathways approach is intended to assist electric
utilities to manage the uncertainties inherent in climate
change.61 Under this approach, electric utilities are
encouraged to implement no- and low-regrets resilience
measures immediately, and establish thresholds or “trigger points” for the taking of other actions.62 The thresholds are based on pre-determined risk levels that, if left

Box 3: Tools for Evaluating Resilience Measures
CBA is widely used, both within and outside the electric utility sector, to assess the financial viability of projects
that have large upfront costs but deliver benefits over many years. The process is conceptually simple—a project’s
benefits and costs are expressed in monetary terms, discounted to present value, and then compared. Few issues
arise when costs and benefits are known and easily quantifiable. However, that is often not the case for climate
resilience measures, the benefits of which will depend (at least in part) on future climate outcomes, which are
uncertain. Any assumptions made will invariably affect the results of the CBA. Thus, when using CBA, electric
utilities should conduct sensitivity analysis to assess how changing the assumptions would affect the results.63
CBA also inevitably involves difficult decisions about which costs and benefits should be counted.64 In the electric
utility sector, the primary focus is typically on costs and benefits that accrue to the electric utility company and
its customers, with little or no attention paid to broader societal impacts.65 This can create difficulties when applying CBA to investments in climate resilience because, while the costs of such measures are imposed on electric
utility companies and their customers today, the benefits are often more widely dispersed (both geographically
and temporally).66
Given the above, electric utilities and the state utility commissions that regulate them should look at using
other tools to evaluate resilience measures. One option is breakeven analysis, which begins by estimating the
value to customers of avoiding electricity outages, 67 and then calculates how many outages would need to be
mitigated by a resilience measure in order for customers to realize sufficient value to justify investing in that
measure. 68 This can then be compared to the probability of future climate-related outages to assess the
expected benefits of investment.
Resilience measures can also be evaluated under the so-called “robust decision making” or “RDM” framework.
Under this approach, measures are assessed under a wide range of possible, future outcomes to determine which
will perform best in a range of circumstances.69

58
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For a discussion of potential resilience measures, see id. at 61-64.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 77-80; see also Craig Zamuda et al., Monetization Methods for Evaluating Investments in Electricity System Resilience to Extreme Weather and Climate
Change, 32 ELEC. J. 106641 (2019), https://perma.cc/V2QR-YUJ7.
See JUDSEN BRUZGUL ET AL., RISING SEAS AND ELECTRICITY INFRASTRUCTURE: POTENTIAL IMPACTS AND ADAPTATION OPTIONS FOR SAN DIEGO GAS
AND ELECTRIC (SDG&E) 18 (2018), https://perma.cc/C5BV-P2ZB.
Id. No regrets measures are ones that can be taken now, despite uncertainty about future climate change, and will deliver benefits regardless of future conditions.
Sensitive analysis shows the relative importance of different inputs into the CBA and thus can be used to determine how varying each input would alter the result.
See 2016 DOE PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 15, at 80.
See Zamuda et al., supra note 60, at 106641.
Id. at 106641, 106645.
Id. at 106642-44.
This is often referred to as the value of lost load (“VOLL”). Previous studies have estimated the VOLL for different classes of electric utility customers.
See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN, ESTIMATED VALUE OF SERVICE RELIABILITY FOR ELECTRIC UTILITY CUSTOMERS IN THE UNITED STATES (2009),
https://perma.cc/9HWV-JVV4; MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN, UPDATED VALUE OF SERVICE RELIABILITY ESTIMATES FOR ELECTRIC UTILITY CUSTOMERS
IN THE UNITED STATES (2015), https://perma.cc/7TMD-CS6S.
See generally William P. Zarakas et al., Utility Investments in Resiliency: Balancing Benefits with Costs in an Uncertain Environment, ELEC. J., June 2014, at 31,
https://perma.cc/3HGJ-6ARJ.
See generally Robert J. Lempert, Embedding (Some) Benefit-Cost Concepts into Decision Support Processes with Deep Uncertainty, 5 J. BENEFIT-COST
ANALYSIS 487 (2014).
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unaddressed, would result in severe impacts and potentially irreversible consequences.70 In assessing risk, electric utilities should consider not only the vulnerability of
individual assets to climate impacts, but also the asset’s
importance to system operation and reliability. Electric
utilities may be justified in incurring larger costs to
enhance the resilience of critical assets, the loss of which
could result in widespread or prolonged outages, or
pose serious risks to public health or the environment.

2.2 T
 he Importance of Climate
Resilience Planning
Climate resilience planning differs from, but complements, other planning processes commonly employed
by electric utilities. Consider, for example, the integrated resource plans (“IRPs”) that many utilities
develop to evaluate supply- and demand-side options
for meeting future electricity needs.71 While IRPs vary,
most employ a twenty-year planning horizon,72 which is
shorter than that recommended for climate resilience
planning.73 Moreover, whereas climate resilience planning relies on forward-looking projections,74 IRPs are
frequently based on historic data.75 The load forecasts
used in IRPs typically assume a continuation of historic
weather patterns and thus do not accurately account
for anticipated future temperature increases and other
climate impacts that could affect electricity demand.76
In evaluating options to meet demand, electric utilities
generally do not consider their relative vulnerability to
climate impacts, or possible resilience enhancements.77
Climate resilience planning addresses these vulnerabilities, providing additional information that can be used
to update load forecasts and compare resource
options, thus enabling electric utilities to make more
informed investment decisions.
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Climate resilience planning is also important to supplement the disaster or emergency response planning
currently undertaken by electric utilities. Broadly,
disaster or emergency response planning focuses on
electric utilities’ preparedness for one-off weather-related or other events (e.g., cyber-attacks), which could
lead to service interruptions or safety issues.78 Such
planning is typically based on historic data, reflecting
the incidence and severity of past events, and focuses
on short-term measures to prepare and respond.79
While that is certainly important, it is not sufficient to
address the risks posed by climate change, which
requires a broader future-focused approach. 80
Integrating climate considerations into current planning and investment decisions should benefit both
electric utilities and their customers. Identifying and
reducing climate-related threats to existing assets may
require material investments in hardening and relocation—projects that typically have long-lead times and
must therefore be planned now to avoid future reliability issues. 81 Advance planning can also improve investment decision-making, ensuring that electric utilities
act prudently and that their capital expenditures benefit ratepayers. Electric utilities must also plan for the
impacts of climate change on new assets, many of
which will remain in operation for several decades,
during which time climate impacts will become increasingly severe. 82 Considering those impacts now enables
electric utilities to build-in resilience, thereby lessening
the need for costly retrofits in the future, as well as the
potential for future outages. 83 Thus, while climate resilience planning may require up-front investments, it
should result in lifetime savings for electric utilities and
their customers, including in the form of avoided storm
damage and recovery costs.

Id.
As of May 2020, 36 states required electric utilities to file IRPs, or equivalent documents. See Coley Girouard, Understanding IRPs: How Utilities Plan for the
Future, ADVANCED ENERGY PERSPECTIVES (Aug. 11, 2015), https://perma.cc/V6DQ-MPG7.
Id.
As discussed in Part 2.1, supra, it is recommended that climate resilience planning take a longer-term view, and consider climate impacts over the expected useful
life of electric system assets, which can be fifty years or more.
See Part 2.1, supra.
See BROCKWAY & DUNN, supra note 14, at 21.
There are some exceptions. For example, the California Energy Commission publishes load forecasts which are developed based on historic weather data, but
then adjusted to account for anticipated future temperature increases. Other climate impacts are not, however, accounted for. See id.
Again, there are some exceptions. For example, Tennessee Valley Authority has previously considered resilience measures in its IRPs. See ALLEN ET AL., supra
note 29, at ix.
See generally AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, ALL-HAZARDS GUIDEBOOK (2018), https://perma.cc/5RMX-ZTGZ.
Id. at 15-17.
The same is also likely true of cyber-attacks. Technological and other advances mean that past experience with cyber-attacks may not be a good predictor of
future events.
Webb, supra note 50.
SCL CLIMATE VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT, supra note 5, at 1 (recognizing that “[d]ecisions are being made today that will shape the resources and
infrastructure of the utility for decades into the future when the impacts of climate change will intensify”).
Id. (concluding that “[i]t will be easier and more cost-effective to consider the impacts of climate change in the planning and design of new infrastructure and
power resources now than it will be to retrofit infrastructure or replace resources once the impacts of climate change intensify”).

Climate Risk in the Electricity Sector: Legal Obligations to Advance Climate Resilience Planning by Electric Utilities

PART 2: CLIMATE RESILIENCE PLANNING IN THE ELECTRIC UTILITY SECTOR

Box 4: The Consequences of Failing to Plan for Climate Impacts
Recent electricity outages in California provide a preview of what might become the “new normal” if climate considerations are not integrated into electric system planning. On August 14 and 15, 2020, the California Independent
System Operator (“CAISO”)—the entity that manages much of California’s electric grid—ordered electric utilities
in the state to initiate temporary rolling service cuts, due to a shortage of electricity supplies. 84 As a result, over
800,000 customers lost electricity, some for up to two hours. 85
A preliminary analysis of the incident, conducted by the CAISO, the CPUC, and the California Energy Commission,
concluded that a “[c]limate change-induced extreme heat storm across the western United States resulted in
demand for electricity exceeding the existing electricity resource planning targets.”86 The analysis further found that
existing resource planning processes do not adequately account for extreme heat and other climate-induced
changes.87 For example, the electricity demand forecasts used to develop resource adequacy requirements are
based on average historic peak demand, reflecting one-in-two-year conditions.88 A fifteen percent “planning
resource margin” is added to that amount to, among other things, account for demand spikes.89 However, even that
was not sufficient to account for the impact of the August 2020 heatwaves, which reflected what was considered
to be a one-in-thirty-five-year event. As climate change accelerates, such events will occur more frequently, and thus
must be factored into planning processes so as to minimize the risk of supply shortages and associated outages.

Failing to plan for the impacts of climate change could
also increase electric utilities’ costs in other ways. For
example, electric utilities that fail to design new infrastructure with climate impacts in mind may face higher
borrowing and insurance costs as concern grows
within the financial community about the impacts of
climate change on electric utility infrastructure and
business models. 90

2.3 Extent of Climate Resilience Planning in
the Electric Utility Sector
Despite the benefits of climate resilience planning, relatively few electric utilities have engaged in the process, with many citing the uncertainties inherent in
climate change and the challenges associated with
studying it as reasons not to act (see Box 5). Where
climate resilience planning has occurred, electric utilities have often been forced into action by particularly

84
85
86
87
88
89
90

91

92
93
94

severe extreme weather events, which have highlighted
vulnerabilities within their systems. For example, after
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita caused widespread damage to its transmission and distribution systems in
2005, Entergy Corporation instituted a program to
study climate risks and develop resilience measures.91
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. (“Con
Ed”) did the same following Superstorm Sandy in 2013.
As discussed further below, Con Ed’s “Climate Change
Vulnerability Study” (“Con Ed Climate Study”) was particularly comprehensive, using custom downscaled
projections to analyze five climate variables over seven
time periods from 2020 through 2080.92 In accordance
with recommended best practice, Con Ed took a probabilistic approach, under which it analyzed the likelihood and consequences of a range of plausible climate
outcomes.93 This enabled Con Ed to identify key vulnerabilities within its system and design flexible resilience pathways to manage those vulnerabilities.94

CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N & CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, PRELIMINARY ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS: MID-AUGUST 2020 HEAT STORM
2-3 (2020), https://perma.cc/2KV2-K76D.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 43-44.
Id. at 18.
Id.
See generally Juhyun Jong et al., CARBON RISK, CARBON RISK AWARENESS, AND THE COST OF DEBT FINANCING, 150 J. BUS. ETHICS 1151 (2018) (finding an
“economic[ally] meaningful” “positive association between cost of debt and carbon risk”). As discussed further below, electric utilities that fail to plan for climate
impacts also risk being denied cost recovery for their capital investments under the prudence standard. See infra Part 3.1.1.
Gloria Gonzalez, Entergy Seeks to Lead on Climate Risk Mitigation, GREENBIZ (Aug. 14, 2013), https://perma.cc/9E9N-RP4D. Entergy Corporation documented
the findings of its study in a series of reports. See ENTERGY CORPORATION ET AL., EFFECTIVELY ADDRESSING CLIMATE RISK THROUGH ADAPTATION FOR
THE ENERGY GULF COAST (2010), https://perma.cc/QS6S-WC9W; ENTERGY CORPORATION ET AL., BUILDING A RESILIENT ENERGY GULF COAST:
EXECUTIVE REPORT (Undated), https://perma.cc/9J47-FVFG.
See CONSOLIDATED EDISON, supra note 37.
Id. at 12-15.
Id. at 32-49, 57-61.
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Box 5: Why Have So Few Electric Utilities Engaged in Climate Resilience Planning?
Various explanations have been offered for electric utilities’ reluctance to engage in climate resilience planning.
The Fourth National Climate Assessment identified “[t]he inability to predict future climate parameters with complete accuracy” as a key factor discouraging climate resilience planning.95 While electric utilities regularly deal
with uncertainty in other contexts (e.g., when planning for projected changes in electricity load), climate change
is often perceived as involving greater unknowns. Many electric utilities appear to view climate resilience planning
as akin to an exercise in conjecture. For example, in May 2016, NextEra Energy—the parent company of Florida
Power and Light—opposed a shareholder proposal to require the electric utility to report annually on its vulnerability to sea level rise by saying: “a proposal that asks the company to speculate on a single aspect of global climate change nearly a century into the future would be a waste of time and money.”96
Other electric utilities have cited limited data availability as a hindrance to climate resilience planning. For example, some utilities participating in DOE’s Resilience Partnership complained of a “disconnect between the granularity of the outputs of climate modeling and the types of temperature [and other] projections utility planners
need.”97 Recent improvements in climate modeling and downscaling techniques have helped to mitigate this
problem (see Box 2). Still, however, electric utilities often have to engage consultants or other researchers to
develop localized climate data that meets their needs which can be costly.98 Even larger costs are associated with
measures to harden or otherwise enhance the resilience of electric utility assets.
This raises another set of questions for electric utilities considering engaging in climate resilience planning—will
they be permitted to recover the potentially significant costs incurred in the planning process? And, even more
important, will they be permitted to recover the much larger costs associated with implementing resilience measures that planning demonstrates are advisable? Due to electric utilities’ status as monopoly service providers,
and the essential nature of the service they provide, their rates are strictly regulated by state utility commissions.99
While regulation varies between states, the basic goal of all commissions is to ensure “just and reasonable” rates,
which enable electric utilities to recover no more than their prudently incurred costs, plus a reasonable return on
prudent investments.100 Many state utility commissions are yet to rule on whether, and if so when, electric utilities
will be permitted to recover the costs associated with climate resilience planning and investment. The resulting
uncertainty may have discouraged some electric utilities from engaging in the planning process.101 Seemingly confirming this, the Con Ed Climate Study was delayed for several years, in part due to uncertainty regarding whether
the New York Public Service Commission (“NYPSC”) would allow Con Ed to recover the associated costs. This may
be even more of a concern for electric utilities operating in states where the utility commission has not historically
acted on climate-related issues or there is political resistance to addressing or even discussing the issue.

The Con Ed Climate Study is widely regarded as the
gold standard for climate resilience planning in the
electric utility sector.102 The studies conducted by other
electric utilities have generally been more limited: often

focusing solely or primarily on event-based climate
impacts (e.g., storms or wildfires) and ignoring more
gradual changes (e.g., temperature and sea level rise);
considering climate impacts on only a subset of their

95
96

Zamuda et al., supra note 1, at 192.
Mary Ellen Klas, Shareholders of FPL’s Parent Company Reject Climate Change Report, MIAMI HERALD (May 19, 2016),
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/business/ceo-compensation/article78721212.html.
97 2016 DOE PARTNERSHIP REPORT, supra note 32, at 2; see also id. at 27 (noting that utilities participating in the Resilience Partnership “identified multiple data
that are necessary for effective resilience planning but currently unavailable,” such as “downscaled climate model data for projected changed in future climate,”
and that “[i]n general, Partners found the spatial and temporal resolution of current climate models lacking”); see generally CRAIG ZAMUDA ET AL., ELECTRIC
SECTOR RESILIENCE STRATEGIES: CURRENT PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED FOR EXTREME WEATHER 6, 24 (2019) (on file with authors).
98 Id. at 25.
99 See generally REGUL. ASSISTANCE PROJECT, ELECTRICITY REGULATION IN THE US: A GUIDE 3 (2011), https://perma.cc/V82A-7S2F.
100 Id. at 38.
101 See generally Heather N. Jarvis, Keeping the Lights on at All Costs? Imploring Consistent Prudence Review and a Prudence Standard that Includes Demand
Response and Responsible Portfolio Management, 29 VT. L. REV. 1037, 1040-41 (2005), https://perma.cc/U6MU-UFJF (concluding that electric utilities are often
reluctant to “take risks for fear of not being able to recapture expenditures” and citing, as an example, utilities’ avoiding investment in new generation assets
because of “regulatory uncertainty” arising from a “perceived . . . breakdown in the regulatory compact under which utilities had come to believe they were
entitled to recover full all of their utility investments” (internal citations omitted)).
102 Direct Testimony of James Van Nostrand and Tyler Fitch on Behalf of Vote Solar, In the Matter of Application of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC for Adjustment of
Rates and Charges Applicable to Electric Service in North Carolina, N.C.U.C. Docket No. E-7, Sub 1214, at 54-55 (Feb. 18, 2020), https://perma.cc/RLM6-Z4DA
[hereinafter Vote Solar DEC Testimony].
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assets, rather than the system as a whole; or assessing
asset vulnerabilities based only on historic weather
data or very limited climate projections (e.g., a single
“worst case” outcome).
These and other flaws were identified in several of the
climate vulnerability assessments prepared by electric utilities as part of DOE’s Partnership for Energy
Sector Climate Resilience (“Resilience Partnership”).
Established in April 2015 in response to industry
requests for additional guidance on climate resilience
planning, the Resilience Partnership was intended
to provide a forum for electric utilities to exchange
information and compare best practices.103 As part of
the Resilience Partnership, seventeen electric utilities,
serving approximately twenty-five percent of electricity customers in the U.S., conducted climate vulnerability assessments.104 Most also developed
resilience plans.105
DOE provided participating electric utilities with general guidance on planning, but “encouraged each [utility] to determine the approach, level of detail, and
specificity that was appropriate for their organization.” 106 As a result, the quality of electric utilities’ planning processes varied considerably, with some having
major shortcomings.107 For example:
• Three of the participating electric utilities
based their climate vulnerability assessments solely
on historic weather data and did not use forward-looking climate projections.108 As DOE recognized, “relying solely on historical data
puts a utility at risk of underestimating its
vulnerability to future climate change impacts.” 109

• Rather than consider the full range of climate
impacts expected to occur within their respective
service territories, most participating electric
utilities focused on one or a subset of impacts.110
Notably, nine utilities did not consider changes in
average and/or extreme temperatures that are
projected to occur in all regions, and at least four
coastal utilities did not consider sea level rise.111
Some vulnerabilities were, therefore, almost
certainly overlooked in the utilities’ assessments.
• Less than half of participating electric utilities
assessed climate vulnerabilities across all of
their “assets and operations.” 112 Several utilities
considered only a sub-set of assets, with many
focusing on a single asset type (e.g., substations).113
Again, this likely resulted in the utilities overlooking some vulnerabilities.
• While some participating electric utilities
conducted quantitative exposure assessments
to identify specific assets at risk from the studied
climate impact(s), several undertook only a
qualitative assessment, looking generally at
possible risks to the types of assets they own,
but not conducting an asset-by-asset review.114
This qualitative approach is unlikely to provide
sufficient detail to enable the development of
resilience plans.115
A small number of state utility commissions have
recently taken steps to promote more robust climate
resilience planning by electric utilities. Examples are
provided below.116

103 U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Partnership Description, OFFICE OF POLICY, https://perma.cc/7Z57-RLHH (last visited July 17, 2020).
104 The participating companies were: (1) Con Ed, (2) Dominion Virginia Power, (3) Entergy Corporation, (4) Exelon Corporation, (5) Great River Energy, (6) Hoosier
Energy, (7) Iberdola USA, (8) National Grid, (9) New York Power Authority, (10) Pacific Gas and Electric Company, (11) Public Service Enterprise Group, (12)
Sacramento Municipal Utility District, (13) San Diego Gas and Electric Company, (14) Seattle City Light, (15) Southern California Edison, (16) Tennessee Valley
Authority, and (17) Xcel Energy, Inc. 2016 DOE PARTNERSHIP REPORT, supra note 32, at 5-7.
105 At least fifteen companies developed resilience plans. See generally ZAMUDA ET AL., supra note 97, at 6.
106 2016 DOE PARTNERSHIP REPORT, supra note 32, at 4.
107 See generally id. (discussing the adequacy of electric utilities’ climate vulnerability assessments); ZAMUDA ET AL., supra note 97 (discussing the adequacy of
electric utilities’ resilience plans). The shortcomings in some electric utilities’ past climate vulnerability assessments and resilience plans highlight the need for
careful scrutiny thereof by state utility commissions.
108 2016 DOE PARTNERSHIP REPORT, supra note 32, at 12.
109 Id.
110 Three companies considered only one type of climate impact (i.e., either “flooding & precipitation changes” or “winter storms”), while two others considered
three or less. See id. at 5-7.
111 See id. at 5-7, 20.
112 Eight companies considered “all assets and operations,” four considered “assets” only, and five considered a “subset of assets.” Id. at 5-7.
113 Id. at 8.
114 Id. at 15.
115 Qualitative assessments do not, for example, enable utilities to determine the precise number of at-risk assets. See id.
116 Like the state utility commissions in California and New York, the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities has also taken some steps to support climate
resilience planning, but its efforts to date have been more limited. See Mass. Dep’t of Pub. Utils., Order Establishing Eversource’s Revenue Requirement, Docket
No. D.P.U. 17-05, at 411 (Nov. 30, 2017), https://perma.cc/3THR-ZKU7.
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2.3.1 California
In April 2015, then California Governor Jerry Brown
signed an executive order requiring, among other
things, an assessment of climate change vulnerabilities by economic sector.117 In response, in July 2015,
the CPUC and California Energy Commission established a working group to assist electric utilities to
conduct climate vulnerability assessments and
develop resilience plans.118 While California’s three
largest electric utilities—Pacific Gas and Electric
Company (“PG&E”), San Diego Gas and Electric
Company (“SDG&E”), and Southern California Edison
(“SCE”)—had already committed to doing so through
DOE’s Resilience Partnership, the CPUC and California
Energy Commission working group encouraged them
and other utilities to go beyond the requirements
of that program.119
In a January 2016 report, the CPUC indicated that
electric utilities “should create an iterative process” for
climate resilience planning, such that updated information is available “at least in advance of every general rate case to inform the investment process.” 120
PG&E, SDG&E, and SCE have since integrated climate
change considerations into the Risk Assessment
Mitigation Phase (“RAMP”) process they are required
to complete prior to each rate case.121 While that is an
important first step, the analysis in the utilities’ RAMP
reports is far from comprehensive.
The RAMP process was not designed specifically for
climate resilience planning, but rather as a more general tool, which electric and gas utilities can use to
assess a wide range of safety-related risks to their
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operations. In their first RAMP reports, PG&E, SDG&E,
and SCE all identified climate change as one of several
key sources of safety-related risk.122 The three utilities’
reports discussed, in general terms, how various climate impacts could affect their operations. PG&E’s
report examined six climate impacts in two different
time periods—i.e., 2022 and 2050—using two model
scenarios for each.123 This approach enabled PG&E to
identify a range of plausible future climate outcomes in
both the near- and long-term.124 Based on those outcomes PG&E estimated safety risks to its workforce
and the general public from climate change in terms of
additional injuries and deaths.125 PG&E concluded that,
in 2022, it could “experience safety consequences for
PG&E workforce and the public of an additional 25–129
injuries and 1-3 fatalities per year due to climate change
impacts, and in 2050, an additional 66–173 injuries and
2–5 fatalities.” 126 Both the 2022 and 2050 figures are
significantly lower than the actual number of deaths
caused by recent wildfires sparked by PG&E equipment and worsened by climate change. For example, in
2020, PG&E pleaded guilty to eighty-four counts of
involuntary manslaughter in connection with deaths
arising from the 2018 Camp Fire which ignited when a
PG&E owned and operated transmission line came into
contact with dry vegetation.127
The RAMP reports prepared by SDG&E and SCE were
more limited than that of PG&E, focusing on a smaller
number of near-term, event-based climate impacts.128
All three utilities concluded that further analysis is
required to determine the full extent of their climate
vulnerabilities, and develop resilience solutions. None
of the utilities had published such analysis at the time
of writing.

Cal. Exec. Order B-30-15 (Apr. 29, 2015), https://perma.cc/PH7Y-97MK.
CAL. NAT. RES. AGENCY, SAFEGUARDING CALIFORNIA: IMPLEMENTATION ACTION PLANS 88 (2016), https://perma.cc/LQE3-U4KU.
For example, the CPUC encouraged electric utilities to expand their vulnerability assessments to include a broader range of assets, among other things.
See 2016 CPUC REPORT, supra note 15, at 16-14.
Id. at 21.
Established in December 2014 in response to the enactment of state legislation declaring “safety” to be “the top priority” of the CPUC, the RAMP process is
intended to provide greater transparency on how electric and gas utilities assess and mitigate safety-related risks. To that end, prior to their three-yearly rate
case, each utility must file with the CPUC a RAMP report that identifies the key risks it faces and options for mitigating those risks. See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n,
Decision 14-12-025: Incorporating a Risk-Based Decision-Making Framework into the Rate Case Plan and Modifying Appendix A of Decision 07-07-004 (Dec. 9,
2014), https://perma.cc/3JQ5-4FB3.
See RISK ASSESSMENT AND MITIGATION PHASE REPORT OF SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY AND SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA GAS COMPANY
(Oct. 27, 2016), https://perma.cc/7LPQ-9TPZ [hereinafter SDG&E RAMP]; SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY’S 2018 RISK ASSESSMENT AND
MITIGATION PHASE REPORT (Nov. 15, 2018), https://perma.cc/Z6G6-FXQQ [hereinafter SCE RAMP]; ARTHUR O’DONNELL ET AL., CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N,
RISK AND SAFETY ASPECTS OF RISK ASSESSMENT AND MITIGATION PHASE REPORT OF PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC (Mar. 30, 2017),
https://perma.cc/TTD4-5KLE [hereinafter CPUC Review of PG&E RAMP].
PG&E analyzed risks associated with major storm events, sea level rise, subsidence, heat waves, wildfires, and drought in 2022 and 2050.
See CPUC Review of PG&E RAMP, supra note 122, at 144.
Id.
Id. at 145.
Id.
Ivan Penn & Peter Eavis, PG&E Pleads Guilty to 84 Counts of Manslaughter in Camp Fire Case, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2020), https://perma.cc/M9U4-8YY8.
SDG&E focused on increased temperatures and heat waves, increased wildfires, precipitation changes, and sea level rise and analyzed risks associated with a
potential “worst case scenario” involving “[e]xtreme winds in SDG&E’s Fire Threat Zone during a time of drought and elevated temperatures [that] cause a wire
down event leading to a wildfire.” See SDG&E RAMP, supra note 122, at 14-4 to 14-6. SCE examined risks associated with “99th percentile extreme heat events,
extreme rain events, and extreme wildfires in the near term (2018-2023).” See SCE RAMP, supra note 122, at 12-2.
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Seeking to advance climate resilience planning, in May
2018, the CPUC instituted proceedings to develop guidance for electric, gas, and other utilities “on how to
incorporate [climate] adaptation into their planning and
operations” (among other things).129 In August 2020,
the CPUC issued a decision requiring investor-owned
energy utilities to submit climate vulnerability assessments every four years as part of their rate case filings.130 The assessments must identify risks to the
utilities’ assets, operations, and services from changing
temperatures, sea level rise, variations in precipitation,
wildfire, and “cascading impacts / compounding incidents” over the next fifty years and options for dealing
with those risks.131 Each utility will be required to file its
assessment with the CPUC prior to its general rate case.
SCE will submit its first assessment in 2022, followed by
PG&E in 2024, and SDG&E in 2025.132

ages from major storms, as well as to improve responsiveness and expedite the recovery process.” 134 Con
Ed’s focus solely on storm hardening prompted criticism from several environmental and other groups,
who pushed for a broader approach that would account
for the full range of climate impacts.135
The Resiliency Collaborative provided a forum for
NYPSC staff, Con Ed, federal, state, and local government agencies, and a range of non-governmental organizations to work together on climate issues.136 The
participating groups reached a settlement requiring,
among other things, Con Ed to complete a climate vulnerability assessment in 2014.137 While Con Ed missed
that deadline,138 the completed assessment was published in the Con Ed Climate Study in December 2019,
and is the most robust climate resilience planning effort
undertaken by any electric utility to date.139

2.3.2 New York
In June 2013, as part of rate case proceedings for Con
Ed, the New York Public Service Commission (“NYPSC”)
convened a “Resiliency Collaborative” to explore issues
related to storm hardening and climate resilience.133
Those issues received special attention in the rate case,
largely because of New York’s experience with
Superstorm Sandy, which occurred less than three
months before Con Ed filed its rate case. In its filing,
Con Ed had requested approximately $1 billion for
“storm hardening structural improvements . . . that are
intended to reduce the size and scope of service out-

The Con Ed Climate Study analyzed projected change in
temperature, humidity, precipitation, sea level, and
extreme weather in Con Ed’s service territory over seven
time periods spanning from 2020 through 2080.140 Con
Ed engaged scientists at Columbia University’s LamontDoherty Earth Observatory and consultants at ICF
International, Inc., to develop downscaled climate projections for three sub-areas within its territory based
thirty-two GCMs.141 To account for uncertainty, the study
team used multiple projections assuming different
future greenhouse gas concentrations, as well as
“extreme event narratives” representing plausible worst-

129

See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Rulemaking 18-04-019: Order Instituting Rulemaking to Consider Strategies and Guidance for Climate Change Adaptation
(May 7, 2018), https://perma.cc/BL9Q-Y9AX.
130 Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Rulemaking 18-04-019: Decision on Energy Utility Climate Change Vulnerability Assessments and Climate Adaptation in Disadvantaged
Communities (Phase 1, Topics 4 and 5) (Aug. 27, 2020), https://perma.cc/2GKK-VCNP.
131 Id. at 4.
132 The filing dates are staggered to align with the utilities’ general rate cases. See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Climate Change Adaptation, ENERGY,
https://perma.cc/79FF-LJV6 (last visited Oct. 15, 2020).
133 N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Notice of Collaborative Meeting Concerning Storm Hardening and Resiliency Issues, Case 13-E-0030, et al. (July 1, 2013),
https://perma.cc/92Y3-6HJG.
134 Letter from Craig Ivey, President, Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., to Hon. Jeffrey C. Cohen, Acting Sec’y, N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 1 (Jan. 25, 2013)
(on file with authors).
135 See generally N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Approving Electric, Gas and Steam Rate Plans in Accord with Joint Proposal, Case 13-E-0030 et al., at 62
(Feb. 21, 2014), https://perma.cc/Y78W-GY8H [hereinafter NYPSC Rate Order]. Prior to the rate case proceedings, several environmental groups, led by the
then Columbia Center for Climate Change Law (now the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law), had filed a petition with the NYPSC, requesting that it require
all utility companies under its jurisdiction to engage in climate resilience planning. See Letter from Anne R. Siders, Assoc. Dir., Ctr. for Climate Change L., et al.,
to Hon. Jaclyn A. Brilling, Sec’y, N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n (Dec. 12, 2012), https://perma.cc/V43Z-9MX8.
136 Participants in the Resiliency Collaborative were: (1) NYDPS Staff, (2) Con Ed, (3) City of New York, (4) County of Westchester, (5) New York State Office of
Attorney General, (6) New York Department of Environmental Conservation, (7) Utility Intervention Unit, Division of Consumer Protection, Department of State,
(8) New York University School of Law Guarini Center on Environmental and Land Use Law, (9) Institute for Policy Integrity, (10) Public Utility Law Project of New
York, Inc., (11) New York Energy Consumers Council, Inc., (12) Consumer Power Advocates, (13) Utility Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, Local 1-2, (14) Energy
Initiative Group LLC, (15) Columbia University Center for Climate Change Law, (16) Environmental Defense Fund, (17) Pace Energy and Climate Center, and (18)
Natural Resources Defense Council. See NYPSC Rate Order, supra note 135, at 63. For a discussion of the collaborative process, see Eleanor Stein, Judging and
Mediating for the “Long Emergency”: Superstorm Sandy, New York State’s Regulatory Response to the Climate Change Crisis, and Reforming the Energy Vision, in
CRISIS LAWYERING: EFFECTIVE LEGAL ADVOCACY IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS 259 (Raymond Brescia & Eric Stern, eds.) (forthcoming 2020).
137 NYPSC Rate Order, supra note 135, at 71.
138 Gwynne Hogan, ‘They Dragged Their Feet’: Con Ed’s Plan for Heat Waves Is Years Behind Schedule, GOTHAMIST (July 24, 2019), https://perma.cc/KQG9-QFAE.
Commencement of the Con Ed Climate Study was delayed for several years in part because of uncertainty over whether the company would be permitted to
recover its costs from ratepayers.
139 CONSOLIDATED EDISON, supra note 37.
140 Id. at 18-19.
141 Id. at 17.
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case scenarios.142 The study team compared anticipated
climate conditions against existing asset design and
operating parameters to identify vulnerabilities within
Con Ed’s system and evaluated measures to address
those vulnerabilities (see Box 6).143 Based on that work,
and an assessment of broader electricity market trends,
Con Ed will develop a Climate Change Implementation
Plan identifying priority actions to be taken over the
next five, ten, and twenty years to improve the resilience
of its system to climate impacts.144 That plan is expected
to be published by the end of 2020.145
In approving the settlement that led to the Con Ed
Climate Study, the NYPSC encouraged other electric
utilities in New York to also engage in climate resilience
planning, stating:
The State’s utilities should familiarize themselves
with scientists’ projections for local climate change
impacts on each service territory. . . . We expect the
utilities to consult the most current data to evaluate
the climate impacts anticipated in their regions over
the next years and decades, and to integrate these
considerations into their system planning and construction forecasts and budgets.146
Following the decision in Con Ed’s rate case, the Sabin
Center for Climate Change Law intervened in rate case
proceedings involving two other New York-based utilities—Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation and
Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc. In both proceedings, a settlement was reached, under which each utility agreed to review the Con Ed Climate Study upon its

completion and evaluate whether the results of the
study and/or other information “suggest a need for an
adjustment associated with [the utility’s] capital
expenditure planning or investment or operational
procedures and whether further study may be
required.” 147 However, because the Con Ed Climate
Study was not completed during the term of the settlement agreements, neither utility conducted the
agreed upon review. To the authors’ knowledge, at the
time of writing, no other New York-based electric utility had completed a climate risk assessment similar to
that done by Con Ed.
Seeking to promote greater transparency of the climate risks facing electric utilities, in October 2020, the
NYPSC initiated a new proceeding to address “matters
related to the financial reporting of climate issues.” 148 It
appears that the proceeding will focus on whether and
how electric utilities should be required to make climate-related risk disclosures in their annual financial
statements.149 The order initiating the proceeding
noted that the parent companies of several New Yorkbased electric utilities already disclose climate risks in
their financial statements, but that the disclosures
reflect “data aggregated at the holding-company level
and [are] not utility specific.” The order indicated that
the NYPSC “believes” climate-related risk disclosures
should be made at the utility level and solicited comments on the form of such disclosures.150 Depending
on the outcome of the proceedings, it could result in
electric utilities being forced to engage in climate resilience planning (i.e., to identify climate-related risks
that must be disclosed).
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Id. at 17-19.
Id. at 32-37, 38-49.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 1.
NYPSC Rate Order, supra note 135, at 71-72.
See N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Proceeding on Motion of the Commission as to the Rates, Charges, Rules and Regulations of Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corporation for Electric Service, Joint Proposal, Case 14-E-0319, at 51 (Feb. 6, 2015); N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Proceeding on Motion of the Commission as to the
Rates, Charges, Rules and Regulations of Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc. for Electric Service, Case 14-E-0493, at 52 (June 5, 2015).
148 N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Instituting Proceedings in the Matter Regarding the Need for Reporting Risks Related to Climate Change, Case 20-M-0499
(Oct. 15, 2020), https://perma.cc/459N-PTJY. While we focus here on electric utilities, the proceedings apply to New York gas utilities as well.
149 Id. at 3.
150 Id. at 8.
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Box 6: Key Findings from the Con Ed Climate Study
The Con Ed Climate Study revealed highly relevant, specific, and actionable information regarding the impacts of
climate change on electric utility assets and operations. Downscaled climate projections developed for the study
detail a number of significant changes in weather conditions in Con Ed’s service territory, including a fourteen-fold
increase in the number of days with temperatures above 86ºF (30ºC), a twenty-percent decrease in cold weather
days, and a twenty-five-time increase in heat wave events by 2050.151 Precipitation in Con Ed’s service territory is
likewise expected to increase, with 500-year floods occurring every ten years by 2100, and the flood height associated with a 100-year flood increasing by up to fifty percent.152 The study identified a number of ways in which
these and other climate impacts could put Con Ed’s infrastructure at risk. For example, increased temperatures
were shown to result in transmission line sag, which presents a safety risk.153 Other infrastructure—particularly
substations—was found to be at risk from climate change-amplified storm surge and flooding.154 Predicted peak
load was also revised to reflect increased demand and reduced operational efficiency on hotter days.155
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CONSOLIDATED EDISON, supra note 37, at 11, 17.
Id. at 22-24.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 42.
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PART 3:

Advancing Climate Resilience
Planning Through Electric Utility
Regulatory Proceedings
As discussed in Part 2.3, state utility commissions
have played an important role in advancing climate
resilience planning in the electric utility sector, at least
in some areas. Recent proceedings before the CPUC
and NYPSC, in particular, serve as case studies
for how broad principles of utility regulation can be
used to further climate resilience planning. In this
Part, we discuss two possible avenues for engagement on climate resilience planning before state utility
commissions, namely:
1. intervening in rate case proceedings for a specific
electric utility to challenge its past or proposed
future expenditures on the basis that it has not
adequately considered climate risks and/or to
obtain commission approval for the recovery of
costs associated with climate resilience planning
and investment; and
2. petitioning a state utility commission for a
regulation or administrative order mandating
climate resilience planning by all electric utilities
under its jurisdiction.
For each avenue, we identify specific legal theories
that require climate resilience planning, focusing in
particular on electric utilities’ core obligation to ensure
reliable services at just and reasonable rates.

3.1 A
 dvocating for Climate Resilience
Planning Through Rate Case Proceedings
Climate resilience planning may be advocated in rate
case proceedings, wherein the state utility commission
reviews and approves or rejects an electric utility’s
rates and other terms of service. Rate regulation is a
core responsibility of all state utility commissions,
which are charged with ensuring that electric utilities
do not misuse their monopoly power in a way that
harms customers, for example by engaging in price
gouging.156 The regulatory framework varies between
states, but all require electricity rates to be “just and
reasonable,” 157 which has been interpreted to mean
that rates must be “neither less than compensatory nor
excessive.” 158 To achieve that balance, state utility commissions set rates using a cost of service approach,
under which electric utilities are permitted to earn a
reasonable return on investments and recover reasonably incurred expenses.159
In some states, rate case proceedings are held on a
fixed schedule (e.g., every three years), while in others
they are conducted on an ad hoc basis.160 Rate case
proceedings involve judicial-type processes, with parties filing briefs and written evidence and the state utility commission holding hearings in which witnesses
appear and can be cross-examined.161 Most state utility
commissions also provide an opportunity for non-parties to make statements during the hearing or at other
times.162 That is one avenue for raising issues relating
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See generally REGUL. ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 99, at 5-6. Even in states where the electricity sector has been deregulated, utility commissions
continue to regulate rates for monopoly services, such as distribution.
157 James M. Van Nostrand, Keeping the Lights on During Superstorm Sandy: Climate Change Adaptation and the Resiliency Benefits of Distributed Generation,
N.Y.U. ENV’T L. J. 92, 145 (2015), https://perma.cc/93JL-GGN4 (“Ratemaking statutes uniformly require utility rates to be ‘just and reasonable’ or ‘fair, just,
reasonable, and sufficient.’” (internal citations omitted)).
158 Farmer’s Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 734 F.2d 1486, 1502 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
159 REGUL. ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 99, at 5.
160 Id. at 40.
161 Id. at 41-45.
162 Id. at 44.
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Box 7: State Utility Commissions’ Authority to Consider Environmental Issues
State utility commissions are often thought of as economic regulators, responsible solely for ensuring that electric
utilities deliver reliable service at low cost.163 As such, environmental issues are often thought to fall outside the
purview of state utility commissions, and instead be the exclusive responsibility of environmental protection
agencies.164 In fact, however, state utility commissions often can and do act on environmental issues. A 2006
study found that “[f]ifteen state commissions have statutes explicitly setting out a general authority or obligation
to consider environmental matters” and others have “implicit authority” to do so “through their general charge
that regulation of public utilities furthers the public interest.” 165
Environmental issues are most commonly dealt with by state utility commissions in the context of facility siting
decisions.166 Those decisions may provide another avenue for identifying and assessing climate risks to electric
utility infrastructure.
State statutes often expressly require state utility commissions to consider the environmental impacts of proposed
infrastructure in their siting decisions.167 In several states, the requirement is expressed in broadly-applicable environmental review statutes, which emulate the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).168 Briefly, NEPA requires
federal agencies to evaluate the environmental impacts of major projects they conduct, fund, or authorize.169 Agencies
must consider environmental impacts against baseline conditions in the project area and account for climate change
when defining the baseline.170 Multiple federal courts have held that agencies must consider how a proposed project
will be affected by increasing temperatures, sea level rise, and other climate-induced phenomena.171
Consistent with the federal precedent, in states with their own “little NEPA” statutes, agencies are often required
or encouraged to consider the impacts of climate change on projects as part of their environmental reviews. In
Massachusetts, for example, state agencies are required to consider “predicted sea level rise” and other “reasonably foreseeable climate change impacts” when approving new projects.172 The Massachusetts Executive Office
of Energy and Environmental Affairs has proposed that, for each project, agencies prepare a so-called “climate
impact assessment” that evaluates the potential effects on the project of sea level rise, changes in precipitation,
and changes in average and extreme temperatures, and the appropriateness of measures designed to reduce or
avoid those impacts.173 These issues could be considered by the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities, for
example, when reviewing proposals for new transmission infrastructure.174 In Massachusetts and other states,
third-parties can comment on proposals and intervene in review proceedings, which provides an opportunity to
push for consideration of climate impacts175
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See generally Michael Dworkin et al., Revisiting the Environmental Duties of Public Utility Commissions, 7 VT. J. ENVT’L L. 1 (2006), https://perma.cc/48DZ-SLDC.
Id.
Id. at 1-2.
Decisions regarding facility siting are the responsibility of the utility commissions in some (but not all) states.
Dworkin et al., supra note 156, at 3 (“In thirty states, certification and siting review includes consideration of environmental protection.”).
Sixteen states and the District of Columbia have environmental review laws similar to NEPA. See Daniel P. Selmi, Themes in the Evolution of the State
Environmental Policy Acts, 38 URB. LAW. 949 (2006), https://perma.cc/L9GY-4FLL; Patrick Marchman, “Little NEPAs”: State Equivalents to the National
Environmental Policy Act in Indiana, Minnesota and Wisconsin (Oct. 8, 2012), https://perma.cc/VG98-NJBV (unpublished capstone paper). Some states exempt
the utility commission from compliance with the environmental review statute. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-1-201(3) (“The department of public service
regulation, in exercise of its regulatory authority over rates and charges of railroads, motor carriers, and public utilities, is exempt from” compliance with the state
environmental review statute).
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (requiring preparation of an environmental impact statement for any “major federal action” that “significantly affect[s] the quality of the
human environment”).
See generally Council on Environmental Quality, Considering Cumulative Effects under the National Environmental Policy Act 41 (1997),
https://perma.cc/W5FY-9ZQC. In July 2020, the Council on Environmental Quality finalized revisions to its NEPA implementing regulations, which eliminate
the former requirement to consider “cumulative effects” in environmental reviews. This will have the effect of limiting consideration of climate change in
environmental reviews. However, the revised regulations continue to require agencies to consider climate impacts when defining the baseline, at least in some
circumstances. See Update to the Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 43,304, 43,331
(July 15, 2020) (“[A]gencies will consider predictable environmental trends in the area in the baseline analysis of the affected environment,” including
“[t]rends determined to be a consequence of climate change.”).
See, e.g., AquAlliance v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 287 F. Supp. 3d 969 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (“NEPA requires an evaluation of the impact of climate change on a
project.”); Kunaknana v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 23 F. Supp. 3d 1063, 1092-98 (D. Alaska 2014) (determining that the Amy Corps of Engineers should have
considered new information about climate change when determining whether to prepare a supplemental EIS).
MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 30, § 61.
MASS. EXEC. OFF. OF ENERGY & ENV’T AFFAIRS, DRAFT MEPA CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION AND RESILIENCY POLICY 4-8 (2015),
https://perma.cc/VV2J-MJRU.
The Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities’ Siting Division is responsible for reviewing proposals to construct and operate transmission lines in the state.
See generally Mass.gov, DPU Siting Division, https://perma.cc/X2XZ-RB9L (last visited Sept. 11, 2020). State agencies can make use of various publicly-available
tools and datasets to evaluate climate impacts on new infrastructure. See generally JESSICA WENTZ, ASSESSING THE IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE
BUILT ENVIRONMENT UNDER NEPA AND STATE EIA LAWS: A SURVEY OF CURRENT PRACTICES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MODEL PROTOCOLS 15-26
(2015), https://perma.cc/M6MQ-S2UB.
See generally Mass.gov, EFSB and DPU Siting Process, https://perma.cc/Y529-V5FQ (last visited Sept. 11, 2020).
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to climate resilience planning in rate case proceedings,
which requires only minimal investments of time and
other resources by the raising entity. It should, however, be noted that state utility commissions generally
attach less weight to statements made by non-parties.176 For that reason, interested persons may choose
to formally intervene in, and become parties to, the
rate case proceeding.
Intervention refers to the process by which interested
persons obtain approval from the state utility commission to participate in rate case or other proceedings.
Each commission has its own rules regarding participation, with most requiring third parties to file a petition to intervene, which explains their interest in the
case and reasons for intervening.177 Some state utility
commissions require would-be intervenors to demonstrate that their legal rights or duties will be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding and/
or that their interests are not sufficiently represented
by other parties.178 Although some state utility commissions restrict intervention,179 many are highly permissive of it and merely require a showing that it is “in
the public interest.” 180 However, there may be other,
practical challenges associated with intervening in
rate case proceedings. Such proceedings can last for
several months and are highly complex, dealing with a
broad range of technical issues, most of which have

little or no relevance to climate resilience planning.
Nevertheless, even if an intervenor is focused solely on
that one issue, he/she/it may need to be represented
in hearings concerning other matters.181 Intervenors
may need to engage outside legal counsel to represent them and/or expert witnesses to appear on their
behalf which can be highly costly.182
The remainder of this subpart discusses three key ratemaking principles that could be relied on to advance
climate resilience planning in rate case proceedings: (1)
the prudence standard, (2) the used and useful test,
and (3) the least cost principle.

3.1.1 The Prudence Standard
Prudence is a central tenet of electric utility rate regulation.183 Electric utilities are typically only permitted
to recover prudent and necessary operating expenses
and earn a return on prudent used and useful capital
investments.184 State utility commissions assess prudence by considering what a reasonable, professional
utility manager would have done given the information that was known or knowable at the time.185
The prudence standard has thus been described as
similar to the reasonable person standard applied in
tort law.186
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Id. at 44-45.
See, e.g., MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 4, § 240-2.075 (requiring petitions to intervene to be filed within 30 days after the commission gives notice of the case and
include information about the petitioner, including a statement of his/her/its “interest in the case and reasons for seeking intervention”); OR. ADMIN. R.
860-001-0300 (requiring petitions to intervene to contain basic information about the petitioner, “[t]he nature and extent of the petitioner’s interest in the
proceedings,” and “[t]he issues petitioner intends to raise at the proceedings”).
178 See, e.g., KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 82-1-225 (providing that a petition for intervention may only be granted if it “states facts demonstrating that the petitioner’s legal
rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal interests may be substantially affected by the proceeding”); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 4901-1-11 (allowing
intervention by any person who “has a real and substantial interest in the proceeding” and who “is so situated that the disposition of the proceeding may . . .
impair or impede his or her ability to protect that interest, unless the person’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties”).
179 See, e.g., N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils., In the Matter of the Petition of Public Service Electric and Gas Company for Approval of the Energy Storage Program, Docket Nos.
EO13020155 & GO13020156 (Sept. 30, 2013), https://perma.cc/3AFG-P28T (denying Environmental Defense Fund intervenor status). But see N.J. Bd. of Pub.
Utils., In the Matter of the Petition of Atlantic City Electric Company for Approval of Amendments to its Tariff to provide for an Increase in Rates and Charges for
Electric Service Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 48:2-21 and N.J.S.A. 48:2-21.1, for Approval of a Grid Resiliency Initiative and Cost Recovery Related Thereto, and for Other
Appropriate Relief (2016), Docket No. ER16030252 (Oct. 5, 2016), https://perma.cc/HDG9-M7KW (granting Environmental Defense Fund intervenor status).
180 See, e.g., 52 PA. CODE § 5.72 (allowing intervention where the petitioner has an “interest of such nature that participation by the petitioner may be in the public
interest”); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 480-07-355 (allowing intervention “if the petitioner’s participation is in the public interest”).
181 The requirements regarding participation in hearings vary between states. In some states, intervenors must be represented at all or most of the hearing, even
those portions that do not relate directly to climate resilience planning. In other states, intervenors have more flexibility, and can choose to only be represented at
parts of the hearing.
182 In some states, electric utilities provide limited funding to intervenors, but that funding is often only available to those representing consumer groups.
See generally Or. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Intervenor Funding, https://perma.cc/2AJR-TV6E (last visited Oct. 21, 2020).
183 Long Is. Lighting Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of State of N.Y., 523 N.Y.S.2d 615, 620 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (describing prudence as “an essential constituent of utility
regulation”); see also Appeal of Conservation L. Found., 507 A.2d 652, 673 (N.H. 1986) (describing the prudence standard as a key principle governing
ratemaking); Gulf States Utils. Co. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 578 So. 2d 71, 85 (La. 1991) (stating that “one of the principles used by ratemaking bodies and courts
to [determine how much of a utility’s investment in a particular plant should be included within its rate base] is the prudent investment standard”); Entergy Gulf
States, Inc. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 726 So. 2d 870, 873 (La. 1999) (noting that the prudence standard is applied to “counterbalance the monopolistic effects on
the ratepayers who do not have a choice about which company provides their utility service”); Town of Hingham v. Dep’t of Telecomms. & Energy, 740 N.E.2d
984, 989 (Mass. 2001) (indicating that “[t]he prudence test determines whether cost recovery is allowed at all”).
184 See generally REGUL. ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 99, at 47, 51-52, 57-58. Some states do not require electric utilities to establish that their capital
investments resulted in assets that are “used and useful.” See infra Part 3.1.2.
185 Jarvis, supra note 101, at 1042.
186 See, e.g., Appeal of Conservation L. Found., 507 A.2d at 673 (holding that the prudence standard “essentially applies an analogue of the common law negligence
standard for determining whether to exclude value from rate base”).
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In rate case proceedings, the burden of demonstrating
prudence falls on the electric utility, which must prove
that it acted reasonably in the circumstances.187 This
requires a showing that the electric utility engaged in a
sound decision-making process in which it took appropriate steps to obtain relevant information and evaluated that information in reaching its conclusion. As the
Louisiana supreme court observed in Gulf States
Utilities Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission,
“the utility must demonstrate that it went through a
reasonable . . . process to arrive at a course of action
and, given the facts as they were or should have been
known at the time, responded in a reasonable manner.” 188 The Louisiana supreme court held that, to satisfy the prudence standard, the utility’s decision-making
process must have been “logical” and based on “information and planning techniques known or knowable at
the time” the decision was made.189 However, in the
case of long-running investment projects, the electric
utility is not merely expected to act prudently at the
outset, but throughout.190 Thus, according to the
Louisiana supreme court, electric utilities must
“respond prudently to changing circumstances or new
challenges that arise as the project progresses.” 191
Courts and public utility commissions in other states
have applied the prudence standard similarly.192
Applying the above principles, the prudence standard
requires electric utilities to employ established techniques to evaluate and manage climate risks when
making investment and other operational decisions
that impact rates. The physical risks to electric system
operation from increasing temperatures, more severe
storms and wildfires, and other climate impacts have
been well-documented in numerous government and
independent reports.193 Electric utilities, therefore, can

no longer feign ignorance. To use the parlance of the
Louisiana supreme court, electric utilities now know, or
should know, that the impacts of climate change pose
material risks to their operations and assets. Indeed,
many have admitted as much in their filings with the
SEC and other documents.194
In this context, for electric utilities’ decisions to be considered “logical” and “reasonable,” they must integrate
climate risk into their decision-making processes.
Indeed, since many utility investment decisions involve
assets that are intended to remain in operation for forty
years or more, it is impossible to make rational choices
without accounting for long-term climate impacts.
Such climate-focused decision-making has been advocated by corporate analysts and advisors, including
McKinsey and Company, which recently stated:
Climate change needs to become a major feature in
corporate and public-sector decision making. . . .
For companies, this will mean taking climate considerations into account when looking at capital allocation, development of products or services, and
supply chain management, for example. Large capital projects would be evaluated in a way that reflects
the increased probability of climate hazards at their
location: How will that probability change over time?
What are the possible changes in cost of capital for
exposed assets? How will climate risk affect the
broader market context and other implicit assumptions in the investment case? 195
Climate resilience planning enables electric utilities to
answer these and other questions, thereby ensuring that
their investment decisions are prudent in light of climate
change. The techniques for climate resilience planning
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Long Is. Lighting Co., 523 N.Y.S.2d at 620 (holding that the “burden of proof is upon the utility whose rates . . . are being considered to justify its conduct”).
Electric utilities generally benefit from a presumption of prudence absent evidence to the contrary. If there is any evidence suggesting imprudence, the burden
shifts to the utility to demonstrate the appropriateness of its conduct. See, e.g., Off. of Pub. Couns. v. Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 523 S.W.3d 14, 19 (Mo. Ct. App.
2017) (holding that “the presumption of prudence sets out an evidentiary presumption which provides that the utility’s expenditures are presumed to be prudent
until adequate contrary evidence is produced, at which point the presumption disappears from the case . . . . The presumption affects who has the burden of
proceeding, but it does not change the burden of proof, which [is] on the utility” (internal citations omitted)).
188 Gulf States Utils., 578 So. 2d at 85, aff’d, Gulf States Utils. Co. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 689 So. 2d 1337, 1346 (La. 1997); Entergy Gulf States, 726 So. 2d at 874;
Gordon v. Council of New Orleans, 977 So. 2d 212, 292 (La. Ct. App. 2008).
189 Gulf States Utils., 578 So. 2d at 85.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 See, e.g., Long Is. Lighting Co., 523 N.Y.S.2d at 620 (holding that “[p]rudence is determined by judging whether the utility acted reasonably, under the
circumstances at the time”); Citizens Action Coal. of Ind., Inc. v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 472 N.E.2d 938, 958 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that “[t]he measure of the
prudence of utility expenditures is gauged by what one would consider good management decisions and practices” and that, where a utility undertakes a
long-term project, it must respond prudently to changing circumstances); Gulf States Utils. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 841 S.W.2d 459, 475 (Tex. App. 1992) (noting
that the state utility commission defines prudence as “[t]he exercise of that judgement . . . which a reasonable utility manager would exercise . . . in the same or
similar circumstances given the information” that was known or knowable); Green Mountain Power Corp., 184 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 1, 217 (Vt. Pub. Serv. Bd. 1998)
(stating that, to satisfy the prudence standard, the electric utility must “mak[e] all reasonable efforts to gather relevant information and . . . respond
accordingly”); Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Light Co. v. Dep’t of Pub. Utils., 956 N.E.2d 213, 216 (Mass. 2011) (indicating that “[w]hen conducting a prudence review, the
[D]epartment [of Public Utilities] determines whether a utility’s actions, based on all that it knew or should have known at the time, were reasonable and prudent
in light of the circumstances”).
193 See supra note 14.
194 See supra note 11.
195 McKinsey & Co., supra note 15.
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are well-established and have already been put into
practice by some electric utilities. The Con Ed Climate
Study, discussed in Part 2.3, demonstrates that the necessary tools and data are available to evaluate the
impacts of climate change over long periods and develop
flexible resilience pathways to manage those impacts. In
short, no electric utility or state utility commission can
deny that the reasons for, and process of, climate resilience planning are now “known or knowable.”
Given the above, in order to meet the prudence standard, electric utilities must engage in climate resilience
planning and consider the findings thereof when making investment decisions. State utility commissions
could mandate climate resilience planning by electric
utilities on that basis. Moreover, regardless of whether
state utility commissions impose such a mandate, electric utilities that fail to engage in climate resilience
planning could have their investment decisions challenged in rate case proceedings. Such challenges could
be used as leverage to secure a commitment from the
relevant electric utility to engage in climate resilience
planning.196 It could also result in disallowance of the
electric utility’s costs on the basis that they are imprudent, which would send a strong signal as to the importance of climate resilience planning and encourage
other utilities to engage in the process.

power, improve reliability, [and] efficiently restore
service to customers after major storm damage”
(among other things).198 Subsequently, in April 2020,
Vote Solar challenged DEP’s request to recover costs
associated with grid maintenance and modernization
in its rate case proceedings before the North Carolina
Utilities Commission.199
Both challenges raised the same broad argument. Vote
Solar noted that, in developing their plans to maintain
and modernize the electric system, DEC/DEP did not
conduct a climate vulnerability assessment or any similar study of climate impacts, purportedly because they
were “unable to say with certainty what the future
impacts of climate change may or may not be.” 200 Vote
Solar argued that, due to DEC/DEP’s failure to consider
climate change, there was insufficient evidence “to
determine if the Compan[ies] made the most prudent
prioritization and investments in light of [their] actual,
projected climate risk.”201 Before the North Carolina
Utilities Commission could rule on this issue, the parties
reached a settlement under which DEC/DEP agreed to
convene Climate Risk and Resilience Working Groups,
which will look at ways to assess the impacts of climate
change on the DEC/DEP system and integrate consideration of those impacts into DEC/DEP planning. 202

3.1.2 The Used and Useful Test
At the time of writing, at least two electric utilities—
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (“DEC”) and Duke Energy
Progress, LLC (“DEP”)—had seen their expenditures
challenged under the prudence standard on the basis
that they failed to adequately consider climate risk. In
February 2020, Vote Solar submitted testimony197 in
rate case proceedings for DEC before the North
Carolina Utilities Commission, challenging its request
to recover “[c]osts incurred to maintain and modernize the company’s electric system, generate cleaner
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Electric utilities that fail to adequately prepare for the
impacts of climate change also risk being denied cost
recovery for their capital investments under the “used
and useful” test. 203 Where that test applies, electric
utilities are only permitted to include in their rate base,
and claim depreciation and other expenses on, capital
investments that are physically used and useful in
providing services to customers. 204 The distinction
between used and useful is somewhat blurry. Generally,

Disputes regarding the prudence of electric utility investments are, in practice, often resolved through settlement. See generally Eleanor Stein, The Long Island
City Power Outage Settlement: A Case Study in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 27 PACE ENV’T L. REV. 357 (2009), https://perma.cc/5WUU-U55V.
Vote Solar DEC Testimony, supra note 102.
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Application to Adjust Retail Rates, N.C.U.C. Docket No. E-7, SUB 1214 (Sept. 30, 2019), https://perma.cc/95DV-WZDA.
Direct Testimony of James Van Nostrand and Tyler Fitch on Behalf of Vote Solar, In the Matter of Application of Duke Energy Progress, LLC for Adjustment
of Rates and Charges Applicable to Electric Service in North Carolina, N.C.U.C. Docket No. E-2, Sub 1219 (Feb. 18, 2020), https://perma.cc/C5FD-E9QY
[hereinafter Vote Solar DEP Testimony].
Vote Solar DEC Testimony, supra note 102, at 19 (discussing DEC’s response to discovery on how it manages climate-related risks); Vote Solar DEP Testimony,
supra note 199, at 20 (discussing DEP’s response to discovery on how it manages climate-related risks).
Vote Solar DEC Testimony, supra note 102, at 94; Vote Solar DEP Testimony, supra note 199, at 98.
Agreement and Stipulation of Settlement, In the Matter of Application Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC for Adjustment of Rates and Charges Applicable to Electric
Service in North Carolina, N.C.U.C. Docket No. E-7, SUB 1214 (July 8, 2020) [hereinafter DEC Settlement Agreement]; Agreement and Stipulation of Settlement, In
the Matter of Application of Duke Energy Progress, LLC for Adjustment of Rates and Charges Applicable to Electric Service in North Carolina, N.C.U.C. Docket
No. E-2, Sub 1219 (July 9, 2020) [hereinafter DEP Settlement Agreement]. DEC and DEP agreed to undertake climate-resilience planning to “study the impacts of
climate change on” their Grid Improvement Plans and “existing grid, including operations, planning and physical assets on its transmission and distribution
systems” utilizing “[b]est practices climate modeling and scenario analysis.” DEC Settlement Agreement at 4; DEP Settlement Agreement at 4.
A number of state utility commissions apply both the used and useful test and the prudence standard, though some commissions only employ one of the two
standards. See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect: Canceled Plants and Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 497,
512-13 (1984), https://perma.cc/KE2Z-DZAZ.
Denver Union Stock Yard Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 470, 475 (1983).
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however, state utility commissions look at whether an
investment resulted in an asset that is physically providing services (and is thus “used”) and whether that
asset is actually needed to provide those services (and
thus “useful”). 205
The used and useful test is most commonly employed
to prevent electric utilities including in their rate base
investments in assets that are still under construction. 206 Once an asset is completed and placed into
service, the electric utility’s investment is typically
added to its rate base. In each subsequent rate case
proceeding, the state utility commission verifies that
the asset is still used and useful, and will remain so for
the period during which the rates will be in effect. 207
An asset must be removed from rate based if it ceases
to be used and useful, for example, because of chronic
operational problems that take it out of service for
extended periods. 208 In this regard, the Pennsylvania
Public Utility Commission has held that “[t]he length
of time [an] asset may be out of service and not
removed from rate base depends upon the nature of
the plant, the degree to which the outages can be
expected to occur during normal operation of the
plant, and the certainty with which resumption of service can be predicted.” 209 Prolonged outages (e.g., of
a year or more) that are not expected with normal
operation of assets may result in the assets being
found to be not used and useful and thus removed
from rate base. 210
Without adequate planning and investment in resilience, climate impacts could render electric system
assets inoperable, either permanently or for extended
periods. Sea level rise is perhaps the most obvious
example. A 2014 DOE study found that in Houston, Los

Angeles, Miami, and New York City alone up to forty-five energy facilities could be inundated due to sea
level rise by 2050. 211 Other climate impacts could also
lead to premature facility retirement or service interruptions. Indeed, just this year, Xcel Energy accelerated its plans to close a coal plant in New Mexico due
to water scarcity issues. 212 As climate impacts worsen,
more assets will be affected. For instance, the Con Ed
Climate Study found that increasing temperatures
would accelerate the aging of substation transformers,
for which the design reference temperature is lower
than the temperature projected to occur in the future
due to climate change. 213
Climate-affected facilities that retire prematurely will
cease to be used and useful and thus effectively
become stranded assets, the costs of which cannot be
recovered by electric utilities in rates. The used and
useful test would also prevent electric utilities from
recovering the costs of assets that experience regular
and/or extended outages due to the impacts of climate
change. As noted above, in the past, facilities experiencing non-routine outages, which are not “expected
to occur during normal operations” (e.g., maintenance),
have been treated as not used and useful and therefore
excluded from the electric utility’s rate base. 214

3.1.3 The Least Cost Principle
By applying the prudence standard and/or used and
useful test, state utility commissions ensure that electric utilities are only reimbursed for expenses that were
reasonably incurred, and deliver benefits to customers. This is consistent with the overarching goal of
electric utility regulation—i.e., to ensure “just and reasonable” rates that appropriately balance utilities’

205 See generally Jonathan A. Lesser, The Used and Useful Test: Implications for a Restructured Electric Industry, 23 ENERGY L. J. 349, 352 (2002),
https://perma.cc/Z4AZ-68VN.
206 The used and useful test has also been employed to exclude from rate base assets that are surplus to the utility’s requirements. For example, where an electric
utility has a 1000 megawatt short-fall in generating capacity and adds a new 2000 megawatt plant, the excess 1000 megawatts of supply may be temporarily
excluded from rate base until demand increases. See generally Van Nostrand, supra note 170, at 139-42.
207 Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n v. Metro. Edison Co., 53 Pa. PUC 329, 333 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n June 15, 1979) (holding that the commission must consider whether an
“investment is or will be useful during [the] period in which the rates are to be in effect”).
208 Id.; see also Pa. Power Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 56 A.2d 43, 47-48 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989) (holding that “[t]he touchstone for determining whether or not a
prudently constructed unit should be included in a utility’s rate base is whether or not, during the test year involved, the unit will be used and useful in rendering
service to the public” (second emphasis added) (quoting Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 433 A.2d 620, 623 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981)).
209 Metro. Edison Co., 53 Pa. PUC at 333.
210 Id. (holding that a generating facility expected to be offline for two to four years must be removed from rate base because such facilities “by their nature are not
expected to experience” such prolonged outages).
211 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, EFFECT OF SEA LEVEL RISE ON ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE IN FOUR MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREAS 13 (2014),
https://perma.cc/D66N-633K.
212 Kavya Balaraman, Water Scarcity Accelerates Plans to Close Xcel’s Tolk Coal Plant by a Decade, UTIL. DIVE (Jan. 15, 2020), https://perma.cc/TXM9-JJ9Y.
This decision came as Moody’s raised concern over the effect of climate change induced heat and water stress on Xcel’s and other electric utility’s operations.
Mike Hughlett, Moody’s Gives Xcel ‘Red Flag’ for Water Stress Because of Climate Change in Southwest States, STAR TRIB. (Jan. 22, 2020),
https://perma.cc/J84K-D4ZR.
213 CONSOLIDATED EDISON, supra note 37, at 40. The transformers have a design reference temperature of 86oF. In the future, however, New York City is projected
to experience up to 26 days per year above 86oF, and 23 days above 95oF. See id. at 19.
214 Metro. Edison Co., 53 Pa. PUC at 333 (holding that “[t]he length of time which utility plant may be out of service and not removed from rate base depends upon
the nature of the plant, the degree to which the outage can be expected to occur during normal operation of the plant, and the certainty with which resumption
of service can be predicted”).
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need to earn sufficient revenue to maintain their
systems and make new investments against customers’ interest in keeping prices low. 215 The interest
in keeping customer prices low has a particularly
significant influence on state utility commissions’
regulatory decisions. 216
Legislation in several states expressly identifies cost
minimization as a goal of electric utility regulation. In
Vermont, for example, legislation calls for “meeting the
public’s need for energy services . . . at the lowest present value life cycle cost.”217 Legislation in South Carolina
similarly declares a policy in favor of “minimiz[ing] the
cost of energy throughout the state.”218 Even absent
this type of express statutory direction, state utility
commissions have generally applied the principle of
“least cost” when setting rates. 219 In rate case and other
proceedings, state utility commissions have required
electric utilities to take various steps to reduce electricity costs, while maintaining service reliability. For
example, as discussed in Part 2.2 above, electric utilities in thirty-six states are now required to engage in a
process of integrated resource planning that is intended
to identify the optimal resource mix that will ensure
long-term service reliability at least cost. 220
Requiring electric utilities to engage in climate resilience planning furthers the goal of reducing electricity
costs while maintaining utilities’ ability to provide reliable service. As discussed in Part 2 above, such planning enables electric utilities to design new assets and
systems that are “resilient from the start,” thereby
avoiding the need for costly retrofits in the future. It
also facilitates action to improve electric utilities ability
to avoid or quickly recover from outages which further
reduces costs. The reductions are likely to more than
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offset any costs incurred by electric utilities to enhance
their climate resilience.
A 2019 study by McKinsey and Company found that, if
left unaddressed, climate change would cause the
storm damage and outage costs incurred by a typical
electric utility to increase by at least twenty-three percent or $300 million to $1.7 billion by 2050. 221 In comparison, according to the study:
[I]t would take $700 million to $1 billion for a typical
Southeastern US utility to prepare for impacts
related to climate change. That is . . . much less than
the projected future storm costs of $1.7 billion. While
each utility’s cost-benefit calculation will differ
based on its unique risk exposure profile and infrastructure costs, our conclusion is that it pays to prepare for extreme weather . . . . There are also likely to
be ancillary benefits, such as improved reliability
and enhanced diversity of supply. 222
Confirming McKinsey and Company’s conclusion, a
2020 study found that due to the impacts of climate
change, spending on transmission and distribution
infrastructure could increase by up twenty-five percent or $24 billion per year by 2090. 223 The study further found that designing new infrastructure based
on projected climate conditions over its useful life
“roughly halves the expected costs of climate change
experienced in 2090” compared to a scenario in
which no adjustments are made to infrastructure
design. 224 Requiring electric utilities to take steps to
enhance their resilience to climate change is, therefore, fully consistent with the least cost principle
employed by state utility commissions when setting
electricity rates. 225

Farmer’s Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 734 F.2d 1486, 1502 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that, in setting rates, state utility commissions must
balance the interests of electricity suppliers and their customers to determine a level that is “neither less than compensatory nor excessive”).
See generally Jeremy Knee, Rational Electricity Regulation: Environmental Impacts and the “Public Interest”, 113 W. VA. L. REV. 739 (2011) (concluding that state
utility commissions have generally exercised their ratemaking authority so as to “minimize[e] costs to consumers”).
VT. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 218c(a)(1).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-52-210.
See, e.g., Re Ky. Power Co., 2010 WL 2640998 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm’n June 28, 2010) (recognizing “that ‘least cost’ is one of the fundamental principles utilized
when setting rates that are fair, just, and reasonable”).
Girouard, supra note 71; see also Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 111(d) (amending section 3 of the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act to insert a
new definition of “integrated resource planning” as follows: “The term ‘integrated resource planning’ means, in the case of an electric utility, a planning and
selection process for new resources that evaluates the full range of alternatives . . . in order to provide adequate and reliable service to its electric customers at
the lowest system cost” (emphasis added)).
Sarah Brody et al., Why, and How, Utilities Should Start to Manage Climate-Change Risk, MCKINSEY & CO. INSIGHTS (Apr. 24, 2019),
https://perma.cc/R84Q-YKMY. This is a conservative estimate because it only accounts for “regional increases in extreme weather or storm damage
due to sea-level” and no other climate impacts. See id.
Id.
Charles Fant et al., Climate Change Impacts and Costs to U.S. Electricity Transmission and Distribution Infrastructure, 195 ENERGY 7 (2020),
https://perma.cc/QN2J-D4VQ.
Id.
It should be noted that the least cost principle could be relied upon to challenge cost recovery for climate resilience planning and investment. Those activities
often involve significant upfront costs, which may necessitate consumer rate increases, at least in the short term. In the longer term, however, climate resilience
planning and investments should generate cost savings that can be passed onto ratepayers, as discussed above.
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Box 8: Cost Recovery for Climate Resilience Planning and Investments
While it delivers many benefits, climate resilience planning also involves costs. Electric utilities must generally
engage consultants or other researchers to develop localized climate projections and analyze the impact of projected conditions on assets (see Box 2 and Box 3). Where vulnerable assets are identified, electric utilities may
need to make material investments to enhanced their resilience, for example through hardening or relocation.
Electric utilities may be discouraged from investing by uncertainty as to whether, when, and how they will be permitted to recover their costs. 226
In the case of capital investments, cost recovery typically does not occur until after the electric utility has invested
and the relevant state utility commission has determined that the investment was “prudent” and/or resulted in an
asset that is “used and useful” (among other requirements). 227 This approach ensures that customers are not burdened with inappropriately incurred costs, but can discourage innovation by electric utilities concerned about the
potential for disallowance of investments with novel or unquantified benefits. This is likely to be a particular issue
with resilience investments, the benefits of which are often uncertain or difficult to quantify. 228 Compounding this
problem, even where benefits are known and quantifiable, they may not be taken into account by state utility
commissions. A 2017 study by the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory found that several state utility commissions consider only a “[l]imited number of benefit categories” when evaluating resilience investments. 229 For
example, the Florida Public Service Commission focuses solely on the value of avoiding physical damage to electric utility infrastructure and does not account for the value to customers of avoiding service interruptions, 230
despite the many tools available to estimate customer interruption costs. 231 State utility commissions should
employ those and other tools to assess the full range of benefits of resilience investments. They should also look
at using alternatives to cost-benefit analysis, such as breakeven analysis or RDM, to evaluate resilience investments (see Box 3).
Even if electric utilities are permitted to recover resilience investments, the regulatory lag—i.e., the gap between
when the investments are made and when cost recovery occurs—could undermine their financial viability. 232 This
is likely to be less of an issue in states where rate case proceedings are held on an ad hoc basis because, in those
states, the electric utility can request adjustment of its rates to reflect new investments when they are made. This
is not, however, possible in states where rate case proceedings are held on a fixed schedule (e.g., every three
years). In those states, cost recovery may be delayed, which could affect the electric utility’s credit rating and thus
its ability to obtain financing on reasonable terms. It could also lead to declining profits because the utility is
required to cover financing costs internally for long periods of time.
Given the above, electric utilities may want to obtain pre-approval of resilience investments, and/or recover their
costs as they are incurred. This could be achieved through cost tracking which, in simple terms, allows a utility to
recover the costs associated with a specific activity on a periodic basis outside of its rate case. 233 Historically, cost
tracking was only permitted for substantial, variable, and uncontrollable costs that could threaten the utility’s
financial viability if not recovered outside its rate case (e.g., fuel costs). 234 More recently, however, cost tracking
has been permitted in a broader range of circumstances. For example, some state utility commissions have
allowed cost tracking for investments in grid modernization technologies (e.g., advanced metering), reasoning
that utilities may otherwise be reluctant to invest therein due to their high costs and unquantified benefits. 235 The
same will often be true of resilience investments. The appropriateness of allowing cost tracking for resilience
investments must be assessed on a case-by-case basis and appropriate customer safeguards put in place. In the
grid modernization context, some state utility commissions have capped the total amount utilities can recover
through cost tracking and dealt with variations through risk sharing mechanisms, under which cost overruns are
borne primarily by the utility and cost under-runs allocated primarily to customers. 236 A similar approach could be
used for resilience investments.
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229

See supra Box 5.
As discussed above, some state utility commissions only apply one of the two standards. See supra note 203.
See supra Part 2.1.
KRISTINA LACOMMARE ET AL., LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., EVALUATING PROPOSED INVESTMENTS IN POWER SYSTEM RELIABILITY AND
RESILIENCE: PRELIMINARY RESULTS FROM INTERVIEWS WITH PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION STAFF 3 (2017), https://perma.cc/FXS9-DSLQ.
230 Id. at 25.
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3.2 P
 etitioning the State Utility Commission
to Require Climate Resilience Planning
As well as addressing climate risk through rate case
proceedings for specific electric utilities, state utility
commissions could also deal with the issue in general
rulemaking proceedings, involving all electric utilities
under their jurisdiction. Through such proceedings a
state utility commission could adopt an administrative
order or regulation directing electric utilities to engage
in climate resilience planning. The CPUC recently did
just that, issuing a decision in August 2020 that requires
investor-owned electric and gas utilities in California to
periodically evaluate risks to their assets, operations,
and services from the impacts of climate change. 237
The CPUC decision could serve as a model for other
state utility commissions.
The CPUC’s work on climate resilience was prompted,
in part, by an executive order issued by then-California
Governor Jerry Brown in April 2015. 238 The executive
order noted that the impacts of climate change “pose
tremendous risks to [California’s] people, agriculture,
economy, infrastructure and the environment” and that
accounting for those risks “in planning and decision
making will help the state make more informed decisions and avoid high costs in the future.”239 To that end,
the executive order directed the California Natural
Resources Agency to develop and maintain a statewide climate adaptation strategy, which identifies “vulnerabilities to climate change by sector” and “priority
actions” to reduce those vulnerabilities. 240 The
California Natural Resources Agency appointed the
CPUC, California Energy Commission, and California
Department of General Services to lead adaptation
efforts in the energy sector. 241 The CPUC subsequently
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commenced a rulemaking proceeding on its own
motion “to consider how to address climate change
adaptation for the investor-owned electric and gas utilities” it regulates. 242
Several other states also have policies regarding climate change adaptation, which could serve as the
foundation for state utility commission action on the
issue. For example, in October 2019, New Jersey
Governor Philip Murphy signed an executive order
mandating the development of a Statewide Climate
Change Resiliency Strategy outlining measures the
state should take to adapt to the impacts of climate
change. 243 In justifying the need for such a strategy,
Governor Murphy noted that “the severity of future
impacts of climate change on our state will directly
depend on the willingness and ability of communities,
businesses, industries, and government entities to
integrate climate change considerations into planning and decision-making.” 244 The Governor declared
a state-wide policy requiring agencies to “take proactive and coordinated efforts” to plan for, and protect
against, climate impacts. 245 That policy could be
relied upon by the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities
to justify commencing proceedings on electric utility
climate resilience.
Where state utility commissions fail to act on climate
resilience planning of their own initiative, third parties
could petition them to do so. An example of this
occurred in December 2012, when a coalition of environmental and public interest organizations filed a
petition with the NYPSC, requesting that it direct all
electric and other utilities under its jurisdiction to evaluate and plan for climate impacts. 246 The NYPSC did
not take any formal action in response to the petition

One such tool is the Interruption Cost Estimate (“ICE”) Calculator, which was developed by Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory and Nexant, Inc.
The ICE Calculator can be used to estimate the cost of electricity outages per interruption event, per average kilowatt, or per unserved kilowatt hour. See U.S.
Dep’t of Energy, Lawrence Berkeley Nat’l Lab., & Nexant, Inc., ICE Calculator, https://www.icecalculator.com/home. The Florida Public Service Commission
reportedly does not use the ICE Calculator or similar tools due to concerns about their accuracy. See LACOMMARE ET AL., supra note 229, at 3, 25.
KEN COSTELLO, NAT’L REGUL. RSCH. INST., THE TWO SIDES OF COST TRACKERS: WHY REGULATORS MUST CONSIDER BOTH 4, 14 (2009),
http://perma.cc/255P-MJEA.
Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 7-8.
For a discussion of the use of cost tracking mechanisms in this context, see ROMANY M. WEBB, DEPLOYING ADVANCED METERING INFRASTRUCTURE ON
THE NATURAL GAS SYSTEM: REGULATORY CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES (2018), https://perma.cc/SY7A-XTRJ.
See id. at 22-23.
Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, supra note 130.
Cal. Exec. Order. B-30-15, supra note 117.
Id. at pmbl.
Id. at art. 4.
CAL. NAT. RES. AGENCY, supra note 118, at 6.
Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, supra note 129.
N.J. Exec. Order No. 89 (Oct. 29, 2019), https://perma.cc/LQ5G-XGZP.
Id. at pmbl.
Id.
See Letter from Anne R. Siders, Assoc. Dir., Ctr. for Climate Change L., et al. to the Hon. Jaclyn A Brilling, Sec’y, N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n (Dec. 12, 2012)
(on file with authors) [hereinafter “NYPSC Petition”].
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but, in a letter to the petitioners, then acting secretary
of the Commission Jeffrey Cohen noted that New York
Governor Andrew Cuomo had called for climate resilience planning and indicated that staff were working to
identify planning approaches that were in the “best
interests of ratepayers.”247 The issues raised in the petition were ultimately dealt with in the Resiliency
Collaborative convened by the NYPSC as part of Con
Ed’s 2013 rate case. 248
Like the NYPSC, other state utility commissions also
allow third parties to file petitions seeking declaratory
orders or the adoption or amendment of regulations.
While the filing rules vary between states, there are
often no or few restrictions on who can petition the
commission, with many states allowing any person to
do so, even if they do not have a demonstrated legal
interest in the matter at issue. 249 Thus, unlike inter
venors in rate case proceedings (discussed above),
petitioners are often not required to show that their
legal rights or duties will be affected by the outcome of
the petition. 250
State utility commissions typically require petitions
seeking the adoption or amendment of regulations to
include suggested regulatory language. 251 Petitions
must also explain why regulatory or other action is
being sought, the anticipated effects of such action,
and the commission’s legal authority to take it. 252 The
latter is particularly important because, as most are
statutory creations, state utility commissions can only
act on petitions to the extent permitted under their
authorizing statutes and related judicial decisions. 253

Petitions regarding climate resilience planning could
point to a number of legal principles that authorize,
and in some cases even require, state utility commissions to act. Perhaps most notably, state utility commissions are responsible for ensuring that electric
utilities fulfil their statutory “duty to serve,” including
by providing reliable services to customers. Climate
resilience planning by electric utilities is necessary to
assure long-term service reliability and thus fulfil the
duty to serve.
Originally developed through the common law, and
now codified in state statutes, the duty to serve has
been described as requiring electric utilities “to
provide extraordinary levels of service to customers.” 254 The duty encompasses, among other things,
an obligation to provide “adequate service.” 255 While
each state has its own formulation, service adequacy
is often defined in terms of reliability, with electric
utilities expected to take appropriate steps to prevent
outages and restore service promptly when they
occur. 256 As the California supreme court succinctly
explained more than half a century ago in Langley v.
Pacific Gas & Electric Co., electric utilities must
“exercise reasonable care in operating [their] system[s] so as to avoid unreasonable risks of harm” to
their customers as a result of outages. 257 This principle was recently reiterated by a California court of
appeal in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Southern California
Edison Co. 258 In that case, the court held that while
electric utilities are not expected to (and cannot)
prevent all outages, they must take steps to minimize the effect thereof on customers, including by
engaging in appropriate planning. 259

247 Letter from Jeffrey C. Cohen, Acting Sec’y, N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, in Response to the Petition of the Center for Climate Change Law at Columbia University
Regarding Natural Hazard Planning, Matter No. 12-02755 (Jan. 16, 2013) (on file with authors).
248 See supra Part 2.3.3.
249 See, e.g., OR. ADMIN. R. 860-001-0250 (providing that any “person may petition the Commission to promulgate, amend, or repeal a rule”); see also id. 860-0010010; OR. REV. STAT. § 765.010(5) (defining “person” to include “individuals, joint ventures, partnerships corporations, and associations or their officers,
employees, agents, lessees, assignees, trustees or receivers”).
250 See supra Part 3.1.
251 See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 20, § 6.3(b) (stating that, where a petition seeks “adoption or amendment of a regulation,” it “must include specific proposed
wording for that regulation”).
252 See, e.g., OR. ADMIN. R. 137-001-0070 (requiring petitions to include “[f]acts or arguments in sufficient detail to show the reasons for and effects of adoption,
amendment, or repeal of the rule” and “[a]ll propositions of law to be asserted by the petitioner”).
253 Some state utility commissions are established in the relevant state constitution. See, e.g., CAL. CONST., art. XII.
254 Jim Rossi, The Common Law “Duty to Serve” and Protection of Consumers in an Age of Competitive Retail Public Utility Restructuring, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1233, 1242
(1998), https://perma.cc/W5CV-853C; Jim Rossi, Universal Service in Competitive Retail Electric Power Markets: Whither the Duty to Serve? 21 ENERGY L. J. 27,
29 (2000), https://perma.cc/EZA6-2NAE.
255 See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 451 (“Every public utility shall maintain such adequate, efficient, just, and reasonable service, instrumentalities, equipment, and
facilities . . . as are necesary [sic] to promote the safety, health, comfort, and convenience of its patrons, employees, and the public.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:2-23
(“The board may . . . require any public utility to furnish safe, adequate and proper service.”); 66 PA. CONS. STAT § 1501 (“Every public utility shall furnish and
maintain adequate, efficient, safe, and reasonable service and facilities.”).
256 See generally Note, The Duty of a Public Utility to Render Adequate Service: Its Scope and Enforcement, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 312, 312-13 (1962) (noting that, while
“[t]he standard of adequacy is incapable of precise definition,” state statutes generally require utilities to “provide safe, continuous, comfortable, and efficient
service,” and “to take precautions against [service interruptions] and to restore service as quickly as possible” (internal citations omitted)).
257 Langley v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 262 P.2d 846, 853 (Cal. 1953).
258 No. B145834, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 595 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan 21, 2003).
259 Id. at *23-24.
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Unless electric utilities plan for climate change, the
more frequent and severe storms and other extreme
weather events it brings will lead to additional and longer-lasting electricity outages, with potentially severe
consequences for customers. Electric utilities can,
however, minimize the risk of outages and their effect
on customers by engaging in climate resilience planning. As discussed in Part 2.1, climate resilience planning enables electric utilities to identify where and
when their systems are vulnerable to the impacts of
climate change and develop solutions to mitigate
those vulnerabilities, such that they can continue to
provide reliable electricity services to customers
despite climate change.
Requiring electric utilities to take steps to avoid future
reliability issues falls squarely within state utility commissions’ regulatory mandate. There is no doubt that
climate resilience planning is necessary for electric utilities to operate their systems with “reasonable care” so
as to “avoid unreasonable risks of harm” to their customers. Indeed, with the impacts of climate change
and their effects on electric systems now well documented in numerous government and other reports, 260
it is not reasonable for electric utilities to continue
operating their systems based on past climate condi-

tions. Doing so exposes customers to an unreasonable
risk of harm from increasingly frequent and severe outages, which could be avoided or mitigated by employing proven climate resilience planning techniques.
Relatedly, where state law imposes requirements on
electric utilities with respect to storm or other
extreme event preparedness that provides another
legal justification for requiring climate resilience
planning. For example, the December 2012 petition
filed with the NYPSC cited section 66 of the New
York Public Service Law, which requires electric utilities to develop “emergency response plans” that outline measures to prepare for, and ensure prompt
restoration of service after, storms and similar
events. 261 The petition noted that electric utilities’
emergency response plans focus solely “on anticipation and response to disasters in the short-term” and
argued that “[a]dequately planning for storms, as
required under the Public Service Law, requires longterm assessment of risks,” based on “future climate
predictions.” 262 This enables electric utilities to make
a more informed assessment of how frequently
storms will occur, their likely severity, and what system changes are needed to prevent and manage
associated outages. 263

260 See supra note 14.
261 NYPSC Petition, supra note 246, at 5; see also N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 66. Similar planning obligations are imposed on electric utilities in many other states.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 366.96; MASS. GEN. LAWS. Ch. 164, § 85B; 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.53.
262 NYPSC Petition, supra note 246, at 5-6.
263 Id. at 6.
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PART 4:

Advancing Climate Resilience Through
Tort Law Claims in State Court
Part 3 considered whether and when state public utility
law requires electric utilities to address the consequences of climate change through climate resilience
planning. In this Part we consider the use of tort law
to advance climate resilience planning in the electric
utility sector.
Although factual considerations often remain similar in
the context of public utility and tort law, and the evidence identified in Part 2 will be relevant in both areas,
the two bodies of law diverge in material ways. Most
significantly, whereas claims grounded in public utility
law will often center primarily on anticipated impacts
of climate change, tort law claims will generally be
based upon some prior impact. For the purpose of this
paper, we term the contemplated tort law claim a ‘climate resilience claim,’ and define it as a claim arising
from an electric utility’s failure to adequately prepare
for reasonably foreseeable event- and non-eventbased climate impacts to owned assets and/or operations where that failure results in cognizable harm.
Cognizable harm could include injury to persons and/
or property damage resulting from electricity service
outages, for example where a heat wave causes a
transmission line to sag, triggering an outage that
results in a blackout at the premises of a customer who
uses electricity to power a medical device. Climate
resilience claims could also arise in situations where
the harm (e.g., personal injury or property damage) is
not directly connected to, or the result of, a service
outage. One example might be where transmission line
sag caused by a heat wave sparks a wildfire which
damages property. 264
This Part explores whether and when a climate resilience claim could be brought against an electric utility
in connection with its failure to engage in climate resilience planning The Part proceeds in primarily four
subparts, modeled upon common law tort claims.

First, the Part explores the bounds of an electric utility’s duty of care, and argues that it encompasses a
duty to prepare for the impacts of climate change.
Second, the Part describes how such a duty might be
breached by failing to engage in climate resilience
planning. Four approaches to identifying breach are
discussed in particular: risk-utility analysis, the
multi-factor balancing test, industry custom, and public policy considerations. Third, causation is considered, with particular emphasis upon proximate cause
and foreseeability. Fourth, harm is explored, with the
underlying retroactive basis for tort claims noted
above distinguished from the fundamentally proactive
focus which undergirds state utility commission proceedings. Before turning to those subparts, however,
we first address questions of precedent.

4.1 Climate Resilience Claims and Precedent
In examining climate resilience claims, this work draws
primarily from three sources of precedent: (1) extreme
weather tort claims, (2) statutory failure to adapt
claims, and (3) tort claims premised on defendant’s
direct greenhouse gas emissions or sale of fossil fuels.
Climate resilience claims, however, are premised upon
a different theory and basis than these sources of
examined precedent, and are therefore compared and
distinguished in this subpart.
In borrowing from precedent, we rely most heavily
upon negligence suits brought against electric utilities
in the context of extreme weather events, which we
term ‘extreme weather tort claims.’ Such claims typically arise from an electric utility’s failure to adequately
prepare for, or respond to, a particular extreme weather
event that impacts its owned assets or operations.
Take, for example, Rich Mountain Electric Cooperative,
Inc. v. Revels. 265 There, a severe storm took down a tree,
which in turn pulled down one of the utility’s distribu-

264 Importantly, we do not foreclose the possibility of some tort law climate resilience claim based on the showing of event not yet occurred.
We do not, however, consider such issues here.
265 841 S.W.2d 151 (Ark. 1992).
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tion lines, causing power outages. 266 As a result, the
plaintiff—a chicken farmer—was unable to operate
cooling equipment in his sheds, which resulted in the
death of several thousand chickens when temperatures
skyrocketed to over 100 degrees Fahrenheit the following day. 267 Plaintiff argued that the utility should
have “more diligently pursued the cause of the outage.”268 The court agreed, holding that the utility “is
required to use active diligence to discover defects in
its system,” but “had not been actively diligent in pursuing the outage.”269
Extreme weather tort claims and climate resilience
claims share similarities. The form of the injury can
overlap270 and questions of foreseeability are often
central to analysis. 271 Yet the claims diverge in important ways. Temporally, an extreme weather tort claim
generally focuses on the electric utility’s immediate
actions in response to an impending or recently
occurred event, and questions of negligence center
upon the reasonableness of that activity within a relatively short timeframe. The focus of Rich Mountain
Electric, for example, was upon utility action in the
hours before and after the storm. 272 A climate resilience
claim, however, is focused on the sufficiency of longer-term utility planning for climate change. The focus
is on whether the utility has adequately incorporated
climate considerations into its operating procedures,
practices, and decisions regarding capital investments
and expenditures. These distinctions have important
implications for utility obligation. While an extreme
weather tort claim may focus inquiry on whether, for
example, the utility’s emergency response or customer
notification was reasonable, a climate resilience claim
would center analysis on the extent to which the utility’s long-term planning reasonably considered the
impacts of climate change on assets and operations.

266
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269
270
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272
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Looking forward, extreme weather tort claims and climate resilience claims may be complementary and
brought together. Because both claims can be premised upon similar events and harms, but are different legal theories, future actions may present both to
the court to capture a wider range of utility policies
and practices.
A second body of relevant precedent is found in statutory “failure to adapt” lawsuits. 273 These cases, like the
Conservation Law Foundation’s (“CLF”) lawsuits
against ExxonMobil and Shell, are premised on each
defendant’s failure to consider climate change impacts
in complying with their statutory and permitting obligations. In both cases, CLF alleges that the companies
failed to consider known climate change-induced
effects in designing and implementing protective measures for their facilities as required by federal law. 274
These claims provide helpful comparison, as they, like
climate resilience claims, premise argument upon an
actor’s failure to plan for reasonably foreseeable
impacts of climate change to assets and operation.
These claims should be distinguished, however, as they
have a statutory basis, whereas climate resilience
claims are premised upon common law obligations. 275
Third and finally, we also consider tort law claims premised on an entity’s contribution to climate change,
either direct or indirect. Some cases, like American
Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, brought under federal common law, sought to hold defendants liable for
their direct emission of climate-damaging greenhouse gases. 276 Other cases have been brought
against fossil fuel companies in respect of the climate
damage caused by the production and use of their
products. Two recent examples are City of Baltimore
v. BP and County of San Mateo v. Chevron. There,

Id. at 152.
Id.
Id. at 153.
Id. (quoting Stacks v. Ark. Power & Light Co., 771 S.W.2d 754 (Ark. 1989)).
For example, in both extreme weather tort claims and climate resilience claims, the “harm” could involve personal injury or property damage resulting from
electricity service outages. See Part 4.5 infra.
See Parts 4.2 and 4.4 infra.
841 S.W.2d at 153-54.
CONSERVATION L. FOUND., CLIMATE ADAPTATION AND LIABILITY: A LEGAL PRIMER AND WORKSHOP SUMMARY REPORT (2018),
https://perma.cc/8B4C-NBDS; Dena P. Adler, Turning the Tide in Coastal and Riverine Energy Infrastructure Adaptation, 4 OIL & GAS, NAT. RES. & ENERGY J.
519, 520 (2018), https://perma.cc/5UNG-ZK7N.
See infra notes 311-312 and accompanying text.
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Civil Penalties, Conservation L. Found. v. ExxonMobil Corp., No. 1:16-cv-11950 (D. Mass. Sept. 29, 2016),
https://perma.cc/MD99-LKYW [hereinafter CLF ExxonMobil Complaint]; Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Civil Penalties, Conservation L.
Found. v. Shell Oil Products US, No. 1:17-cv-00396 (D.R.I. Aug. 28, 2017), https://perma.cc/8XKG-5MKM [hereinafter CLF Shell Complaint]. Another example,
while not actively referencing or relying on climate change, is the wave of lawsuit brought after Arkema’s Crosby Facility in Houston exploded in the wake of
Hurricane Harvey. Those suits allege Arkema failed to adapt to the increased chance of greater flooding by not implementing procedures for handling dangerous
chemicals in such a situation. See Harris County’s Original Petition and Application for Permanent Injunction at 8, Harris County, Texas v. Arkema, Inc., No.
2017-7691 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Nov. 16, 2017), https://perma.cc/C8JT-KJLM; Plaintiffs’ Original Petition and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and
Temporary Injunction and Request for Disclosure, Graves v. Arkema, Inc. (Tex. Dist. Ct. Sept. 7, 2017), https://perma.cc/L79L-P8SB.
Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011).
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Box 9: Wildfires and Climate Resilience Claims
Recent wildfires in the western U.S. serve as an increasingly alarming and visible example of climate change-amplified extreme weather. Entities charged with operation of the electric grid increasingly acknowledge the intersections among extreme weather, electricity service, and consequences of climate change. The CAISO concluded,
for example, that “climate change-induced extreme heat storm across the western U.S.” contributed to recent
supply shortfalls and electricity outages277 (see Box 4). The CPUC has likewise made clear that utilities “need to
ensure a comprehensive approach to climate change risk is developed across all of the [utilities’] various departments to ensure a comprehensive approach to the [utilities’] climate change adaptation efforts.”278
Wildfires in the western U.S. have also been the focus of significant litigation, with the 2018 Camp Fire a primary
example. The Camp Fire, sparked by a faulty electric transmission line owned by PG&E and worsened by climate
change-induced drought and high temperatures, resulted in the deadliest and most destructive wildfire in
California’s history at the time, with over 153,000 acres burned, 18,000 structures destroyed, and 85 fatalities. 279
PG&E faced a variety of subsequent claims and claimants, ultimately resulting in criminal charges, bankruptcy,
and a CPUC approved settlement (among other things).
The CPUC’s Safety and Enforcement Division found a number of failures on the part of PG&E in the context of the
Camp Fire, including failure to maintain, reinforce, and regularly inspect its transmission lines and other equipment. The CPUC itself found that the utility had a “demonstrated record of failing to comply with Commission
directives, including those related to vegetation management.”280
Failure to properly maintain equipment serves as a basis for many extreme weather tort claims. In Arkansas Valley
Electric Cooperative Corp. v. Davis, for example, the plaintiff was injured after coming into contact with a fallen
electric power line. 281 The plaintiff argued that the injury was due to the defendant utility’s negligence in failing to
“replace the pole which they knew to be deteriorated” and failing to “maintain the pole and power line.”282 The
Arkansas supreme court found that the lower court’s inference of negligence was reasonable and based on substantial evidence, including findings that “the pole was at twenty-five percent strength,” and insufficiently buried. 283 The defendant contended in response that the injury was an act of God, meaning a “violent disturbance of
the elements such as a storm, a tempest, or a flood.”284 The court, in finding against defendant, carefully distinguished the negligent conduct at issue from a liability due to damages caused “solely by an act of God.”285 The
court held that “[i]f an act of God concurs with the negligence or fault of man to proximately cause damages, the
negligence or fault is not excused by the act of God.”286
Failure to properly maintain equipment might also serve as a basis for a climate resilience claim. As noted above,
climate-amplified wildfires are increasingly foreseeable, and an electric utility’s failure to adequately prepare for
such a reasonably foreseeable event may establish a basis for liability. That is, electric utility planning standards,
equipment deployments, investment decisions, and operational decisions must keep pace with the impacts of
climate change. Not doing so raises claims of negligence and implicates the electric utility’s duty of care. Why
then, has negligence not been the focus of ongoing and multiple PG&E wildfires?287
California is unique among states in applying the doctrine of inverse condemnation to its electric utilities. Under
this doctrine, electric utilities are “held strictly liable for any wildfire caused by utility equipment regardless of
standard of care or negligence.”288 Negligence has not been the standard, and thus not the aim, of litigation. 289
Other jurisdictions do not similarly apply inverse condemnation to electric utilities. Some other standard, and
most often negligence, will thus be relevant to considering a utility’s liability under a similar fact pattern.

277 Press Release, CAISO, CPUC, and CEC Issue Preliminary Report on Causes of August Rotating Outages (Oct. 6, 2020), https://perma.cc/3GX9-9ELJ.
278 Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, supra note 130, at 107.
279 Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Investigation 19-06-015: Decision Approving Proposed Settlement Agreement with Modifications, at 3 (May 7, 2020),
https://perma.cc/FF3M-98JH.
280 Id. at 73.
281 800 S.W.2d 420 (Ark. 1990).
282 Id. at 421.
283 Id. at 422.
284 Id. at 423.
285 Id.
286 Id.
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plaintiff local governments have sought to impose liability for adaptation measures in response to rising
sea levels and other climate impacts on the companies that have profited from the production and sale
of fossil fuels. 290 The cases center upon the production and promotion of fossil fuels by defendants and
the alleged disinformation campaign mounted by
them to obscure the inevitable climate effects of
defendants’ activities. 291 A climate resilience claim is
premised upon a different theory and basis.
Specifically, a climate resilience claim, as considered
here, focuses on the defendant’s failure to adequately
prepare for the impacts of climate change on its own
assets and operations.

often—but not always, see Box 10—a duty of care. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts, describes the duty of
care to “denote the fact that the actor is required to
conduct himself in a particular manner at the risk that
if he does not do so he becomes subject to liability to
another to whom the duty is owed for any injury sustained by such other, of which that actor’s conduct is
a legal cause.” 292 That is, the law imposes “a duty of
reasonable care to avoid foreseeable harm when performing acts that could injure others.” 293 In considering whether a duty of care is present, two inquiries are
relevant: “(1) to whom is the duty owed and (2) what
does the duty entail.” 294

4.2.1 To Whom Is the Duty of Care Owed?
Given the untested nature of climate resilience claims,
likely obstacles and challenges are particularly important to consider. Some, such as interaction between
civil and public utility commission forums, and potential regulatory barriers such as limitation of liability
provisions in utility tariffs are explored in greater
detail in Part 5, infra. Others, such as the highly complex and technical nature of the evidence required to
establish a climate resilience claim, and variation in
tort and utility law across states are not exhaustively
addressed in this paper and deserve careful consideration and further attention.

4.2 Duty of Care
In tort law, whether an electric utility has an obligation
to consider the consequences of climate change turns
first upon the presence of a duty. This duty is most

The test to be used to identify to whom the duty of
care is owed remains a topic of debate, largely centered upon the extent to which inquiry must be relational. Dueling opinions in Palsgraf v. Long Island
Railroad, provide two analytic poles. Judge Cardozo’s
majority opinion conceived of duty as relational
and turning on whether the aggrieved party is within
the zone of foreseeable risk. 295 An “act is only
negligent with respect to specific parties and
specific harms.” 296 In contrast, in his dissenting
opinion, Judge Andrews described the duty of care
as being “imposed on each one of us to protect
society from unnecessary danger, not to protect A,
B, or C alone.” 297 Relational inquiry is thus not
central, nor instructive, to Judge Andrews’ enun
ciation. Analysis of these dueling theories of the
duty of care is beyond the scope of this particular

287 We do not suggest here that negligence has never been alleged in the context of the 2018 Camp Fire. Rather, we seek to explicate California’s unique
liability structure for electric utilities and suggest that a climate resilience claim, rather than application of inverse condemnation doctrine, is more likely
relevant to other jurisdictions.
288 COMM’N ON CATASTROPHIC WILDFIRE COST & RECOVERY, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON CATASTROPHIC WILDFIRE COST AND RECOVERY 4
(June 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/5QUC-SB6D.
289 We do not suggest here that PG&E was not negligent. Others have opined at length on the utility’s actions and activities. We focus here only of the lack of its
relevancy to establishing liability.
290 Plaintiff’s Complaint, Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., No. 24-C-18-004219 (Md. Cir. Ct. July 18, 2019), https://perma.cc/DQ33-WY57 [hereinafter
Baltimore Complaint]; Complaint, County of San Mateo v. Chevron, No. 17 Civ. 03222 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/U7Z9-D83C [hereinafter San
Mateo Complaint]. Suits against fossil fuel companies have also been brought by private parties. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009)
(holding plaintiffs had standing and that none of the claims presented non-justiciable political questions), reversed and remanded, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010)
(Fifth Circuit local rules require that decisions be vacated when rehearing en banc is granted. In this case, the Fifth Circuit granted rehearing and then lost
quorum due to the recusal of a judge. It therefore dismissed the appeal and the let the district court’s dismissal of the case stand because it had already vacated
its previous decision.), dismissed on remand, 839 F. Supp. 2d 849 (S.D. Miss. 2012) (holding that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the doctrines of res judicata
and collateral estoppel or, alternatively, that the plaintiffs did not have standing to assert their claims), affirmed, 718 F.3d 460 (5th Cir. 2013) (upholding the
district court’s dismissal of the case on the basis of res judicata).
291 See, e.g., San Mateo Complaint, supra note 277, at ¶¶ 252, 254 (arguing that “[g]iven the grave dangers presented” a “reasonable” fossil fuel producer “would
have warned of those known, inevitable climate effects”); Baltimore Complaint, supra note 277, at ¶ 10 (“Defendants’ production, promotion, marketing of fossil
fuel products, simultaneous concealment of the known hazards of those products, and their championing of anti-science campaigns, actually and proximately
caused Plaintiff’s injuries.”).
292 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 4 (1965).
293 Alice C. Hill, Jump-Starting the Fight Against Climate Change: The Courts, BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCI. (Sept. 25, 2019), https://perma.cc/36JB-2SEJ.
294 David Hunter & James Salzman, Negligence in the Air: The Duty of Care in Climate Change Litigation, 155 U. PENN. L. REV. 1741, 1746 (2007),
https://perma.cc/LS5Z-9QNB.
295 “Negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do.” Palsgraf v. Long Is. R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928).
296 Hunter & Salzman, supra note 281, at 1747.
297 Id.
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paper. 298 It is, however, notable that both theories
require an assessment of the foreseeability of injury
which provides flexibility and malleability in analysis on
the basis of evidence. Duty owed does not depend
upon nor is it necessarily constrained by “contract,
privity of interest or the proximity of relationship.”299
Rather, facts and evidence, such as that described in
Part 2, are relevant to informing potential plaintiff class.
Climate resilience claims are based upon an electric
utility’s failure to respond to the consequences of climate change. A defined set of individuals—i.e., those
who experience electricity service disruptions or other
adverse effects as a result of the utility’s operation in
the context of a climate-induced extreme weather
event or change in baseline weather conditions—are at
risk of harm from the utility’s failure to identify and
plan for the impacts of climate change. Even so, however, questions remain as to precisely to whom the
electric utility owes a duty of care. Should, for example, the duty be extended to all of the electric utility’s
customers? Any individual within the electric utility’s
particular service territory? Is service territory even an
instructive framework, or should a different delineation be employed? Here, we turn to extreme weather
tort cases to inform our analysis. As explained in
greater detail in Part 4.1, we view this area of case law
to be most adjacent and thus most useful to analysis
throughout this Part.
Case law involving extreme weather torts is relatively
consistent in holding that a duty of care is owed, at a
minimum, to electric utility ratepayers. 300 Whether and
to what extent such a duty of care is additionally owed
to non-ratepayers is less straightforward. Strauss v.
Belle Realty Co. is an oft-cited case in this context. The
case arose out of a 1977 city-wide blackout in New York
City. 301 Plaintiff Strauss injured himself falling down
stairs during the blackout, and argued his injury

resulted from Con Ed’s negligent failure to maintain
power. 302 The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument,
finding that Con Ed owed no duty of care to Strauss—
the plaintiff was injured in the common area of his
building where electricity was provided under a contract with the building owner not Strauss. 303 The court
premised its holding on public policy grounds: “We
conclude that in the case of a blackout of a metropolis
of several million residents and visitors, each in some
manner necessarily affected by a 25-hour power failure, liability for injuries in a building’s common areas
should, as a matter of public policy, be limited by the
contractual relationship.”304
The holding in Strauss creates specific limitations
regarding who is owed a duty. Read narrowly, Strauss
suggests that ratepayers alone are foreseeable. But the
case may be better interpreted as a floor, rather than a
ceiling, in determining who is owed a duty in the context of climate risk. The opinion itself leaves open the
possibility, holding that “[a]s this court has long recognized, an obligation rooted in contract may engender a
duty owed to those not in privity.”305 Limiting duty by
contractual relationship is thus not premised in some
legal basis, but instead was a choice based in moral
values and social policies, 306 used to “limit the legal
consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree.”307
That is, contractual relationship was adopted by the
court primarily to limit liability “which could obviously
be ‘enormous,’” not due to some intrinsic value in privity between parties. 308

4.2.2 What Does the Duty of Care Entail?
The duty of care is generally understood to require an
entity to not create unreasonable risk, but precise language varies depending upon the specific tort and
jurisdiction. The duty in negligence cases is “to act reasonably or not to act in such a way that creates an

298 “Volumes have been written about these two opinions and volumes more no doubt will follow.” Douglas A. Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law,
41 ENV’T L. 1 (2011), https://perma.cc/FJ3J-M9FJ.
299 Id. at 10; see also John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 707 (2001),
https://perma.cc/V3AD-37L8 (“[T]he fact that duty is relational and relationship-sensitive does not entail the further claim that the existence of a prior
relationship between defendant and plaintiff is a prerequisite to the existence of an obligation of care running from the defendant to the plaintiff.”).
300 See, e.g., Praetorian Ins. Co. v. Long Is. Power Auth., No. 704580/2014, 2019 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2952 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 10, 2019) (discussing precedent in which
customers were owed a duty); Schulze v. La. Power & Light Co., 551 So. 2d 22 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (noting utilities have a duty to protect customers from sudden
discontinuance of service); Nat’l Food Stores, Inc. v. Union Elec. Co., 494 S.W.2d 379 (Mo. App. 1973) (finding utility has duty to protect customers from
foreseeable damage from failure of electrical service); cf. Rehab. Ctr. at Hollywood Hills, LLC v. Fla. Power & Light Co., No. 4D19-1786, 2020 Fla. App. LEXIS 6981
(Fla. App. Ct. 2020) (prohibiting non-ratepayer plaintiffs on the basis that doing so would unreasonably extend utility’s “zone of risk”).
301 Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 482 N.E.2d 34, 35 (N.Y. 1985).
302 Id.
303 Id. at 38.
304 Id. at 35.
305 Id. at 36.
306 David G. Owen, Duty Rules, 54 VAND. L. REV. 767, 778 (2001), https://perma.cc/KT2R-YB9F.
307 Strauss, 482 N.E.2d at 36 (quoting Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424 (N.Y. 1969)).
308 Id. (citation omitted).
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unreasonable risk of harm.”309 This aspect of the duty
inquiry thus centers upon “whether certain sorts of
risks . . . are properly within the ambit of [the defendant’s] responsibility.”310
Ongoing “failure to adapt” cases, premised upon statutory violation, provide one analogue when considering what the duty of care requires in the climate
resilience context. Like climate resilience claims, these
cases are oriented to an entity’s failure to plan for reasonably foreseeable climate change impacts, but the
statutory text, rather than tort law, informs content
and obligation. Conservation Law Foundation v.
ExxonMobil and Conservation Law Foundation v. Shell
Oil Products US serve as the primary examples. In
both cases, plaintiff CLF initiated still-extant citizen
suits against ExxonMobil and Shell Oil Products US
(“Shell”), respectively, alleging the companies had
violated the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(“RCRA”) and the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) by failing
to incorporate known climate change-induced risks
into their required permitting application under the
statutes. 311 Specifically, the suits allege that ExxonMobil
and Shell failed to account for climate change-induced effects—such as sea level rise, increased precipitation, increased magnitude and frequency of
storm events and storm surges, and lack of preventative infrastructure—in their statutorily required stormwater pollution prevention plans, spill prevention,
control and countermeasure plans, and facility
response programs for their terminals in Massachusetts
and Rhode Island (respectively). Of particular import,
the statutorily required plans must be made in accordance with “good engineering practices,” but CLF
contends the ExxonMobil and Shell plans were not
based on information regarding climate change-induced impacts known to reasonably prudent engineers. 312 The complaints assert that ExxonMobil and
Shell knew of these impacts, but failed to design and
implement protective measures to fortify their terminals as required by federal law.

The interplay between climate risk and possible statutory claims is beyond the scope of this paper, and
remains an important area in need of further research.
Relevant here, however, is how such claims might
provide a model for the duty of care in a climate resilience claim. In both CLF lawsuits, the courts must
consider whether the defendants violated the requirements of their permits by failing to consider the
known risk of foreseeable climate change impacts.
Climate resilience claims would turn on a similar question: whether electric utilities must consider, as part
of their duty of care, the known risk of foreseeable
climate change impacts on their assets and operations. An electric utility’s duty of care requires one “to
act reasonably or not to act in such a way that creates
an unreasonable risk of harm.”313 As demonstrated in
Part 2, climate change impacts on electric utilities’
assets and operations are increasingly knowable,
as are the consequent risks of harm to utility customers. A reasonable and logical—a prudent—electric
utility would integrate climate risk into decision-making. 314 Addressing climate risk through resilience
planning may thus be within the ambit of an electric
utility’s responsibility.
Elucidating with a high-degree of precision and uniformity what the duty of care entails may prove challenging, however, in a climate resilience claim. Two
tort cases brought against electric utilities in connection with extreme weather events highlight different
ways that courts have approached a similar inquiry.
First, in Praetorian Insurance Co. v. Long Island Power
Authority, a New York court was asked to consider relatively novel questions of duty in the aftermath of
Superstorm Sandy. 315 Plaintiffs in the case, still ongoing at the time of writing, alleged that the storm had
resulted in the loss and destruction of their properties
through a confluence of flooding and energized wiring and that the electric utility had a duty to de-energize lines before a storm. The court held that electric
utilities are “under a duty to exercise reasonable care

309 Hunter & Salzman, supra note 281, at 1746. The inquiry into the content of the duty of care provides a basis to consider whether failing to take certain actions is
unreasonable, issues taken up when determining breach, discussed infra. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 299, at 703-04 (“It is, of course, always possible to
describe these cases as ‘breach’ rather than ‘duty’ cases. . . . The line between duty and breach issues is sometimes blurry. . . .”).
310 Id. at 705. Courts often conflate duty and breach by deciding questions of breach under the guise of duty. See id. at 713 (discussing the use of duty in the sense of
“Breach-as-a-Matter-of-Law”).
311 CLF ExxonMobil Complaint, supra note 275; CLF Shell Complaint, supra note 275. The case against ExxonMobil remains undecided, and is currently subject to a
federal primary jurisdiction doctrine dispute, whether EPA should have an opportunity to review the permit through the ongoing permit renewal process. In
March 2020, the district court granted ExxonMobil’s request for a stay until EPA makes a determination on the renewal. Conservation L. Found. v. ExxonMobil
Corp., 448 F. Supp. 3d 7 (D. Mass. 2020). The stay is now on appeal before the First Circuit. See Notice of Appeal, Conservation L. Found. v. ExxonMobil Corp.,
No. 1:16-cv-11950-MLW (D. Mass. Apr. 17, 2020), https://perma.cc/GW7W-RH8T. This inquiry is closely related to questions of forum discussed in detail in Part 5.1,
below. The case against Shell survived a motion to dismiss and has advanced to the discovery phase, with the court rejecting primary jurisdiction and abstention
arguments. Conservation L. Found. v. Shell Oil Products US, No. 17-396 WES, 2020 WL 577874, at *4 (D.R.I. Sept. 28, 2020).
312 CLF ExxonMobil Complaint, supra note 275, at 59; CLF Shell Complaint, supra note 275, at 62.
313 Hunter & Salzman, supra note 281, at 1746.
314 See supra Part 3.1.1.
315 Praetorian Ins. Co. v. Long Is. Power Auth., No. 704580/2014, 2019 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2952 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 10, 2019).
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in the supply of electric service.”316 Electric utilities
must exercise that duty in a way “commensurate with
the inherent danger hidden in its high voltage equipment.”317 The court avoided answering “whether
defendants, having been able to de-energize [its
power lines ahead of Superstorm Sandy], ‘acted with
the degree of care which was commensurate with the
risk to which it had exposed’ the Plaintiffs.”318 The
court viewed that as a question of breach to be
answered by the jury. 319 Similarly, in considering a climate resilience claim, a court might conclude that the
duty is to take reasonable action commensurate to
the risk to the plaintiff (of outages, for example) and
then allow a jury to determine whether the utility, having failed to undertake feasible climate resilience
planning, acted with the appropriate degree of care.
A New Jersey court approached this inquiry in a similar case with different result. In Roudi v. Jersey
Central Power & Light, the same conduct and harm
was alleged as in Praetorian: the electric utility had

failed to de-energize its lines ahead of Superstorm
Sandy causing fires that damaged plaintiffs’ homes. 320
Here, however, the court did not see preemptive
de-energizing as a matter of breach of the duty of
reasonable care; instead it assessed whether it should
recognize and impose a wholly new duty to preemptively de-energize. 321 The court concluded there could
be no such “far-reaching” duty, emphasizing various
policy considerations relied upon by the lower court,
including the “crushing burden” the duty would place
on the utility. 322 This case illustrates a different
approach to defining what the duty of care entails in
a climate resilience claim. 323 If a court views climate
resilience planning as a duty in and of itself, it might
examine how far-reaching that duty would be and the
burden it would place on the utility. Notably, should a
court adopt this approach, it does not necessarily follow that the outcome of such a case would replicate
Roudi. Rather, it suggests that scope of the court’s
review would similarly focus inquiry under analysis
of duty.

Box 10: Potentially Available Claims and Duties
This Part centers analysis of duty and breach upon theories of negligence and duty of care. However, additional
claims and duties may be relevant, including:
Product liability claims, where the duty of care is defined as obligation “to avoid selling a defective product or
one that is unaccompanied by an adequate warning.”324
Private nuisance claims, which prohibit defendants from “interfere[ing] unreasonably or knowingly with the use
and enjoyment of another’s property.”325
Public nuisance claims, where the duty of care requires a defendant to, “not to contribute unreasonably or knowingly to an interference with the public’s resources.”326
Statutory claims, where duty is defined in law. 327 One example might be the electric utilities’ statutory duty to
serve, which, unlike the duty of care, is based upon the grant of monopoly franchise and requires an electric utility
to extend and maintain adequate service. 328

316
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318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328

Id. at *20.
Id. at *21. This potentially “heightened” duty that electric utilities are under is a common theme throughout negligence claims against utilities. Case law in many
states recognizes a heightened duty of care commensurate with proper operation and maintenance of electric systems. See, e.g., Ala. Power Co. v. Jackson, 166
So. 692, 693 (Ala. 1936); Citerella v. United Illuminating Co., 266 A.2d 382, 386 (Conn. 1969); Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Shepard, 285 So. 2d 725, 729 (Miss. 1973).
Praetorian, 2019 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2952, at *21.
Id.
Roudi v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light, No. A-1505-18T1, 2020 WL 1650710, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 3, 2020).
Id. at *4.
Id. at *5, *7.
The court’s approach in Praetorian appears to more closely aligns with the Restatement’s primary sense of duty, which asks “whether the defendant was
obligated to act with due regard” toward the plaintiff. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 299, at 699-70, 714 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 4).
Hunter & Salzman, supra note 281, at 1746.
Id. at 1749.
Id.
E.g., CLF ExxonMobil Complaint, supra note 275; CLF Shell Complaint, supra note 275.
See generally Rossi, The Common Law “Duty to Serve”, supra note 254 (discussing the contours of the utility’s duty to serve).
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4.3 Breach of Duty
Courts most often employ four key approaches to
determine whether a duty of care, once established,
has been breached: risk-utility analysis, the multi-factor
balancing test, industry custom, and public policy considerations. Each is explored in turn, below. We find
that breach, in a climate resilience claim, is cognizable
through each approach identified.

evidence that the cost of implementing resilience measures today will be less than the cost of injury from
outages that will occur in the future, for example,
in terms of value of lost load due to climate change
impacts (see Box 3). 334 The risk-utility analysis thus
increasingly favors engaging in climate resilience
planning and making resilience investments now, and
that a failure to do so breaches an electric utility’s duty
of care.

4.3.1 Risk-Utility Analysis

4.3.2 Multi-Factor Balancing Test

Risk-utility analysis considers whether “the burden of
preventing injury is less than the product of the magnitude of the injury and its likelihood.”329 The Restatement
(Second) of Torts describes this analysis as “where an
act is one which a reasonable man would recognize as
involving a risk of harm to another, the risk is unreasonable and the act is negligent if the risk is of such magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards as the
utility of the act or of the particular manner in which it
is done.”330

A second approach the courts employ in assessing
breach is the multi-factor balancing test. Here, a court
would consider additional elements beyond simply balancing the burden of avoidance against the likely damage, including (1) the foreseeability and degree of
certainty of harm, (2) the goal of using tort law as a
deterrent for future harm, (3) the burden on the defendant, and (4) the consequences to the community of
imposing a duty. 335

In a climate resilience claim, the product of the magnitude of injury (i.e., to life and property from climate-induced outages and other harms) and likelihood of harm
(variable by location, but nowhere in the U.S. is immune)
would be weighed against the burden of preventing
injury (i.e., by conducting climate resilience planning
and making resilience investments). 331 Climate change
impacts are significant and foreseeable and costs continue to grow as climate change increasingly results in
more frequent, severe, and intense extreme weather
events and marked changes in non-event weather patterns (e.g., higher average temperatures). 332 A court, in
employing risk-utility analysis, thus has significant evidence to draw from to support a finding of breach.
Scales will tip only further as the consequences of climate change increase in severity and the magnitude of
harm becomes greater. 333 Planning may reveal methods to reduce injury through operational changes
rather than new, significant, and additional expenditures. Such methods would reduce the burden on the
defendant of preventing injury. There is mounting

The multi-factor balancing test’s additional considerations generally favor a finding that failure to adequately prepare for the impacts of climate change
may constitute a breach of a utility’s duty of care.
For example:
1. Foreseeability and degree of certainty of
harm are both increasingly supported by eversharpening climate science and granular,
down-scaled data analysis.
2. Imposing liability for failure to prepare for climate
change may well deter future harm by spurring
proactive resilience planning.
3. The burden to electric utilities of engaging in
climate resilience planning is likely to be modest as
any costs associated could be structured similarly
to how risks are traditionally allocated. Although
consideration of climate change is not within the
traditional role of an electric utility, risk assessment
is a foundational aspect of electric utility planning

329 Hunter & Salzman, supra note 281, at 1756.
330 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965).
331 ProPublica, New Climate Maps Show a Transformed United States (Sept. 15, 2020), https://perma.cc/EB9W-E2Q3; see generally David W. Fahey et al.,
Physical Drivers of Climate Change, in CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL REPORT: FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, VOLUME I 73, 76, 81, 94-98
(D.J. Wuebbles et al., eds., 2017), https://perma.cc/HB9P-F8EL.
332 Fahey et al., supra note 331, at 76, 81, 94-98.
333 See generally id.
334 See supra Parts 2 and 3.1.3.
335 Hunter & Salzman, supra note 281, at 1768-69 (providing list of factors considered by a federal court in California, Vu v. Singer Co., 538 F. Supp. 26, 29
(N.D. Cal. 1981)). The Third Restatement also touches upon several of these concepts. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 3 (2010).
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and thus whatever additional effort climate resilience planning may require may be supported
through existing processes.
4. Ratepayers, at the very least, and likely any individual within a given service area, would benefit,
insofar as improved climate resilience planning
results in reduced harm to person and property
through at least the entirety of a utility’s franchise
area. Predicted benefits would, however, be evaluated in the context of expected rate impacts.

4.3.3 Industry Custom
Industry custom may aid in establishing breach, with
the courts considering the practices of the relevant
industry to assess the scope of the duty and comparing
that to the defendant’s own conduct. 336 However, as
made clear in T.J. Hooper v. Northern Barge Corp.,
industry custom is not controlling, and only girds
against breach to the extent that custom itself is reasonable. 337 In Hooper, the plaintiffs’ barges, towed by
the defendant’s tugboats, were lost at sea during a
storm. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant was negligent in failing to provide the tugboats with radios
which would have provided advanced warning of the
oncoming storm. The defendant argued that no industry custom nor legal requirement existed to obligate it
to ensure radios were installed. The court, in finding for
the plaintiffs, held that industry custom was not a shield
against liability in the case at hand because “there are
precautions so imperative that even their universal disregard will not excuse their omission.”338
Nor is industry custom static; it necessarily changes as
technology and science improves. There may be situations where “a whole calling may have unduly lagged in
the adoption of new and available devices.”339 In such a
case, the whole industry would have failed to adopt
reasonable measures for preventing risk, and thus a
showing of industry custom would provide no defense
to a defendant’s breach.

336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345

As explored in more detail in Part 2.3 above, electric
utilities have until recently not robustly engaged in climate resilience planning. Indeed, this paper is a reflection of the need to advance industry efforts to keep
pace with best available science, evidence, and practical experience. There are, however, signs that industry custom is changing. In recent years, a number of
electric utilities have engaged in climate resilience
planning, and others have acknowledged the need to
do so. 340 Several state utility commissions have also
recognized the relevance of climate change to the
sector it regulates. 341 Con Ed’s Climate Study has
demonstrated that climate resilience planning is feasible and provides vital information about how climate
change will impact assets and operations. It is already
being held up as industry standard in other rate cases
and at least two other electric utilities have already
agreed to undertake similar assessments. Electric utilities that fail to follow suit could be considered “laggards” in breach of a growing industry custom. 343
Additionally, climate resilience planning has been
widely supported and recommended by government
and industry bodies, suggesting that it is a practice
“so imperative that even [its] universal disregard will
not excuse [its] omission.”344

4.3.4 Public Policy Considerations
Breach may additionally be informed by public policy
considerations, which are relevant also to identifying
duty in certain instances, as illustrated in Strauss and
Roudi. Here, just as overriding policy concerns might
persuade a court not to impose a duty, it might also
prompt a judge to forego a finding of breach “out of
concern that the scale of liability will be so large as to
run counter to public policy.”345 In particular, courts
may find reason to limit breach out of concern that
not doing so would create limitless liability for the
defendant. That concern would, however, be less
persuasive where plaintiffs are limited to electric
utility ratepayers.

Id. at 1776-77.
The T.J. Hooper v. N. Barge Corp., 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
Id. at 740.
Id.
Electric utilities in California, for example, have recognized the need to further study the impacts of climate change on their assets and operations.
See supra Part 2.3.1.
E.g., CONSOLIDATED EDISON, supra note 37; N.J. Exec. Order No. 89, supra note 243; Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, supra note 130; N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n,
Order Instituting Proceeding, Case No. 20-M00499 (Oct. 15, 2020), https://perma.cc/7P5A-6FG4; CFTC REPORT, supra note 10, at 14-15, 18, 32, 76.
Vote Solar DEC Testimony, supra note 102, at 53; Vote Solar DEP Testimony, supra note 199, at 56; DEC Settlement Agreement, supra note 202, at 4;
DEP Settlement Agreement, supra note 202, at 4.
Hunter & Salzman, supra note 281, at 1794.
T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d at 740.
Hunter & Salzman, supra note 281, at 1781.
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Box 11: Breach and Specific Conduct
Precision is necessary in defining what constitutes breach. That is, the specific conduct and particularity of breach
alleged matters. In Praetorian, discussed above, the court rejected public policy reasons why no duty should be
imposed and, if there is a duty, why no breach found. 346 The court concluded it was up to the trier of fact to determine whether failing to de-energize lines, even though it had the ability to do so, amounted to a breach of the
electric utility’s duty to exercise reasonable care—whether the electric utility had “acted with the degree of care
which was commensurate with the risk to which it had exposed.”347
A similar degree of specificity would be necessary in informing what constitutes breach in a climate resilience
claim. In theory, various electric utility actions (or failures to act) could support a finding of breach, such as:
• failure to build or raise assets at a level outside the zone of flooding likely to occur given the foreseeable
increased storm surge due to climate change; and
• failure to account for climate change-amplified temperature rise when purchasing infrastructure built to operate at certain temperatures.
Reasonably foreseeable planning practices that can be implemented when the utility conducts a risk assessment
provide accurate projections of what its service territory will look like in a changed climate and the physical
impacts that climate change will have on owned infrastructure. The failure to engage in such practices could thus
serve as a specific conduct that would inform whether the duty of care was breached.

4.4 Causation
Tort law requires that the plaintiff’s harm is linked
through some cause and effect relationship to the
defendant’s negligent conduct. This causation requirement includes two analytic prongs: (1) cause-in-fact
and (2) proximate, or legal, cause. 348

4.4.1 Cause-in-Fact
Cause-in-fact is most often determined through the
“but for” test. This test is met only on the finding that
“the harm would have not occurred but for the defendant’s negligence.”349 The defendant’s negligent conduct must be a necessary cause of the harm; it must be
“at least partially to blame.”350
Climate change claims premised upon a defendant’s
production and sale of fossil fuels have relied upon
careful collection and reflection of scientific evidence
and study. 351 This is particularly true with respect to the

causation element, which first required establishing the
existence of the anthropogenic greenhouse gas effect.
Given that “it is fair to say that global warming may be
the most carefully and fully studied scientific topic in
human history,” this causal connection has been
well-established. 352 This same basis is also necessary to
climate resilience claims, which likewise must premise
any causal chain first upon evidence of increasing climate change. Although such causal linkage in a climate
resilience claim may require specific and particularized
climate impacts to that utility’s service territory, downscaled climate projections, as described in Part 2, make
such information attainable.
From here, however, paths diverge. Tort litigation premised on an entity’s contribution to climate change
generally next considers questions of scale and attribution, linking the defendant’s conduct (e.g., the production and sale of fossil fuels) to a specific set of harms. 353
These inquiries are relevant to the cause-in-fact analysis. Climate resilience claims, however, focus causality

346
347
348
349

Praetorian Ins. Co. v. Long Is. Power Auth., No. 704580/2014, 2019 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2952, *15-20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 10, 2019).
Id. at *20-21 (citations omitted).
David G. Owen, The Five Elements of Negligence, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1671, 1673-74 (2007), https://perma.cc/XZ33-L247.
Id. at 1680. In some instances, cause-in-fact is established using the substantial factor test, although this is generally reserved “for situations where multiple
events combine to cause an injury that would have occurred even if one of them were removed.” Id. at 1681.
350 Id. at 1680.
351 Hunter & Salzman, supra note 281, at 1763-64.
352 Kysar, supra note 298, at 30.
353 Id. at 31; see also Michael Burger, Jessica Wentz & Radley Horton, The Law and Science of Climate Change Attribution, 45 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 57 (2020),
https://perma.cc/M8FH-8EKS.
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on a different chain: the linkage between a defendant’s
failure to reasonably plan for the increasingly severe
and frequent consequences of climate change to owned
infrastructure and harms that result. Take, as an example, outages after Superstorm Sandy in New York City—
Con Ed’s service territory. Assume the outages occurred
because a piece of equipment was in the flood zone
and was rendered inoperable by storm surge. Before
the storm, Con Ed built its assets based on an assumed
12.5-foot storm surge, which was derived from the historical record. 354 This assumed storm surge was incorrect, as historic data did not account for the impacts of
climate change. Had Con Ed engaged in climate resilience planning, it would presumably have identified a
different set of assumptions that were more accurate.
This fact pattern could potentially give rise to an
extreme weather tort claim. A plaintiff might allege, for
example, that the electric utility’s emergency preparations immediately prior to the storm were insufficient.
The fact pattern might additionally give rise to a climate
resilience claim. Here, a climate resilience claim might
focus on the sufficiency of the electric utility’s actions in
incorporating foreseeable climate change impacts to its
longer-term planning, processes, and risk assessments.
It might assert, for example, that but for Con Ed’s decision not to conduct a climate risk assessment and identify reasonably foreseeable consequences of climate
change, like higher storm surges, assets would not have
been placed in flood prone areas. That is, the utility’s
failure to engage in climate resilience planning—is at
least partially to blame for the assets being rendered
inoperable by flooding and the consequent outages,
and thus a “but for” or “necessary” cause of the harm.

4.4.2 Proximate Cause
Proximate cause “addresses . . . the question of whether
in logic, fairness, policy, and practicality, the defendant
ought to be held legally accountable for the plaintiff’s
harm that in some manner is ‘remote’ from the defendant’s breach.”355 Defined as the “reasonably close
connection between a defendant’s wrong and the
plaintiff’s injury,” proximate cause provides limitation
to defendant liability. 356 The concept of foreseeability

is central to determining proximate cause, premised on
the theory that “responsibility for consequences should
be based on the quality of an actor’s choices that led to
the consequences. The moral fiber of such choices is
gauged by the consequences the actor should have
contemplated as plausible eventualities at the time the
choice was made.”357 Proximate cause will not be found
when the “defendant’s negligence appear[s] simply too
attenuated” or “tenuous or ‘remote.’”358
Extreme weather tort cases again are instructive in
considering causation. Similar questions of foreseeability emerge, as the remoteness of the causal chain
is often central to court inquiry. Extreme weather tort
cases are, however, surprisingly sparse and outcomes
are uneven. As a general rule, precedent often collapses both prongs of the causality analysis or centers
only on proximate cause. Analysis generally turns
upon the foreseeability of the plaintiff’s harm in connection to the defendant’s breach of duty. Praetorian
serves as one example. In dismissing defendant’s
motion for summary judgment, the court held that
“the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiffs was clear.
There were ample weather reports of the approach of
Superstorm Sandy and about the great surges that
would occur. The dangers of flood waters coming into
contact with live electric power were well known in
the utility industry.”359
A similar analysis is embedded in National Food Stores,
Inc. v. Union Electric Co.360 There, plaintiff National Food
Stores alleged that electric utility defendant was liable
for the loss of foodstuffs, caused by an electricity outage during a summer heat wave. Although the case was
premised on a duty to serve and defendant’s failure to
provide notice of an impending outage, rather than
duty of care, the causation analysis proceeded similarly,
with the court oriented again to the foreseeability of the
harm. Whether the utility should have been aware of
looming outage was central. In ruling in favor of the
plaintiff, the court contrasted precedent where an outage was “caused by external forces outside the control
of the power company, which were not reasonably foreseeable,” with the case at hand, where the utility “was
well aware of the unprecedented demand upon its facil-
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Van Nostrand, supra note 170, at 101.
Owen, supra note 348, at 1681.
Id. at 1681-82.
Id. at 1671.
Id. at 1684.
Praetorian Ins. Co. v. Long Is. Power Auth., No. 704580/2014, 2019 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2952, at *18 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 10, 2019).
The Praetorian case was ongoing at the time of writing.
360 494 S.W.2d 379 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
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ities.”361 In the latter situation, the utility’s negligence is
a legal cause that is not excused because of the presence of external forces at play.
Applying this precedent to a climate resilience claim,
establishing proximate cause will require a showing
that it was reasonably foreseeable that particular climate impacts would occur in particular areas and that,
unless the electric utility implemented appropriate
resilience measures, those impacts would lead to outages. As discussed in Part 2, downscaled climate projections can be used to identify local climate impacts,
and their likely consequences for electric utility operations assessed through the climate resilience planning
process. 362 Indeed, as the Con Ed Climate Study
demonstrates, electric utilities have the ability to
uncover climate vulnerabilities within their systems and
take appropriate remedial action. To the extent other
electric utilities fail to undertake and periodically
update similar studies, any outages resulting from climate-induced phenomena are arguably not only
caused by climate change—an external event—but also
by the utility’s failure to appropriately prepare for it.
The electric utility’s negligence in failing to conduct climate resilience planning is a proximate cause for which
it can be held liable in tort.

361
362
363
364
365
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4.5 Harm
As stated at the outset of this Part, a climate resilience
claim arises from an electric utility’s failure to adequately prepare for reasonably foreseeable event- and
non-event-based climate impacts to owned assets
and/or operations where that failure results in cognizable harm. While state utility commissions will often
consider climate resilience in the context of future climate impacts, climate resilience claims before a court,
like the majority of tort law claims, will generally center
upon past events. 363
Cognizable harm could include a variety of injuries.
Borrowing from extreme weather case law, harm to
person and property both appear to be cognizable
harms. In Praetorian and National Food, plaintiffs
brought suit on the basis of property loss. 364 Other
cases have been based on physical harm to individuals,
for example, from downed power lines. 365 Harm may
thus include injury to persons and/or property damage
resulting from electricity service outages, for example
where a heat wave forces curtailment of output from a
thermoelectric generating plant, triggering an outage
that results in a blackout at a frozen foods warehouse,
leading to spoilage. Climate resilience claims might
also, however, arise in situations where the harm (e.g.,
personal injury or property damage) is not directly
connected to, or the result of, a service outage. Like in
Arkansas Valley Electric, where litigation resulted from
contact and injury with a downed power line, harm
resulting from the electric utility’s equipment, operation, or asset directly (i.e., rather than a subsequent
forced outage) is a potential additional basis for a climate resilience claim. One example might be where
transmission line sag results in a wildfire, which leads to
loss of life and property damage.

Id.
See CONSOLIDATED EDISON, supra note 37 (employing downscaled modeling).
Note, however, that this should not be read to foreclose potential cases brought on different theories of harm or injury.
Praetorian, No. 704580/2014, 2019 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2952; Nat’l Food Stores, Inc. v. Union Elec. Co., 494 S.W.2d 379 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
See, e.g., Ark. Valley Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Davis, 800 S.W.2d 420 (Ark. 1990) (negligence action against utility for failing to replace a deteriorated pole
which had been downed in a tornado).
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PART 5:

Interplay between State Utility
Commissions and Courts
Parts 3 and 4 above detail two pathways for advancing
climate resilience planning by electric utilities—one
before state utility commissions and the other in state
court. Although these two approaches generally raise
different temporal issues—that is, prospective compared to retrospective action—interplay and overlap
necessarily exists. This Part considers the interaction
between the pathways, with a focus upon how state
utility commission and state court proceedings may
intersect. Specifically, this Part considers how a climate
resilience claim brought against an electric utility implicates the jurisdiction of both state utility commissions
and civil courts, and the law governing each body’s role
in reviewing such a claim.
This Part proceeds in three subparts. First, it addresses
issues of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion to provide
an understanding of where climate resilience claims
likely will be heard in the first instance. Second, it
describes the relevance of state utility commission
findings in “collateral” civil litigation where claims
related to commission proceedings are raised. Third, it
identifies instances where limitation of liability provisions in electric utility tariffs may apply. In each of these
areas, there is variability among states, since each has
its own body of law and judicial doctrines. Original
research was conducted to elucidate these state differences. This Part’s analysis relies upon that work to
identify and analyze variability between states.

5.1 P
 roper Forum: Primary Jurisdiction
and Exhaustion
Climate resilience claims involve factual and legal issues
that may be relevant to both state utility commission
and state court proceedings. Questions of proper forum
necessarily emerge, as it is not immediately clear in all
instances whether the state court or state utility commission should consider climate resilience claims in the
first instance. 366 As a general rule, civil courts most
often serve as the forum for tort law claims against
electric utilities, particularly where only questions of
law exist. 367 Conversely, claims relating to the rates
charged and services provided by electric utilities generally fall within the jurisdiction of the state utility commission. 368 Issues raised in climate resilience claims,
where there is some alleged failure on the part of the
electric utility to fulfil a planning obligation, fall somewhere between these two, creating thorny question of
proper forum. Such a claim might “sound in” tort, as
described in Part 4, but might also implicate issues of
rates and services, like those discussed in Part 3.
Two doctrines are particularly relevant to the proper
forum inquiry: primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of
administrative remedies. While distinct doctrines,
courts often muddle the two or even use them interchangeably. 369 Primary jurisdiction doctrine is a prudential doctrine that courts may invoke where a claim
is originally cognizable by both a trial court and an
administrative agency. 370 When the doctrine is
invoked, a court may abstain from hearing the claim
and refer it to the relevant agency for determination

366 Notably, this question may not be present in other contexts. Electric utilities are closely regulated, resulting in extensive agency jurisdiction, and thus important
considerations of forum exist. This may not be true for other professions and industries, and thus questions of forum will be less relevant in those contexts.
367 E.g., Hamilton v. United Tel. Co. of Kan., Inc., 636 P.2d 202, 204 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981) (cases lacking factual issues, essentially private disputes and those raising
questions that are “inherently judicial, i.e., was there breach of contract? Was there negligence?” belong within the jurisdiction of the courts not the commission);
Schuster v. Nw. Energy Co., 314 P.3d 650, 652 (Mont. 2013) (finding courts have jurisdiction in cases involving the “legal rights and responsibilities” of parties);
see also infra notes 395-398 and accompanying text.
368 E.g., Daily Advertiser v. Trans-La, Div. of Atmos Energy Corp., 612 So. 2d 7, 17 (La. 1993); Sheffler v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 399 Ill. App. 3d 51, 70 (Ill. App. Ct.
2010); Nev. Power Co. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nev., 102 P.3d 578, 584 (Nev. 2004); see also infra note 384.
369 Paula Knippa, Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine and the Circumforaneous Litigant, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1289, 1291-92 (2007).
370 Id. at 1290 (“The development of the primary jurisdiction doctrine is a function of the judiciary’s recognition that the adjudicatory authority of regulatory
agencies will inevitably overlap with the jurisdiction of traditional judicial courts.”); see, e.g., Pacific Lightnet, Inc. v. Time Warner Telecomms., Inc., 318 P.3d 97,
109 (Haw. 2013) (“[P]rimary jurisdiction presumes that the claim at issue is originally cognizable by both the court and the agency.”).
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in the first instance. 371 Exhaustion doctrine, on the
other hand, is a non-discretionary rule requiring a
party to initiate its claims before an administrative
agency. 372 The claim can only be heard by the judi-

ciary through appellate review after the agency has
made a determination. 373 Exhaustion is generally
required where an agency is said to have “exclusive”
jurisdiction over the claim. 374
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Box 12: Fifty State Survey – Description and Methodology
This Part is informed by original research that identified relevant state-level precedent on primary jurisdiction and
exhaustion. The research examined cases involving common law claims against electric and other public utilities.
Specific emphasis was placed on cases involving tort claims brought against electric utilities. In some instances,
we also examined cases involving other common law claims, primarily contract claims, to fill in research gaps
where courts discussed forum for common law claims more generally. Likewise, claims against other types of
utilities, particularly telecommunications and water utilities, were encompassed in the research.
Cases where a tort claim was brought against a utility and premised upon an extreme weather event were of particular note. Again, we believe these cases to be the best analogue for the climate resilience planning considerations that animate this paper. As such, this Part identifies and summarizes, when available, the analysis and
holdings in those cases in particular.

371 Knippa, supra note 369, at 1291-92.
372 United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 532 U.S. 59, 63 (1963) (“‘Exhaustion’ applies where a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an administrative
agency alone . . . .”).
373 Louis L. Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1037, 1037 (1964) (“Exhaustion emerges as a defense to judicial review of an administrative action not
as yet deemed complete.”); Western Pacific R.R., 352 U.S. at 63 (when exhaustion applies, “judicial interference is withheld until the administrative process has
run its course”).
374 See, e.g., Pacific Lightnet, 318 P.3d at 97 (“[T]he court must first determine whether the agency has exclusive original jurisdiction, in which case, the doctrine
of exhaustion would apply.”).
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Application of these doctrines varies significantly
among state jurisdictions. Drawing from a fifty state
survey conducted to inform this paper (see Box 12) we
categorize states based on whether there is/are: (1)
precedent providing direction on forum availability, (2)
precedent providing guidance as to process and evaluation of forum availability, or (3) no rules that emerge
from precedent.
Importantly, the research demonstrates that categorization is fluid, and there is often space for courts to
distinguish a claim to avoid precedent or apply an
exception. This is likely to be particularly true with
respect to climate resilience planning, which is a generally novel concern for courts and utility commissions. Thus, while this subpart categorizes states, the
research should be viewed as illuminating the myriad
ways in which questions regarding forum have been
resolved in the past and could play out in future climate resilience claims.

5.1.1 Direction on Forum Availability
Twenty-two states have precedent that provides some
consistency in whether tort law claims against an electric utility first proceed to a state court or the state
utility commission.

(A) Civil Court
In fourteen states, precedent illustrates a pattern of
allowing tort claims against an electric utility to be
heard in a civil court in the first instance. 375 This is evidenced by either explicit statements that such claims
fall within the province of the courts as a common law
tort, 376 or from a pattern of precedent in which courts
heard such claims. 377
One example is Florida Power & Light v. Velez, wherein
a Florida appellate court was asked to address electricity customer allegations of gross negligence by Florida
Power and Light (“FPL”) in the context of a severe
weather event. 378 Plaintiffs asserted that FPL had failed
to comply with storm-hardening standards imposed by
the state utility commission. 379 The court concluded the
claims could be heard by the trial court, holding that
“the mere fact that such claims may involve questions
of whether FPL failed to meet certain standards established by the [state utility commission] does not divest
the trial court of its jurisdiction, or vest exclusive jurisdiction in the [state utility commission], to resolve such
issues.”380 The court relied on an earlier Florida supreme
court decision that the court had jurisdiction over a
claim against a telephone company for negligently failing to provide efficient telephone service as required by
state utility commission standards. 381 That decision is
widely cited by Florida courts for the proposition that
jurisdiction over tort claims properly lies with the judiciary even when the case concerns technical matters
related to a utility’s regulatory compliance. 382

375 These states include Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Kansas, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota and Vermont.
376 See, e.g., Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Adams, 718 P.2d 508, 513 (Colo. 1986); Hamilton v. United Tel. Co., 636 P.2d 202, 204 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981)
(“[N]o administrative remedy exists for a party where the dispute is essentially private. Where there is no administrative remedy, the litigant may proceed directly
to district court.”); Fernandes v. Attleboro Housing Auth., 20 N.E.3d 229 (Mass. 2014) (court is not ousted of jurisdiction where case presents at least one matter
for judicial determination); State ex rel. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Dist. Court of First Judicial Dist. in and for Lewis and Clark County, 84 P.2d 335, 335 (Mont. 1938)
(concluding the state utility commission was not enacted for the purpose of arbitrating “controversies between utilities and private persons”);
Green Mountain. Power Corp. v. Sprint Commc’ns, 779 A.2d 687 (Vt. 2001).
377 See, e.g., Entergy Miss., Inc. v. Acey, 153 So. 3d 670 (Miss. 2014) (emotional distress claim after suffering burns from touching sagging power line); Williams v.
Entergy Miss., Inc., 19 So. 3d 757 (Miss. 2008) (negligence claim by pedestrian who tripped on guy wire); Redhead v. Entergy Miss., Inc., 828 So. 2d 801 (Miss.
2001) (negligence claim alleging company responsible for fire and damage to tree farm); Mitsubishi Elec. & Elecs. USA, Inc. v. Duke Power Co., 573 S.E.2d 742
(N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (appellate court approvingly discusses trial court’s decision to try the torts claims in the first instance on the merits); Willis v. Duke Power
Co., 229 S.E.2d 191 (N.C. 1976) (wrongful death claim alleging negligence in maintenance of wires); Kirton v. Williams Elec. Coop., 265 N.W.2d 702 (N.D. 1978)
(wrongful death based in negligence and nuisance); Dehn v. Otter Tail Power Co., 251 N.W.2d 404 (N.D. 1977) (claim for personal injuries sustained from contact
with transmission line); Froemke v. Otter Tail Power Co., 276 N.W. 146 (N.D. 1937) (negligence resulting in fire); Del. Elec. Coop. v. Duphily, 703 A.2d 1202, 1204
(Del. 1997) (negligence claim for electrocution); Delmarva Power & Light Co. v. Burrows, 435 A.2d 716, 717 (Del. 1981) (same); Scanlon v. Conn. Light & Power Co.,
782 A.2d 87 (Conn. 2001) (negligent maintenance and installation of equipment causing harm to dairy herd); Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Conn. Light & Power
Co., 2008 WL 2447351 (Conn. Sup. Ct. June 4, 2008) (tort claims, including negligence and products liability, for home fire).
378 Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Velez, 257 So. 3d 1176, 1177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018). This class action law suit is ongoing and currently in the pre-trial discovery stage.
See Miami-Dade County Clerk of the Courts, Civil, Family and Probate Courts Online System, Local Case No. 2017-022854-CA-01,
https://www2.miami-dadeclerk.com/ocs/Search.aspx (last visited Oct. 12, 2020).
379 Id.
380 Id.
381 S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Mobile Am. Corp., 291 So. 2d 199, 201 (Fla. 1974).
382 See Ramos v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 21 So. 3d 91 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (exhaustion not required in suit against utility for gross negligence related to meter
tampering and service cut off); Trawick v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 700 So. 2d 770 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (action for injunction and declaratory relief against
utility for improper tree trimming not within PUC’s jurisdiction); Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Glazer, 671 So. 2d 211 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (courts may hear tort
claims where statutory and regulatory compliance is raised as a defense).
New York courts have also allowed tort claims against utilities to proceed in civil court, including a claim in the context of an extreme weather event.
See Praetorian Ins. Co. v. Long Is. Power Auth., No. 704580/2014, 2019 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2952 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 10, 2019) (claim against utility for failing to
de-energize power lines ahead of Superstorm Sandy proceeds, with court deciding a motion to dismiss, but without reference to forum questions).
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(B) State Utility Commission
Courts in eight states have precedent that indicates
tort law claims are generally heard by the state utility
commission in the first instance. 383 In several of these
states, the courts have reached this conclusion on the
basis that the cases inevitably involve “services” or
“rates” that are subject to state utility commission
oversight, making it the primary adjudicator. 384 Others
have concluded that adjudication of these claims
requires the commission’s expertise in resolving questions of fact. 385 Notably, these courts have reached this
conclusion even in light of state case law holding that
typical common law claims, like tort and contract
claims, can be heard by the trial court initially. 386 Often,
tort claims against utilities in these states will be bifurcated, such that all issues within the jurisdiction of the
state utility commission will be decided in that forum
first and then questions of negligence will be decided
by the judiciary, see infra section 5.2. 387
Illinois is particularly illustrative. The Illinois Commerce
Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over claims
stemming from services and rates of public utilities
under its jurisdiction. 388 The Illinois supreme court
most recently considered this authority in Sheffler v.
Commonwealth Edison Co. and interpreted it broadly.
Plaintiff customers had lost power during a winter
storm, and alleged that electric utility Commonwealth
Edison had negligently failed to provide adequate,
efficient, and reliable electrical service in violation of
its statutory duties. 389 The supreme court affirmed the
lower court’s holding that such claims went to the ser-

vice provided for the rates charged and should be
heard by the commission, not the court. 390 The high
court found the nature of the relief sought “was predicated on allegations that Commonwealth Edison was
not providing adequate service,” which “goes directly
to [Commonwealth Edison’s] service and infrastructure, which is within the Commission’s original jurisdiction.”391 It also explained it was “essential” that the
agency handle matters related to service and rates
that involved technical data and expert opinions. 392
Illinois is therefore an example of a jurisdiction that
has concluded that claims against a utility, even those
that sound in tort, must be heard first by the state
utility commission.

5.1.2 Evaluative Framework for Assessing
Forum Availability
Courts in nineteen states and the District of Columbia
have adopted evaluative frameworks to determine
proper forum for particular tort law claims brought
against an electric utility. 393 Courts in these states have
identified relevant considerations that judges should
weigh in assessing primary jurisdiction. While not all
states use each, five common considerations are: (1)
the relative expertise of each potential adjudicator; (2)
the desire for regulatory uniformity; (3) the potential
for adjudication to interfere with the agency’s role; (4)
whether the claim is of public concern; and (5) the
possible futility of agency adjudication. 394 These considerations are not specific to cases involving electric
utilities. However, given the expansive jurisdiction of
state utility commissions over electric utilities, the con-

383 These states include Alabama, Alaska, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, New Jersey, New Hampshire, and Texas.
384 E.g., Richards v. Baton Rouge Water Co., 142 So. 3d 1027 (La. Ct. App. 2014); Oncor Electric Delivery Co. v. Chapparall Energy, 546 S.W.3d 133 (Tex. 2018).
385 E.g., Alaska Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Chugach Elec. Ass’n, 580 P.2d 687 (Alaska 1978) (overruled on other grounds); Bell Atl. of Md., Inc. v. Intercom Sys. Corp., 782
A.2d 791 (Md. 2001).
386 E.g., Nelson v. Pub. Serv. Co., 402 A.2d 623, 625 (N.H. 1979); City of Graysville v. Glenn, 46 So. 3d 925, 929 (Ala. 2010).
387 See, e.g., Minutella v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light, No. OCN-L-2955-14 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Mar. 30, 2015. Defendants argued the negligence claim raised issues regarding
the “safe, adequate and proper provision” of service, which were issues “within the exclusive authority and expertise of the BPU.” Id. at 17-18. The court agreed.
While the question of negligence was within the “conventional experience and jurisdiction of the courts,” the “issues of safe delivery” of electricity service fell
within the jurisdiction of the BPU, which should be allowed to decide “factual issues as to whether it was appropriate or necessary to suspend the delivery of
electrical service” in the first instance. Id. at 32-33.
388 See, e.g., Adams v. N. Ill. Gas Co., 809 N.E.2d 1248 (Ill. 2004); Vill. of Roselle v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 859 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006); City of Chicago ex rel.
Thrasher v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 513 N.E.2d 460 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). But cf. Sutherland v. Ill. Bell, 627 N.E.2d 145 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (claims that the services
and equipment of phone company were unordered, inadequate or ambiguously billed constituted typical claims for damages and within the province of the
courts).
389 Sheffler v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 923 N.E.2d 1259, 1262, 1262 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010), aff’d, Sheffler v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 955 N.E.2d 1110, 1122 (Ill. 2011).
390 Sheffler, 923 N.E.2d at 1273-77; Sheffler, 955 N.E.2d at 1122. The lower court found that the plaintiffs claim was for “reparations,” as opposed to civil damages,
because “the essence of the claim is that a utility has charged too much for a service.” Sheffler, 923 N.E.2d at 1275. The complaint pertained to rates because it
“concerns claims that ComEd provided inadequate or unreliable electric services.” Id.
391 Sheffler, 955 N.E.2d at 1125.
392 Id. at 1122.
393 These states include Arizona, California, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Notably, Oklahoma, Virginia and Wyoming do not use a multifactor test, but instead the answer
seems to hinge primarily on whether the case involves public or private rights. See infra note 415.
394 As discussed above, CLF’s statutory failure to adapt lawsuit against ExxonMobil has been stayed under federal primary jurisdiction doctrine. See supra note 311.
The district court there considered some similar factors in assessing whether to stay its proceedings to allow EPA an opportunity to review the permit at issue
first. Conservation L. Found. v. ExxonMobil Corp., 448 F. Supp. 3d 7 (D. Mass. 2020). The court relied on the Blackstone factors: “(a) ‘the agency determination
l[ies] at the heart of the task assigned the agency by Congress’; (b) ‘agency expertise [i]s required to unravel intricate, technical facts’; (c) ‘the agency
determination would materially aid the court’; and (d) deference to the agency would ‘serve the interest of national uniformity in regulation.’”
Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. Blackstone Valley Elec. Co., 67 F.3d 981, 992 (1st Cir. 1995)).
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siderations are particularly useful in applying primary
jurisdiction doctrine in such cases.
First, courts often consider the relative expertise of
each potential adjudicator. Where tort law issues “predominate”395 or only issues of statutory interpretation
or legal construction are raised, 396 claims are viewed as
falling within the “conventional jurisdiction”397 of the
judiciary. Courts may presume they have at least as
much expertise in handling these claims, if not more. 398
However, state utility commissions may be better qualified to examine technical questions that arise in claims
against electric utilities and to make conclusions about
compliance with the statutory and regulatory scheme.
399
State utility commission are viewed as having “special competence” 400 and expertise in these areas.401
Second, courts also consider regulatory uniformity.
Where court adjudication could create inconsistency
through ad hoc judicial decisions applying regulations
and resolving similar issues, courts may decide that
claims are best heard in the first instance by the state
utility commission. Likewise, a court might consider
whether judicial adjudication could lead to conflicting
decisions not just between judges, but also between
the courts and the state utility commission.

Third, and relatedly, courts also consider whether adjudication would interfere with the legislative purpose in
creating regulatory agencies. Courts are often reticent
to interfere in areas that have been delegated to agencies and seek to respect the role that the legislatures
intended for agencies to fill.404 The courts, therefore, will
often refer claims where there are relevant regulatory
standards in place,405 where interpretation of technical
terms or tariff provisions is needed,406 or where a claim
involves a “general supervisory or regulatory policy.”407
Fourth, courts consider whether the claim is a matter
of public concern or of a private nature. Where tort
claims against electric utilities implicate “broad public
doctrines” 408 or “widespread acts,” 409 and involve disputes affecting the public410 that are not unique to one
party,411 such claims are best heard by the agency.
However, where claims are purely private disputes412 or
relate to personal injury or property damage not covered by tariffs,413 the court might choose to retain the
case because regulatory schemes are not designed to
address such individual harm. Courts also refer to this
consideration as a division between “individual rights
and public rights.”414 Some courts most heavily rely on
this consideration to the exclusion of others, although
the dividing line between public and private rights
claims remains hazy.415

395 E.g., Campbell v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 586 P.2d 987, 993 (Ariz. 1978) (cited by Qwest Corp. v. Kelly, 59 P.3d 789, 797 (Ariz. 2002)); Nev. Power Co. v.
Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 102 P.3d 578, 587 (Nev. 2004) (cited by Jafbros, Inc. v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., No. 57058, 2012 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 457, at *6
(Nev. Apr. 2, 2012)). Indiana has ruled that if even one issue falls within the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, the whole case falls within its jurisdiction.
Austin Lakes Joint Venture v. Avon Utils., 648 N.E.2d 641, 646 (1995).
396 E.g., MDC Rests., LLC, v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 419 P.3d 148, 153 (Nev. 2018) (refusing to refer a question of constitutional interpretation to the agency);
State ex rel. Norvell v. Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., 510 P.2d 98, 104 (N.M. 1973) (issues of law or statutory interpretation significant).
397 E.g., Campbell, 586 P.2d at 991; State ex rel. Bell Atlantic-West Virginia v. Ranson, 497 S.E.2d 755, 764 (W. Va. 1997). Some states refer to these types of case as
“inherently judicial.” E.g., City of Rochester v. People’s Coop. Power Ass’n, 483 N.W.2d 477, 480 (Minn. 1992).
398 E.g., Campbell, 586 P.2d at 993; District of Columbia v. D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 963 A.2d 1144, 1153 (D.C. 2009); Am. Ass’n of Cruise Passengers v. Cunard Line, 31
F.3d 1184 (D.C. 1994); Benton Falls Assocs. v. Cent. Me. Power Co., 828 A.2d 759, 764 (Me. 2003).
399 E.g., Elkin v. Bell Tel. Co., 420 A.2d 371, 376 (Pa. 1980); MDC Restaurants, 419 P.3d at 153; Norvell., 510 P.2d at 104; State ex rel. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v.
Ashworth, 438 S.E.2d 890, 894 (W. Va. 1993); Brookfield v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 491 N.W.2d 484, 492 (Wis. 1992).
400 E.g., District of Columbia, 963 A.2d at 1153; Austin Lakes, 648 N.E.2d at 647.
401 E.g., Durcon Co. v. Detroit Edison Co., 655 N.W.2d 304, 310 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002); District of Columbia, 963 A.2d 1144.
402 E.g., Elkin, 420 A.2d at 376; City of Taylor v. Detroit Edison Co., 715 N.W.2d 28, 35 (Mich. 2006); Bell Atlantic-West Virginia, 497 S.E.2d 755.
403 E.g., Dreyer v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 142 P.3d 1010, 1022 (Or. 2006); Bell Atlantic-West Virginia, 497 S.E.2d 755.
404 E.g., Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Ct., 826 P.2d 730, 741 (Cal. 1992); Kona Old Hawaiian Trails Grp. v. Lyman, 734 P.2d 161 (Haw. 1987); Matthews v. District of
Columbia, 875 A.2d 650 (D.C. 2005); City of Taylor, 715 N.W.2d 28 (Mich. 2006) (asking whether “court would upset the regulatory scheme of the agency”).
405 Corrigan v. Illuminating Co., 910 N.E.2d 1009, 1011-14 (Ohio 2009); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Ct. (“Covalt”), 920 P.2d 669, 742 (Cal. 1996) (asking
whether the CPUC is actually exercising authority to regulate the matter at issue in assessing a claim belongs before the CPUC); see also Ind. Mich. Power Co. v.
Runge, 717 N.E.2d 216, 225 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
406 E.g., Bell Atlantic-West Virginia, 497 S.E.2d at 764; Levesque v. Cent. Me. Power Co., 2019 Me. Bus. & Consumer LEXIS 9, *10 (Me. Bus. & Cons. Ct. 2019).
407 Wilson v. S. Cal. Edison, 184 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
408 Campbell v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 586 P.2d 987, 991 (Ariz. 1978).
409 D.J. Hopkins, Inc. v. GTE Northwest, Inc., 947 P.2d 1220, 1225 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (“Courts often defer to agency jurisdiction when the allegations involve
widespread acts” rather than “an isolated action or transaction”).
410 Sw. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Artesia Alfalfa Growers’ Ass’n, 353 P.2d 62, 68-69 (N.M. 1960); accord OS Farms, Inc. v. New Mexico Am. Water Co., 218 P.3d 1269 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2009) (“[W]hen there is a clear demarcation between acts concerning rights of private litigants and acts affecting the public interest” the courts have
jurisdiction over the former and the PUC over the latter) (quiet title suit against utility and commission).
411 E.g., D.J. Hopkins, 947 P.2d at 1225 (citing Moore v. Pac. Nw. Bell, 662 P.2d 398, 402 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983), approving of a “distinction between tortious injury
unique to one and unreasonable practices suffered by all”).
412 E.g., Campbell, 586 P.2d at 991; Artesia Alfalfa Growers’, 353 P.2d at 68-69; D.J. Hopkins, 947 P.2d at 1225.
413 E.g., Rinaldo’s Const. Corp. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 559 N.W.2d 647, 654 (Mich. 1997).
414 Artesia Alfalfa Growers’, 353 P.2d at 68 (noting prior case finding the right to not be discriminated against is an individual right, while the public has a right to be
protected against exorbitant rates and explaining that the former is a “legal right” while the latter is a “political right”).
415 For example, Oklahoma courts have emphasized that the state utility commission has jurisdiction over public rights claims, described as those that “arise between
the government and others,” Tenneco Oil Co. v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 687 P.2d 1049 (Okla. 1984), and Wyoming courts have concluded the state utility commission’s
jurisdiction extends to matters “affected with a public interest,” which are services geared “to or for the public.” In re Investigation, 745 P.2d 563 (Wyo. 1987).
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Fifth, courts consider the futility or inadequacy of
agency processes due to a lack of remedy. Often, this
becomes particularly important where a state utility
commission is unable to award monetary damages that
the plaintiff seeks.416 Courts will also emphasize adjudicatory efficiency and acknowledge the burden that an
exhaustion requirement would place on a plaintiff in
assessing whether futility favors court adjudication.417

5.1.3 No Rules Emerge from Precedent
In the remaining nine states, precedent is limited and
uneven on forum availability and evaluative framework.418 In some states, there is insufficient case law
addressing proper forum or involving tort claims
against utilities. In other states, courts have not clearly
distinguished a tort law claim from an adequacy of service claim. In Missouri, there is conflicting case law on
the issue—early decisions provided guidance, but those
cases appear to have been contradicted in later decisions without explanation.419

5.2 State Utility Commission Findings
in “Collateral” Case
Where the state utility commission makes findings and
conclusions in the first instance, plaintiffs might choose
to bring (or reinitiate) “collateral” civil litigation against
an electric utility before the state trial court. This may
occur where the state utility commission was unable to
provide the requested remedy or where the state court
bifurcated the proceeding between regulatory compliance and/or highly technical issues on the one hand
and tort law questions on the other. A few state courts
have provided direction on the effect of state utility
commission proceedings on subsequent civil litigation
against electric utilities. In most cases, the courts have
held that statutory and regulatory compliance findings

416
417
418
419

420
421

422
423
424
425

44

of the state utility commission will not be binding on
questions of law, but the court will take the commission’s factual findings and apply them in making legal
conclusions.420 Some courts have been clear that compliance findings are subject to collateral estoppel,421
while others have allowed for some review.422
This subpart is intended to demonstrate how related
state utility commission and state court proceedings
may interact. As discussed above, there are instances
where some aspects of a case should be decided by the
expert agency, while other matters must be determined
by the competent legal court. We highlight cases from
four states—Florida, Texas, Pennsylvania, and Mass
achusetts—that illustrate different ways courts have
considered the effect of state utility commission determinations and findings on collateral civil litigation.

5.2.1 Florida
In Florida, the state utility commission’s findings, like
those regarding statutory or regulatory compliance, are
not binding on questions of tort liability in collateral civil
litigation. For example, in Southern Bell Telephone &
Telephone Co. v. Mobile America Corp., the plaintiff
alleged its telephone utility failed to comply with its
statutory duty to provide efficient phone service and
sought monetary damages.423 The Florida supreme
court concluded that where a trial court seeks the expertise of the state utility commission regarding statutory
compliance, its findings “are not conclusive but should
be considered together with any other evidence before
the court on the issue of liability, and on the issue of
damages if applicable to that issue.” 424 Decisions should
be made by considering the “total evidence”; state utility commission findings are “much like that of the report
of a referee or special master which the court, or jury,
could act upon as all of the evidence might indicate.” 425

E.g., Moore, 662 P.2d 398; Siewart v. N. States Power Co., 793 N.W.2d 272 (Minn. 2011).
E.g., Elkin v. Bell Tel. Co., 420 A.2d 371, 371 (Pa. 1980); Pacific Lightnet, Inc. v. Time Warner Telecomms., 318 P.3d 97, 109-10 (Haw. 2013).
These states include Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Missouri, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Utah.
While a more recent case established a three-factor test for primary jurisdiction, see Killian v. J & J Installers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 158 (Mo. 1991) (en banc), a much
older case continues to be cited as the seminal primary jurisdiction decision and that three-factor test has been ignored. State ex rel. and to Use of Kan. City
Power & Light Co. v. Buzard, 168 S.W.2d 1044 (Mo. 1943) (en banc), cited by, e.g., Inter-City Beverage Co., Inc. v. Kan. City Power & Light Co., 889 S.W.2d 875
(Mo. Ct. App. 1994). What’s more, a variety of tort suits against utilities have simply proceeded in court without discussion of either case. E.g., Gladden v. Mo.
Pub. Serv. Co., 277 S.W.2d 510 (Mo. 1955) (negligence case proceeding without discussion); Sparks v. Platte-Clay Elec. Coop., 861 S.W.2d 604 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993)
(electrical fire negligence proceeds without discussion). And, some cases have simply said that the PSC cannot abrogate tort law claims for negligence. E.g.,
Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Mo. Gas Energy, 388 S.W.3d 221 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012).
E.g., S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Mobile Am. Corp., 291 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 1974).
E.g., Elkin, 420 A.2d at 376-77. The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies to “preclude[] relitigation of issues actually litigated and necessary to the outcome of
the first action” in a second action where a judgment has been rendered in a prior case. Parkland Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979). Offensive
collateral estoppel “occurs when the plaintiff seeks to foreclose the defendant from litigating an issue the defendant has previously litigated unsuccessfully.” Id. at
326 n.4. Defensive collateral estoppel “occurs when a defendant seeks to prevent a plaintiff from asserting a claim that the plaintiff has previously litigated.” Id.
Oncor Elec. Delivery Co. v. Chapparall Energy, 546 S.W.3d 133 (Tex. 2018).
291 So. 2d at 200.
Id. at 201-02.
Id. at 202.
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5.2.2 Texas
The Texas supreme court recently held that factual
findings made by the state utility commission should
be reviewed under the “substantial evidence” standard—that is, “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 426 In Oncor Electric Delivery Co. v. Chapparall
Energy, the plaintiff brought a breach of contract claim
against the electric utility for failing to adhere to the
service agreement.427 The electric utility contended
that the state utility commission had jurisdiction and
should hear the claim first; the court agreed.428 The
Texas supreme court explained that there was a twostep hybrid process for resolution of common law
claims against utilities for monetary damages.429 First,
because a relevant statutory scheme required an
agency with exclusive jurisdiction to make certain findings before a trial court could adjudicate a claim, the
agency needed to first resolve all issues that fell within
its exclusive jurisdiction.430 Second, those findings
could then be used in a later filed suit before a trial
court to obtain any relief that the agency was unable
to provide.431 Commission findings relied upon in the
later filed suit would be “subject to substantial
evidence review.”432

5.2.3 Pennsylvania
The Pennsylvania supreme court, in Elkin v. Bell
Telephone Co. of Pennsylvania, stated that state utility
commission determinations regarding statutory and
regulatory compliance are “binding upon the court and
the parties” and are “not subject to collateral attack in
the pending court proceeding.”433 There, among other
claims, the plaintiff alleged that the telephone company had negligently failed to provide reasonable service.434 The company contended the state utility

426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435

436
437
438
439
440
441

commission had jurisdiction over the issues, and the
trial court agreed and stayed the case until the commission made determinations on standards of service.435 In affirming the lower court’s decision, the
Pennsylvania supreme court explained that where a
matter is referred by the trial court to the state utility
commission, it cannot allow the commission’s determinations to be challenged in the collateral trial court
case—they are subject to appellate review, but not collateral attack.436 The collateral case, “will not, of course,
be used to relitigate the question of adequacy of service, but only to litigate such questions as were not
resolved through administrative channels.”437 The civil
litigation will be “guided in scope and direction by the
nature and outcome of the agency determination.”438

5.2.4 Massachusetts
The Massachusetts supreme court has opined on
whether a trial court may apply offensive collateral
estoppel to state utility commission factual findings. In
Bellermann v. Fitchburg Gas & Electric Light Co., the
state utility commission sua sponte opened an investigation into a utility’s preparation and response to a
major winter storm to determine whether it had satisfied its public service obligation to provide safe and
reliable service.439 After an investigation and adjudicatory proceedings, the state utility commission concluded that the electric utility had violated its
obligations.440 Electric utility customers subsequently
filed a class action lawsuit alleging gross negligence
and statutory violations and requested the court grant
the commission’s findings issue preclusive effect.441
Unlike the Pennsylvania supreme court in Elkin, which
made a blanket statement on the application of collateral estoppel to state utility commission factual findings, the Massachusetts supreme court in Bellermann
explained that the trial court has broad discretion in

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
546 S.W.3d at 137.
Id. at 138-41.
Id. at 142.
Id.
Id.
Id.
420 A.2d 371, 376-77 (Pa. 1980).
Id. at 373.
Id. Pennsylvania, like Texas, employs a bifurcated jurisdictional procedure in which trial courts may, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, refer aspects of a
claim to the commission where adjudication of the matter involves statutory or regulatory compliance or standards of service that fall within the state utility
commission’s jurisdiction and technical expertise. Id. at 374-75.
Id. at 376-77.
Feingold v. Bell of Pa., 383 A.2d 791, 801 n.4 (Pa. 1977) (Pomeroy, J., dissenting), quoted with approval by Elkin, 420 A.2d at 376 n.7.
Elkin, 420 A.2d at 377.
18 N.E.3d 1050, 1057 (Mass. 2014).
Id. at 1057-58.
Id. at 1054. While the plaintiffs sought to apply issue preclusion, the court uses the term collateral estoppel instead, explaining they are the same concept. Id. at 1065.
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determining whether offensive collateral estoppel
should apply.442 The court emphasized that the central
inquiry is whether the defendant had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate in the first action.443 In concluding that the lower court had not abused its discretion in
finding that the state utility commission’s findings had
preclusive effect, the court highlighted the robust
procedural nature of the commission proceeding at
issue: “The [commission] conducted a five-day adjudicatory hearing at which [Fitchburg Gas & Electric
(“FG & E”)] was represented by competent counsel,
and FG & E had a right to proffer evidence, subpoena
witnesses, cross-examine witnesses under oath,
present oral and written arguments, and appeal an
adverse decision.” 444

5.3 Limitations on Liability
State utility commission-approved tariffs often limit
the liability of electric utilities in a variety of ways.445
Tariff provisions vary significantly in language and
scope, not just by state, but also between utilities operating within the same jurisdiction.446 These limitations
can bind the hands of judges in providing relief to parties injured by electric utilities’ actions (or failure to
act). Limitations on liability have generally been justified as in the public interest on the basis that, when
their liability is defined and limited, electric utilities are
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better able to provide service at reasonable rates.447
Such limitations will be binding on state courts: tariffs
have the force and effect of law.448 Limitation provisions are generally enforced under the filed rate doctrine, which prevents courts from hearing collateral
challenges to approved tariff provisions.449 However,
the courts in a few states have concluded that certain
liability provisions are unenforceable as contrary to
public policy. Further, while these liability provisions
could severely limit judges’ ability to provide relief,
courts have retained flexibility through their ability to
interpret and apply tariff language. In some states,
courts have narrowly construed tariff provisions to
limit their application.450
While there are some differences between states, only
a few courts have refused completely to enforce tariff
limitations on liability.451 In a majority of states, courts
have held that tariff provisions may limit an electric utility’s liability for ordinary negligence that causes economic harm, but may not limit liability for gross
negligence or willful or wanton misconduct causing
economic harm.452 A few have extended this rule to
allow utilities to limit their liability for ordinary negligence that causes personal injury or property damage.453 There are also states that have allowed electric
utilities to limit liability for gross negligence causing
economic harm.454

Id. at 1065, 1066, 1068, 1069.
Id. at 1065.
Id. at 1069.
In some states, statutes and regulations also may limit liability. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-22-203 (electric utility cannot be held liable for damage to cattle
from stray voltage); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 49-47-7 (stray voltage damages limited to those incurred in the year prior to notice to utility). In other states, statutes
or regulations may prevent limitations on liability. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 56-260.1 (prohibiting utility from including provisions limiting liability for personal
injury or property damage related to power lines); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 16, § 218.1 (1973) (prohibiting inclusion of certain limitations of liability in
utility tariffs).
Re Liability of Elec. Power Cos. for Injury or Damages Resulting from Problems in Delivery of Elec. Power, 82 Md. P.S.C. 92 (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Apr. 5, 1991)
(noting lack of uniformity in liability provisions among utilities operating in the state and rejecting proposal to standardize the liability provision).
E.g., W. Union Tel. Co. v. Esteve Bros. & Co., 256 U.S. 566, 569 (1921); Comput. Tool & Eng’g, Inc. v. N. States Power Co., 453 N.W.2d 569, 572 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990);
U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Qwest Corp., 361 P.3d 942, 946 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015), aff’d in relevant part, U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Qwest Corp., 385 P.3d 412 (Ariz. 2016).
E.g., Pacific Lightnet, Inc. v. Time Warner Telecomm., 318 P.3d 97, 110 (Haw. 2013); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. PECO, 54 A.3d 921, 926 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012);
Adams v. N. Ill. Gas. Co., 809 N.E.2d 1248, 1263 (Ill. 2004).
E.g., Teleconnect Co. v. U.S. W. Commc’ns, 508 N.W.2d 644, 648 (Iowa 1993).
See infra notes 470-475 and accompanying text.
Mobile Elec. Serv., Inc. v. FirsTel, Inc., 649 N.W.2d 603, 606 (S.D. 2002) (inclusion of limitations on liability creates contracts of adhesion because customers have
no choice but to accept the tariff terms); Discount Fabric of Racine, Inc. v. Wis. Tel. Co, 345 N.W.2d 417 (Wis. 1984). Michigan courts have conflicting case law,
although Allen v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co. is often relied upon by other jurisdictions as a decision concluding tariff limitations should not be enforced. 171
N.W.2d 689 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969). But see Durcon Co. v. Detroit Edison Co., 655 N.W.2d 304 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) (applying Rinaldo’s Construction Corp. v. Mich.
Bell Tel. Co., 559 N.W.2d 647, 654 (Mich. 1997), concluding that tariff limitations on liability are presumptively valid until challenged before the commission).
Adams v. Northern Illinois Gas Co., is another case often relied upon for the same premise, 809 N.E.2d 1248 (Ill. 2004), however later Illinois case law is clear that
tariff limitations on liability that speak to the issue are controlling. See, e.g., Sheffler v. Commonwealth Edison, 955 N.E.2d 1110 (Ill. 2011).
Most recently, a Connecticut trial court generally questioned whether the state utility commission had any authority to approve limitations on liability provisions,
and specifically questioned the validity of its broad exculpatory clause that could be read to “immunize CL&P from any liability whatsoever.” O’Neill v. Conn. Light
& Power Co., No. HHDCV186089044S, 2020 WL 1889124, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 21, 2020); but see Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. S. Conn. Gas. Co., No. 19-cv-00534,
2020 WL 869862 (D. Conn. Feb. 21, 2020) (enforcing gas company’s limitation on liability for negligence provision).
E.g., Danisco Ingredients USA, Inc. v. Kan. City Power & Lighting Co., 986 P.2d 377, 384-85 (Kan. 1999) (noting that Kansas has followed the “majority rule”);
Bulbman, Inc. v. Nev. Bell, 825 P.2d 588 (Nev. 1992) (affirming lower court’s endorsement of the “majority view”).
E.g., Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Grant, 73 S.W.3d 211 (Tex. 2002) (allowing limitation on liability for personal injury where it is narrowly drawn); Los Angeles Cellular
Tel. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Los Angeles Cnty., 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 894 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (same); Landrum v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 505 So. 2d 552 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1987) (same). But see, e.g., Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Mo. v. Mo. Gas Energy, 388 S.W.3d 221, 230-31 (Mo Ct. App. 2012) (“We find no statute . . . that grants the
Commission the authority to limit a public utility’s negligence liability involving personal injury or property damage.”).
Brown v. United Water Del. Inc., No. 291,2009, 2010 WL 2052373, at *5-7 (Del. Super. Ct. May 20, 2010); Md. Cas. Co. v. NSTAR Elec. Co., 30 N.E.3d 105, 110-15
(Mass. 2015) (allowing limitation on liability owed for economic harm (i.e., special, indirect, or consequential damages) even in face of gross negligence after
concluding in dicta that there were no statutory or public policy bars to a tariff limiting liability for gross negligence); Prof’l Answering Serv., Inc. v. Chesapeake &
Potomac Tel. Co., 565 A.2d 55, 65 (D.C. 1989).
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Beyond broad limitations on ordinary negligence,
electric utilities’ tariffs often limit claims in more specific ways. For example, rather than excluding liability
for negligence entirely, some will place specific caps
on the amount of damages that may be recovered. 455
Others will limit the types of damages that may be
sought (i.e., direct vs. consequential). 456 Sometimes
these provisions will distinguish between types of

customers (i.e., residential versus non-residential). 457
These caveats have been considered by some courts
in assessing the reasonableness of tariff provisions
because the caveats demonstrate that the electric
utility is not seeking to immunize itself from liability
entirely, but instead only in certain reasonable and
narrowly prescribed circumstances. 458 Notably, some
courts have also held that tariff provisions are

Box 13: Tariff Language
The following tariff provisions are illustrative of the examples above. It is notable, however, that these types of
provisions exist in utility tariffs in every state. As the provisions are often given the force and effect of law once
they are approved by the state utility commission, judges will be bound by their limitations in adjudicating tort
claims against utilities, although there is some room for interpretation.
Cap on Damages: PECO Energy Company (Pennsylvania)
12.1 Limitation on Liability for Service Interruptions and Variations: In all other circumstances, the liability of the
Company to customers or other persons for damages, direct or consequential, including damage to computers
and other electronic equipment and appliances, loss of business, or loss of production caused by any interruption, reversal, spike, surge or variation in supply or voltage, transient voltage, or any other failure in the supply of
electricity shall in no event, unless caused by the willful and/or wanton misconduct of the Company, exceed an
amount in liquidated damages equivalent to the greater of $1000 or two times the charge to the customer for
the service affected during the period in which such interruption, reversal, spike, surge or variation in supply or
voltage, transient voltage, or any other failure in the supply of electricity occurs.459
Limitation on Type of Damages: Northern States Power Co. (Minnesota)
1.4 Continuity of Service: The Company will endeavor to provide continuous service but does not guarantee an
uninterrupted or undisturbed supply of electric service. The Company shall not be responsible for any loss or
damage resulting from the interruption or disturbance of service for any cause other than gross negligence of
the Company. The Company shall not be liable for any loss of profits or other consequential damages resulting
from the use of service or any interruption or disturbance of service. 460
Distinguishing Between Customers: NSTAR Electric Co. (Massachusetts)
3. Limitation of Liability: In any event, for non-residential Customers served under general service rates, the
Company shall not be liable in contract, in tort (including negligence and M.G.L.c.93A), strict liability or otherwise for any special, indirect, or consequential damages whatsoever including, but not limited to, loss of profits
or revenue, loss of use of equipment, cost of capital, cost of temporary equipment, overtime, business interruption, spoilage of goods, claims of Customers of the Customer or other economic harm.461

455 E.g., O’Neill, 2020 WL 1889124, at *7 (noting previous cases had approved tariffs where liability was reasonably capped); Woodburn v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 275
N.W.2d 403, 404-05 (Iowa 1979) (approving tariff capping amount recoverable); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. PECO, 54 A.3d 921, 929-30 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012)
(“The second paragraph establishes two scenarios which serve solely to limit the amount of recovery.”); Providence Forge Oil Co. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel.,
1966 WL 88488, at *3 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1966) (upholding limitation in tariff for errors in directory to a certain amount).
456 E.g., Re Liability of Electric Power Cos. for Injury or Damages Resulting from Problems in Delivery of Elec. Power, 82 Md. P.S.C. 92 (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Apr. 5,
1991) (commission noting and approving of tariffs limiting the type of damages that could be recovered for interruptions in services); Maryland Cas. Co., 30
N.E.3d at 109-10 (limiting liability for gross negligence, but only for special, indirect, or consequential damages); Busalacchi v. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., No.
12-CV-298-H-KSC, 2013 WL 12100702, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013) (tariff provision barring special or consequential damages against utility enforced);
ZumBerge v. N. States Power Co., 481 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (assessing limitation on consequential damages from use of service provision).
457 E.g., Maryland Casualty, 30 N.E.3d at 115-16 (limiting liability where claim brought by nonresidential customer).
458 E.g., id.; State Farm Fire, 54 A.3d 921, 929.
459 PECO Energy Co., Electric Service Tariff (effective Sept. 1, 2020), https://perma.cc/J7FP-RCL6.
460 Northern States Power Co., Minnesota Electric Rate Book: General Rules and Regulations (effective Apr. 1, 2010), https://perma.cc/8HQB-KAJG.
461 NSTAR Electric Co., Terms and Conditions – Distribution Service (effective Mar. 1, 2018), https://perma.cc/4NSE-6GHK.
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enforceable against both customers and non-customers, 462 while others have limited application solely
to customers. 463
While tariffs are generally binding and enforced by
state courts, judges retain broad authority to interpret
tariff provisions. The filed rate doctrine does not prevent courts from interpreting their scope and applicability.464 Some courts, viewing tariffs as having the
force and effect of law, will apply the rules of statutory
construction in interpreting ambiguous limitation provisions,465 while others use the rules of contract interpretation instead.466 Many courts have adopted the
rule that exculpatory clauses in tariffs should be strictly
construed against the electric utility and in favor of the
customer.467 Ambiguous provisions in particular leave
room for court interpretation,468 and a common interpretation rule is that limitations of liability for negligence must clearly express that purpose.469
Examples of narrow interpretations abound. A
Washington court interpreted a provision that barred
liability for damages due to causes beyond the utility’s
reasonable control to only protect the electric utility

where the outside cause (in this case, a windstorm) was
the sole cause, but not where there was concurrent
negligence on the utility’s part.470 New York courts
have narrowly construed provisions limiting liability for
interruption of service, finding that they do not limit
liability for harms that result from the negligent supply
of service.471 The Wisconsin supreme court concluded
that stray voltage does not fall under the regular supply of electricity and therefore liability for harm from
stay voltage is not limited by continuity of service limitation provisions.472 Relatedly, a Minnesota court narrowly interpreted a limitation on liability for
consequential damages “resulting from the use of service,” concluding that a customer’s mere use of service
could not be viewed as resulting in the presence of
stray voltage on his farm, which caused his damages.473
There is even a difference among courts about how to
interpret a tariff provision that says the electric utility is
not liable except in cases of “willful default or neglect.”
Some have interpreted this as “willful default or willful
neglect” meaning that it limits liability for negligence;474
others have interpreted it as precluding liability except
for negligence or willful default, which limits liability in
fewer instances.475

462 U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Qwest Corp., 361 P.3d 942, 946 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015) (applying limit to non-customer).
463 Tyus v. Ind. Power & Light, 134 N.E.3d 389, 407 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (concluding commission lacked authority to shield utility from liability for injuries to
noncustomers caused by utility’s negligence); Thrifty-Tel Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that it was not clear that Constitutional
provisions authorizing the commission to set rates for services empowered it to liquidate a utility’s tort damages against third parties); Colich & Sons v. Pacific
Bell, 244 Cal. Rptr. 714 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (finding limitation of liability provisions did not apply in cases involving personal injuries by third parties); Abel Holding
Co. Inc., v. American Dist. Tel. Co. 371 A.2d 111, 113-15 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977) (rejecting argument that tariff limitation was binding on both customers and
third parties).
464 E.g., Pacific Lightnet, Inc. v. Time Warner Telecomms., Inc., 318 P.3d 97, 110 (Haw. 2013) (“It is well-established that ‘the filed-rate doctrine . . . does not preclude
courts from interpreting the provisions of a tariff . . . .’” (quoting Brown v. MCI WorldCom Network Servs. Inc., 277 F.3d 1166, 1171-72 (9th Cir. 2002))).
465 Adams v. N. Ill. Gas. Co., 809 N.E.2d 1248, 1268-73 (Ill. 2004).
466 Estate of Pearson ex rel. Latta v. Interstate Power & Light, 700 N.W.2d 333, 343 (Iowa 2005).
467 Uncle Joe’s Inc. v. L.M. Berry & Co., 156 P.3d 1113 (Alaska 2007); see also Finagin v. Ark. Dev. Fin. Auth., 139 S.W.3d 797, 806 (Ark. 2003).
468 See Tesoro Refining & Mktg. Co. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 146 F. Supp. 3d 1170, 1182-87 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (noting that while exculpatory tariff provisions are clearly
enforceable, because PG&E’s provision was ambiguous, the court could conclude that it did not bar liability in the specific case).
469 Id.
470 Nat’l Union Ins. of Pittsburgh v. Puget Sound Power & Light, 972 P.2d 481 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that utility’s continuity of service provision did not
“absolve it from liability for service interruptions that it could have controlled or mitigated but for its unreasonable or unexplained failure to utilize available
backup equipment in order to reestablish service with a minimum of delay while storm damage to regular equipment is being repaired”).
471 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Long Is. Power Auth., No. 14-CV-0444, 2015 WL 867064, at *3-4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2015); Ahmed v. Consolidated Edison, 59 Misc.3d 323,
326-28 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2018).
472 Schmidt v. N. States Power Co., 742 N.W.2d 294, 315 (Wis. 2007).
473 ZumBerge v. N. States Power Co., 481 N.W.2d 103, 107 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
474 Singer Co. v. Baltimore Gas & Elec., 558 A.2d 419 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989).
475 Lupoli v. N. Utils. Nat. Gas, Inc., No. 991844, 2004 WL 1195308 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2004) (applying N.H. law) (tariff barring lability except for “willful default or
neglect” does not preclude claims for negligence).

48

Climate Risk in the Electricity Sector: Legal Obligations to Advance Climate Resilience Planning by Electric Utilities

PART 6:

Conclusion

Climate resilience planning becomes increasingly
salient as the consequences of climate change become
ever-more pronounced and pervasive. Electric utilities
are not immune to climate change impacts; on the
contrary, as operators of immense place-based infrastructure, they are particularly vulnerable. Already
completed industry efforts make clear that climate
resilience planning, capable of elucidating highly specific analysis and recommendation, is possible. The
emergence of such knowable information necessarily
implicates long-standing obligations already imposed
on electric utilities. This paper explores two legal doctrines, public utility law and tort law structures, which
we argue require electric utilities to engage in climate
resilience planning.
The public utility law and tort law structures examined in this paper impose various obligations on electric utilities. Public utility law obligates electric utilities
to meet, among other things, prudent investment,
safe and adequate service, and reliability standards.
Tort law obligates electric utilities to, among other
things, avoid foreseeable harm when performing acts
that could injure others. Both public utility law and
tort law obligations can only be met if electric utilities
institute effective planning processes. That is, law
requires electric utilities to expend reasonable effort
to uncover and incorporate relevant information into
planning processes.
Science and evidence make clear that the consequences of climate change to electric utility assets is
relevant—even critical—information to planning processes. And climate change impacts on electric utility
infrastructure can be uncovered and incorporated as
relevant information into planning processes with reasonable effort. It is, therefore, reasonable to conclude
that electric utilities are obligated to expend reasonable efforts to uncover and incorporate consequences
of climate change into planning processes.
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